



EIB World Trade Headlines

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Russia has Secretly Spent at Least \$300 Million to Influence Global Politics Since 2014 US Intelligence Assessment Finds

Moscow planned to spend hundreds of millions of dollars more in an attempt to weaken democratic systems and promote groups seen as aligned with Kremlin interests, the review concluded.

<https://www.centralmaine.com/2022/09/13/state-department-says-russia-spent-300-million-to-secretly-influence-world-politics/>

<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-state-department-spokesman-ned-price-holds-news-briefing-5>

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Assistant Secretaries Thea D Rozman Kendler and Matthew S. Axelrod to Travel to Singapore

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod will travel to Singapore from September 12 through September 16.

The Assistant Secretaries will engage in bilateral dialogues with counterparts from countries in Asia and Europe. They will discuss export controls, including emerging technologies, enforcement best practices, and the response to Russia's brutal attack on Ukraine.

In addition, Assistant Secretaries Kendler and Axelrod will participate in several events co-organized by the United States, Singapore, and Japan. Assistant Secretary Kendler and BIS colleagues will speak at the 10th Joint Industry Outreach Seminar on Strategic Trade Management from September 12-13. This event brings together senior government officials from 13 countries, the United Nations and the European Union, exporters, academics, and other stakeholders to share best practices and discuss updates to export control laws and regulations.

Assistant Secretary Kendler will deliver the keynote address at the inaugural Women in Strategic Trade (WiST) Conference on September 14. This event provides an opportunity to collaborate internationally on increased opportunities for women in export controls. She will promote the meaningful participation of women in counterproliferation, consistent with Women, Peace, and Security Strategy goals.

From September 14-16, Assistant Secretaries Kendler and Axelrod will participate in the Southeast Asian Forum on Export Controls, where Assistant Secretary Axelrod will deliver the keynote address on the importance of partnerships and building collective capacity for effective administration and enforcement of export controls.

Finally, the Assistant Secretaries will participate in private sector engagements to better understand the impact of export controls on multinational companies in the region.

Remarks to Traveling Press Before Departing Poland

SECRETARY BLINKEN: (In progress) and in many ways was meaningful because it took place coincident with the beginnings of this counteroffensive that Ukraine is engaged in to liberate the land that has been seized by Russian forces as a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

We had a chance yesterday to hear directly from President Zelenskyy and his team about the state of their efforts in this counteroffensive, and I had an opportunity to share with him and his team additional significant assistance that the United States is providing both in the near term and longer term on the security side - an additional \$2.8 billion. This assistance combined with the extraordinary courage and resilience of Ukrainian forces and the Ukrainian people has been the recipe for success thus far in the Ukrainians pushing the Russians back, and now engaging in this counteroffensive.

I told President Zelenskyy on behalf of President Biden and the American people that we have been with Ukraine. We're with Ukraine today. We will be with Ukraine tomorrow and for however long it takes to deal with Russia's aggression. And I come away, again, very confident in Ukraine's future because the Ukrainians are fighting for their homeland. It's their homeland, not Russia's.

We head now to Brussels. I think I've spent more time in Brussels than in any other city other than Washington, D.C., these past 18 months or so, and there's good reason for that. It's home to the NATO Alliance, the European Union. Allies and partners come together in Brussels to work together on the major challenges of our time; Ukraine now being at the top of the list.

So, I'll have an opportunity in Brussels to debrief NATO Allies, other partners, on what I learned in Ukraine and to work with them on a number of issues that are of concern to everyone, starting with the situation in and around Zaporizhzhia, where Russia has seized as part of its aggression a nuclear facility, and that's of real concern to many of us; making sure that food which needs to get out of Ukraine after it's been blocked by Russia - make sure the agreement that was reached continues; support for Ukraine, not just security support but economic support and humanitarian support; thinking about longer-term reconstruction needs - all of this is going to be part of the agenda in Brussels.

