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Commerce Eases Export Controls on Syria

August 28, 2025

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-eases-export-controls-syria

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a rule easing licensing requirements for civilian exports to Syria.

The rule implements the policy on Syria established in Executive Order 14312, "Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions" (June 30, 2025). EO 14312 declared the United States' commitment to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors. EO 14312 called for the removal of sanctions on Syria, and it also issued waivers that allow for the relaxation of export controls on Syria.

As a result of today's rule, U.S.-origin goods, software, and technology that have purely civilian uses (i.e., those classified under BIS's regulations as "EAR99"), as well as consumer communications devices and certain items related to civil aviation, can generally go to Syria without an export license. In addition, today's rule facilitates the approval of licenses for exports to Syria related to telecommunications infrastructure, sanitation, power generation, and civil aviation. All other applications for exports of dual-use items to Syria will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. BIS will continue to restrict exports when the end-users of items are malign actors, including certain Syrian individuals and entities that remain subject to sanctions.

Jeffrey Kessler, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, stated:

"Today's actions follow through on the Trump Administration's promise to allow a new start for the people of Syria as they seek a stable and prosperous future under their new government. At the same time, BIS will remain vigilant to prevent bad actors worldwide from accessing U.S. goods, software, and technology."

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Department of Commerce Adds 407 Product Categories to Steel and Aluminum Tariffs

August 19, 2025

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, the Department of Commerce announced the addition of 407 product categories to the list of "derivative" steel and aluminum products covered by Section 232 sectoral tariffs. As a result, the steel and aluminum content of these products will be subject to a duty rate of 50%.

Today's action covers wind turbines and their parts and components, mobile cranes, bulldozers and other heavy equipment, railcars, furniture, compressors and pumps, and hundreds of other products.

Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler stated:

"Today's action expands the reach of the steel and aluminum tariffs and shuts down avenues for circumvention – supporting the continued revitalization of the American steel and aluminum industries."

This is the latest in a series of historic steps by the Trump Administration to strengthen America's steel and aluminum industry.

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NEWSLETTER NOTES

In February, President Trump issued Proclamations 10895 and 10986, which eliminated numerous carve-outs from the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and cracked down on tariff misclassification and duty evasion schemes. These proclamations also directed Commerce, within 90 days, to establish a process for adding steel and aluminum derivative products to the Section 232 tariffs – which Commerce did in May. In June, President Trump issued Proclamation 10947, which increased the tariff rate for steel and aluminum from 25% to 50%, making the tariffs stronger than ever.

Under Commerce's steel and aluminum product inclusion process, there are three annual windows for the public to submit product inclusion requests. The next window will open in September and will be announced in the Federal Register.

A complete list of the 407 product categories added today to the steel and aluminum tariffs is in the annex to a Federal Register notice, available here.

Additional information regarding Commerce's decisions on each of the product categories is available here.

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Active-Duty Soldier Arrested and Charged with Espionage and Export Violations

August 6, 2025

Taylor Adam Lee, 22, of El Paso, Texas, was arrested today on charges of attempted transmission of national defense information to a foreign adversary and attempted export of controlled technical data without a license.

"According to the criminal complaint, the defendant sought to transmit sensitive national defense information to Russia regarding the operation of the M1A2 Abrams, our Nation's main battle tank," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. "The National Security Division will continue to work with our law enforcement and military partners to ensure that such serious transgressions are met with serious consequences."

"National security has long been one of the highest priorities of the Justice Department, and here in the Western District of Texas, we remain alert for those who wish to help our adversaries and harm the United States," said U.S. Attorney Justin R. Simmons for the Western District of Texas. "Our enemies, both foreign and domestic, should be aware that we diligently investigate and aggressively prosecute these cases. I appreciate the investigative work by our partners in the FBI and the Army Counterintelligence Command, and I look forward to continuing our work with them as we proceed with the prosecution of this important case."

"The FBI's investigation revealed Taylor Lee allegedly attempted to provide classified military information on U.S. tank vulnerabilities to a person he believed to be a Russian intelligence officer in exchange for Russian citizenship," said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division. "Today's arrest is a message to anyone thinking about betraying the U.S. – especially service members who have sworn to protect our homeland. The FBI and our partners will do everything in our power to protect Americans and safeguard classified information."

"This arrest is an alarming reminder of the serious threat facing our U.S. Army," said Brigadier General Sean F. Stinchon, the commanding general of Army Counterintelligence Command. "Thanks to the hard work of Army Counterintelligence Command Special Agents and our FBI partners, Soldiers who violate their oath and become insider threats will absolutely be caught and brought to justice, and

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we will continue to protect Army personnel and safeguard equipment. If anyone on our Army Team sees suspicious activity, you must report it as soon as possible."

"Lee allegedly violated his duty to protect the United States in favor of providing national defense information to the Russian government," said Assistant Director in Charge Steven J. Jensen of the FBI's Washington Field Office. "The FBI is steadfast in our commitment to protect U.S. national security and bring to justice those who seek to undermine it."

According to court documents, Lee is an active-duty service member in the U.S. Army stationed at Fort Bliss, and holds a Top Secret (TS) / Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) security clearance. From approximately May 2025 through the present, Lee sought to establish his U.S. Army credentials and send U.S. defense information to Russia's Ministry of Defense. In June 2025, Lee allegedly transmitted export-controlled technical information on the M1A2 Abrams Tank online and offered assistance to the Russian Federation, stating, "the USA is not happy with me for trying to expose their weaknesses," and added, "At this point I'd even volunteer to assist the Russian federation when I'm there in any way."

In July, at an in-person meeting between Lee and who he believed to be a representative of the Russian government, Lee allegedly passed an SD card to the individual. Lee proceeded to provide a detailed overview of the documents and information contained on the SD card, including documents and information on the M1A2 Abrams, another armored fighting vehicle used by the U.S. military, and combat operations. Several of these documents contained controlled technical data that Lee did not have the authorization to provide. Other documents on the SD card were marked as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), and featured banner warnings and dissemination controls. Throughout the meeting, Lee stated that the information on the SD card was sensitive and likely classified.

During and after the July meeting, Lee discussed obtaining and providing to the Russian government a specific piece of hardware inside the M1A2 Abrams tank. On July 31, 2025, Lee delivered what appeared to be the hardware to a storage unit in El Paso, Texas. After doing so, Lee sent a message to the individual he believed to be a representative of the Russian government stating, "Mission accomplished."

The FBI Washington and El Paso Field Offices are investigating the case, with valuable assistance from the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Command.

Trial Attorney Menno Goedman of the National Security Division's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nathan Brown and Mallory Rasmussen for the Western District of Texas and are prosecuting the case.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

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U.S. Department of State Debars Seventeen Persons for Violating or Conspiring to Violate the Arms Export Control Act

August 19, 2025

On August 19, 2025, the U.S. Department of State published in the *Federal Register* a notice of 17 persons statutorily debarred for having been convicted of violating, or conspiring to violate, the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751, *et seq.*). This action, pursuant to section 127.7(b) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120