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And I think I'll have a chance to reflect a little bit on what I saw yesterday just in terms of the human toll of Russia's aggression - seeing kids at the children's hospital who are victims of that aggression; going to Irpin, a city that was devastated by Russia's aggression. You see just miles from downtown Kyiv these bombed-out buildings, civilian dwellings. The only thing you can say when you see it is, at best - at best, these were indiscriminate attacks on civilian buildings, and at worst, intentional, deliberate, designed to terrorize the population. It's important that we remember this, because all of this comes down to the effect it's having on the lives of real people in Ukraine.

But finally, the most important reason I think we're in Brussels is because what has worked so well for us thus far has been our unity - unity of purpose, unity of action. When it comes to helping Ukraine defend itself, when it comes to making sure that there's significant pressure on Russia to end this aggression, when it comes to making sure our own Alliance is as strong and resolute as it can be to deter any additional Russian aggression, I think you'll see that unity in action, once again. And I'm confident that based on every conversation I've had, every engagement I've had, it's going to continue.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, going into the Brussels visit, how concerned are you that the energy challenges facing European countries, including the high prices and the supply challenges, are going to erode the unity that you just mentioned of the anti-Russia coalition and the support of Europeans for what's happening in Ukraine?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Look, President Biden said from the start that standing up for what's at stake with Russia's aggression against Ukraine was not going to be cost-free. And countries have stepped up. They stepped up because, in the first instance, the aggression on a human level is abhorrent but also because, fundamentally, it's an aggression against the basic principles of the international system that helped us keep the peace, that helped us maintain security, that allowed countries to grow and move forward. And if we allow this to stand, this aggression to stand with impunity, it opens a Pandora's box for a world of conflict, for a world of hurt going forward.

But it comes with costs, but the cost of inaction, of not doing anything, of allowing this to go forward, would be far greater.

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Now, when it comes to energy, we have taken and we're taking significant action to deal with the challenges that exist. The United States has released significant oil from our strategic petroleum reserve. We have redirected liquefied natural gas to Europe to help alleviate some of the challenges that Europe is facing with the reduction in energy coming from Russia. We have a task force with the European Union looking at how we do this effectively not just in the immediate, but for the long term. And of course the fact that Russia has cut off the Nord Stream I pipeline, again, is further evidence that it is so vital strategically for Europe to move away from dependence on Russian energy, because Putin has shown repeatedly that he will use it as a weapon. And it's not going to stop now.

So, the challenge is to get through the coming winter. Europe has taken very significant steps to put itself in a position to do that, and I'll hear more about that later today. And we're doing everything we can to help. But there's also a tremendous opportunity born of necessity. The opportunity is finally, once and for all, to move away from this dependence on Russia - to get rid of the chokehold that Russia has on Europe, using energy as a weapon, and to diversify supply, diversify roots, but also do it in a way that addresses the climate challenge.

This is a real, genuine opportunity. We see decisive action being taken by Europe. And again, from what I've seen and heard so far, I'm confident this is moving in a good direction. Is there going to be a cost to this? Is it going to be challenging? Yes, but I think we're looking at landing in a place where manifestly Europe, the United States, countries around the world will be better off.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Mr. Secretary, on the offensive in the east and south, what would have to happen? You talked with Mr. - President Zelenskyy. What would have to happen? What would they have to achieve with those offensives for it to make sense to go to the negotiating table, and for the West to support negotiations between Ukraine and Russia?

MR PRICE: That is for Ukraine to decide. That's for President Zelenskyy, the democratically elected leader of Ukraine, to decide. They have to decide the terms upon which they would want to engage and pursue diplomacy. President Zelenskyy said very clearly that when this ends, it will end with diplomacy, but it takes two to engage in meaningful diplomacy. And one is not - it's not present and shows no signs of being present, and that's Russia.

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So, unless and until Russia demonstrates that it's serious about engaging in diplomacy, there's not much, alas, to be done. And as to the specific terms, that is up to Ukraine. Their country has been aggressed. Russia has seized territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. It's Ukraine, it's not Russia. And ultimately, territory needs to go back to Ukraine. Ukraine's sovereignty and independence needs to be reaffirmed. I have no doubts with - about that. I think we've already seen that Putin's efforts to erase that sovereignty, to erase that independence, to try to make good on his conviction that Ukraine is not its own country and belongs to Russia - that's already game over. Putin's lost on that, but, meanwhile, doing tremendous damage to Ukraine, to lives, to livelihoods. That has to stop. The exact terms upon which it stops, again, will be up to Ukraine.

MR PRICE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Again, all of this is up to the Ukrainian people through their democratically elected representatives. We are working closely with them to support them and to make sure that if and when there is a negotiation, that they're in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table to conclude it successfully.

Updates Related to Price Cap on Russian Oil

On September 2, 2022, G7 Finance Ministers [issued a statement confirming their joint intention to implement a price cap with respect to Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products](#). As described in the G7 statement, the G7 countries, along with other allies and partners, plan to prohibit the provision of services that enable maritime transportation of such oil and products unless purchased at or below a price level determined by the coalition of countries adhering to and implementing the price cap.

Today, Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen also [issued a separate statement on the price cap policy](#). In addition, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) anticipates publishing preliminary guidance on the implementation of the price cap in September. The preliminary guidance will provide a high-level overview of this mechanism, including how U.S. persons can comply, in advance of formal guidance and legal implementation to be issued at a later date.

For more information on this specific action, [please visit this page](#).

Designating Iranian Proliferators of Shipping Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Technology to Russia for Use in Ukraine

The United States is designating a person involved in the shipment of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia for its war against Ukraine, as well as four other persons involved in Iranian UAV activities, including the production of Shahed-series UAVs and related components for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Russian military is suffering from major supply shortages in Ukraine, in part because of sanctions and export controls, forcing Russia to turn to unreliable countries like Iran for supplies and equipment. The United States will hold those who support Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine to account, including by continuing to sanction Iranian or other entities that provide lethal aid to Russia.

We will also use all available tools, including sanctions, to prevent, deter, and dismantle the procurement networks that supply UAV-related material and technology to Iran, as well as the Iranian entities that engage in such proliferation. We also warn any third country that seeks to purchase these drones from Iran that doing so implicates multiple U.S. sanction authorities.

Today's action is being taken pursuant to weapons of mass destruction proliferation-related Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 as well as Russia-related E.O. 14024.

For more information on today's action, please see the Department of the Treasury's [press release](#).

Arlington VA, United States

9/1/2022

Story by Warren Duffie
Office of Naval Research

By Scott Hochenberg, Office of Naval Research

ARLINGTON, Va.—During the closing presentation of a week-long conference focused on America's best and brightest Ph.D. students, whose research is focused on U.S. national security, Dr. Bindu Nair — director of Basic Research for the Office of the Secretary of Defense — stared at the crowd of hundreds of young people.

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Boldly and without hesitation, Nair reflected on her interactions with the doctoral students at the conference and said, “It is refreshing to see the country in great hands.”

Indeed, the 2022 Department of Defense (DoD) National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) Fellows Conference – hosted in Boston, Massachusetts, July 24-28 – proved the U.S. Department of Defense is on the right course for developing its next generation of scientific researchers.

The NDSEG Fellowship program was established in 1989 by Congress as an approach to increasing the number of U.S. citizens receiving doctoral degrees in science and engineering disciplines of military importance.

The highly competitive fellowship program is sponsored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the Army Research Office and the Office of Naval Research (ONR), under the direction of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Since its inception, NDSEG has awarded nearly 4,400 fellowships from over 65,000 applications to U.S. citizens and nationals. Selected fellows can choose the U.S. institution to attend for pursuit of their doctoral degree.

Some of the benefits of being an NDSEG Fellow include full tuition and fees being covered, a \$38,400 annual stipend and a \$5,000 travel budget for professional development. Additionally, the fellowship provides academic flexibility that enables recipients to pursue the research that truly sparks their passion.

NDSEG Fellow Annie Leal is thankful that ONR selected her: “They have given me the opportunity to step outside the box that I would have been put into during graduate school. By having my own funding come in, I am able to have the freedom to follow an interesting research path and do more interesting and cross-disciplinary research.”

The week-long July conference included speakers from the DoD, a career fair and a poster and technical competition.

Of the approximately 143 current fellows, ONR sponsors about a third of those whose research is focused on enhancing the Navy and Marine Corps. The areas of research are incredibly varied, including climate change, neural networks, lasers, cognitive sciences and much more.

During the conference, the fellows had the chance to network and meet with representatives from ONR, the Naval Research Laboratory, Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific and Naval Air Systems Command to learn more about potential career opportunities after.

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graduation, and how to potentially leverage their future Ph.D.s to support national security.

The conference was a rare opportunity for fellows scattered throughout the U.S. to meet with their government mentors face-to-face and to connect with other fellows from different universities. Since the COVID-19 pandemic forced the cancellation of the previous NDSEG conference, the 2019 and 2020 classes had a joint conference.

Dr. Jason Stack, ONR director for Ocean, Atmosphere and Space Division, gave a keynote address at the NDSEG Conference.

Stack spoke about how to develop and map out a career. He said he loved his career path after completing his Ph.D. because working at ONR gives him the opportunity to collaborate with the smartest people in the country and be on the receiving end of many innovative proposals.

Stack said there are three items every fellow needs to consider about their career decisions:

- What are your personal core values? Stack said his personal core values are learning something every day and leaving the world better off.
- What is the contribution you want to make in your career? Stack encouraged the fellows to think about their goals and then create a plan on how to achieve them.
- Know one, plan three. Stack said it is important to think about the next step in one’s career. Also, think a few steps ahead and have a big goal in mind. Even if that big dream goal is not achieved, setting the course in that direction will help lead a person to their next decision. Do not simply accept a job offer because it might be the best opportunity or highest-paying one at that immediate time. Think more deeply about whether that job will ultimately lead to a satisfying career.

Learn more about the NDSEG Fellowship at <https://ndseg.org/>. More information about the 2022 NDSEG Conference can be found at <https://ndseg.sysplus.com/NDSEG/Conference/>.

Scott Hochenberg is a contractor for ONR Corporate Strategic Communications.

BIS TAKES ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST PJSC LUKOIL FOR VIOLATION OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Today, John Sonderman, Director of the Office of Export Enforcement, at the U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") issued a Charging Letter ([link](#)) against PJSC LUKOIL for violating the Export Control Reform Act. The charging letter alleges PJSC LUKOIL, a Russian multinational oil and gas corporation headquartered in Moscow, Russia, exported a U.S. manufactured aircraft - bearing tail number VP-CLR and manufacturer serial number 34865 - which is owned by PJSC LUKOIL, from Dubai to Russia on March 12, 2022.

In a related action, the Department of Justice announced a seizure warrant for the same aircraft. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas authorized the seizure, finding probable cause that the aircraft was subject to seizure based on violations of federal law ([link](#)). The plane is valued at approximately \$45 million dollars.

"Today's actions to enforce the powerful export restrictions placed on Russia are our latest coordinated measures that let Vladimir Putin and his allies know they are isolated and we are watching," said **Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod**. "The Commerce Department's Office of Export Enforcement continues to vigorously enforce the export laws of the United States and stand with the people of Ukraine against Putin's war of aggression."

"The Department of Commerce has been consistent and aggressive in our enforcement of the export controls placed on Russia after its unprovoked invasion of the Ukraine. Today's enforcement action is the latest example showing the consequences companies and individuals will face if they violate U.S. export controls," said **Office of Export Enforcement ("OEE") Director John Sonderman**. "We are bringing a whole of government effort to go after violators with two coordinated enforcement actions - BIS' Charging Letter and the Department of Justice's seizure warrant."

The Charging Letter alleges Lukoil, a Russian multinational energy company headquartered in Moscow, Russia, effectively owned, controlled, chartered or leased, through a series of shell companies, at least one U.S.-origin aircraft that is subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): a U.S. manufactured 737-7EM aircraft, bearing tail number VP-CLR and manufacturer serial number 34865. The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian's further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict Russia, and its substantial enabler,

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Belarus's access to technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily target the defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.

As part of these controls, on February 24, 2022, BIS imposed a license requirement for the export or reexport to Russia of aircraft subject to the EAR. On March 2, 2022, BIS also removed the availability of the Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) license exception for all aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia, meaning they must have BIS authorization for legal operation. Flight records reflect that after the license requirement was put in place, the Lukoil-owned aircraft was reexported to Russia on one occasion without the requisite BIS authorization.

Specifically, on or about March 12, 2022, the aircraft flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Moscow, Russia with a Lukoil official as a passenger. No reexport license was sought or obtained from BIS prior to the reexport of the aircraft to Russia on or about March 12, 2022. As set forth above, therefore, on or about March 12, 2022, Lukoil engaged in conduct prohibited by and contrary to the EAR, by reexporting a controlled item, specifically a U.S.-origin 737-7EM aircraft, to Russia without the required BIS license.

COORDINATED ACTION

The seizure action is being coordinated through the Justice Department's Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export controls, and economic countermeasures that the United States, along with its foreign allies and partners, has imposed in response to Russia's unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine. Announced by the Attorney General on March 2 and run out of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the task force will continue to leverage all the department's tools and authorities to combat efforts to evade or undermine the collective actions taken by the U.S. government in response to Russian military aggression.

The New York Field Office of the Commerce Department's Office of Export Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Houston Field Office, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations are investigating the seizure matter. The investigation into additional aircraft is ongoing.

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ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND:

Parties that suspect an export control violation has taken place are encouraged to e-mail: EELead@bis.doc.gov or call the Enforcement Hotline at 800-424-2980.

These BIS actions were taken under the authority of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and its implementing regulations, the EAR. BIS controls exports and reexports of dual-use commodities, technology and software for reasons of national security, missile technology, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological non-proliferation, crime control and regional stability. Criminal and administrative sanctions can be imposed for violations of the EAR. For more information, please visit: <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement>

A Charging Letter is merely the means by which administrative enforcement proceedings are initiated pursuant to the EAR, and the respondent is entitled to contest the violations and allegations therein, as part of the adjudicative procedures set forth in Part 766 of the Regulations. Administrative enforcement proceedings under the EAR currently are adjudicated by administrative law judges employed by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Commerce Furthers Work to Identify Emerging Technologies with National Security Implications

WASHINGTON, D.C. - On September 12, 2022 the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM, or notice) seeking public comments on the potential uses of automated synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers). The notice seeks to assess whether such technology could provide the United States or our adversaries with a qualitative military or intelligence advantage, and requests public comments on how to ensure that the scope of any controls that may be imposed on this technology would be effective and minimize the potential impact on legitimate commercial or scientific applications.

"The advance notice of proposed rulemaking reflects the Bureau of Industry and Security's thoughtful, evidence-based approach to our Congressional mandate to identify and implement appropriate controls on technologies essential to our national security," said Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan Estevez. "Accordingly, this notice ensures that BIS will assess automated peptide synthesizers for appropriate controls to address the risk of the proliferation of controlled toxins for biological weapons."

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"We have known how to synthesize peptide bonds for over 100 years, but in recent decades advances in our technologies and methods have made it a faster, easier, and more widely used process," said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler. "While there are many legitimate uses, the advancement in automated synthesizer technologies also make it easier to produce the kinds of toxins we already control due to their national security concerns. We welcome and encourage the public to provide comments on this important proposal."

The text of the ANPRM released on the 12th is available on the Federal Register's website at this link: <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/09/13/2022-19430/request-for-comments-concerning-the-imposition-of-section-1758-technology-export-controls-on>. The rule formally published in the Federal Register on September 13. Comments to this ANPRM are due to BIS by no later than 45 days after the date of publication, which is October 28, 2022.

Additional Background:

Section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish appropriate controls on the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) of emerging and foundational technologies ("Section 1758 technologies") identified by the Secretary pursuant to the process outlined in the law, including through a notice and comment period.

As part of this process, the Secretary must consider the potential end-uses and end-users of Section 1758 technologies, and the countries to which exports from the United States are restricted (e.g., embargoed countries). While the Secretary has discretion to set the level of export controls, at a minimum a license must be required for the export of such technologies to countries subject to a U.S. embargo, including those countries subject to an arms embargo.

Instruments for the automated synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers) have been identified by BIS for evaluation according to the criteria in Section 1758. BIS assesses that, absent the imposition of additional controls on the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) of certain peptide synthesis technology and instrumentation (e.g., automated peptide synthesizers), there would be an increased risk that such technology and instrumentation could be used to produce controlled toxins for biological weapons purposes.

For more information, visit www.bis.doc.gov.

**Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler
Keynote Address
Women in Strategic Trade Conference
Singapore
September 14, 2022**

It is a personal and professional honor for me to deliver the keynote address at the inaugural Women in Strategic Trade Conference. To do so in a region that is so critically important and with the friendly faces of our international partners in attendance brings me even more joy.

I am delighted to join in this gathering of women leaders in national security, international trade, science, technology, and engineering. Events like this are more important than ever.

They not only facilitate the exchange of ideas but also provide a foundation from which we can develop networks and collaborate on how to help each other successfully navigate and address workplace complexities and encourage future generations of strategic trade leaders.

Many of us who work in the strategic trade field are drawn to it because of a deep-seated interest in global security and counterproliferation. We may come from backgrounds in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM), national security, or economics. All of these fields are critically relevant to strategic trade and are historically male-dominated.

In a 2021 report, UNESCO found that women are under-represented in fields such as computing, information technology, engineering, and mathematics. Women make up just 28% of graduates in engineering, 40% in computer sciences, and just 22% of people working in artificial intelligence. Moreover, studies show that in the United States, 40% of women leave STEM jobs within just 5 years of starting.

One source that tracks women leaders in national security reports that over 50% of senior appointments in national security in the President Biden administration are filled by women. This is higher than any previous administration, but we still have a lot of work to do. Deputy Assistant Secretary Ian Saunders tells me that fewer than 15 heads of customs are women. This has to change. Studies show that representation of women in the national security field drops considerably from the STEM statistics. Our challenge is to support women at every step of their career and to change systems that are designed to exclude them.

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President Biden has observed, “When women are engaged fully in building and maintaining peace and security in their countries, we see more sustainable and more equitable outcomes, less conflict, and longer-lasting peace agreements. If we hope to succeed in building peace and prosperity and delivering real progress, women must be engaged at every step.”

That is why we are here as a group today. Our careers are dedicated to maintaining global peace and security, and stability, and we share the hopes that our controls on strategic technologies to malign actors will lead to fewer global conflicts.

Governments should help lead the way. The Biden Administration is committed to breaking down the barriers of gender inequality in many arenas, including in STEM and national security. It has spearheaded this effort by not only ensuring women are represented at all levels of government, but also, implementing, for the first time ever, a national strategy on gender equity and equality.

The United States is taking our efforts internationally as well. Through the U.S. Singapore Women in Tech Partnership Program, Singapore and the United States have committed to support female entrepreneurs. For example, through the program Singaporean mentors will support U.S. female entrepreneurs looking to get exposed to the Singapore tech ecosystem and U.S. mentors will support female Singaporean entrepreneur who want to succeed in the U.S.

To succeed in a digitally-driven future, we must engage the entire spectrum of society’s diversity and talent—especially women—to train and prepare the next generation of leadership and build the strong partnerships that will ensure technological advancement is being channeled to make the world more peaceful and prosperous.

The world is undergoing a fundamental digital transformation that is changing the way we live, work, and think. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning and the Internet of Things are shaping every aspect of modern society, including national security.

Over the course of the next decade, nations around the world will face a unique geopolitical environment framed by great power competition, extreme climate events, and accelerating technological disruption. Wars will be fought on land, in the sea, in cyberspace, and potentially in outer space. Machines may replace human soldiers. And autonomous weapons systems will be leveraged to overwhelm conventional weapons systems. In the face of these emerging threats, the world needs problem solvers like you who can navigate a complex scientific and technological landscape.

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The world also needs more women at the forefront of ethical innovation. The technologies of tomorrow have the potential to move humanity forward to a better and safer world, but alternatively could cause massive societal disruption.

We are already witnessing this on the world stage with dual-use technologies. State-actors leverage technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data to turn entire regions of the world into open-air prisons. They target populations for forced DNA collection and collect genetic information.

Many of these technologies have peaceful and legitimate uses—artificial intelligence can assist with image recognition to gather data on human rights abuses and forensic technology can reconstruct crime scenes and hold perpetrators accountable. However, in the wrong hands, these same technologies are being weaponized. Strategic trade controls are more important than ever in balancing the risk and benefits of dual-use technologies.

With the digital revolution at our doorstep, bringing women to the strategic trade table is more important than ever. There is ample evidence that people with different backgrounds and experiences bring different perspectives to policy conversations. Our diversity enriches our discussion and offers opportunity for progress.

In our field particularly, where national security, STEM, and international trade meet, we must be the leaders committed to building and sustaining inclusive workplaces. Strategic trade leadership must reflect the diversity of society, just as our controls affect all of society. Please join me in a commitment to use our leadership roles to promote these goals.

I look forward to collaborating with all of you over the course of this event and am excited to hear from our extraordinary panelists.

Sanctioning Iranians for Malicious Cyber Acts

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

The United States is sanctioning ten individuals and two entities, all affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for their roles in conducting malicious cyber acts, including ransomware activity. These designations are part of a joint action with the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, USCYBERCOM, the National Security Agency, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

Ransomware incidents have disrupted critical services and businesses globally. Ransomware actors and other cybercriminals target businesses and critical infrastructure and threaten the physical security and economy of the United States and other nations. The United States is taking actions today to combat and deter ransomware threats.

Concurrently with these designations, the Department of State's Rewards for Justice program, which is administered by the Diplomatic Security Service, is highlighting three individuals under its reward offer for information on foreign malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. Under this reward offer, the Department is offering up to \$10 million for information leading to the identification or location of any person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, participates in malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Today's actions demonstrate our commitment to disrupting ransomware infrastructure and actors. The United States will not tolerate malicious cyber activities victimizing the backbone of the U.S. economy and critical infrastructure.

For more information on today's actions, please see the Department of the Treasury's [press release](#) and RFJ [announcement](#).

Request for Comments Concerning the Imposition of Section 1758 Technology Export Controls on Instruments for the Automated Chemical Synthesis of Peptides

This advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) requests feedback from the public and U.S. industry concerning certain instruments for the automated synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers) that have been identified by BIS for evaluation according to the criteria in Section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) pertaining to emerging and foundational technologies. BIS welcomes comments on this ANPRM that would address, but not necessarily be limited to, the current state of the development of these synthesizers, their availability and predominate applications, the availability of custom peptide synthesis services, near-term developments in peptide synthesis technology, the impact that Section 1758 export controls on these synthesizers would have on U.S. technological leadership in this field, and the effectiveness of such controls in limiting the proliferation of this technology abroad. Comments must be received by BIS no later than October 28, 2022.

MISSION STATEMENT:

Given the geopolitical state of affairs with China, Russia, and Crimea, the Occupied territories of UKRAINE, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, embargoed countries and other specific threatening end users and entities, located in the United States and around the globe.

Evolutions in Business and the companies we serve, armed with robust compliance to the Export Administration Regulations, will adhere to best practices to protect our revenue and yours, and ensure the national security interests of the United States.

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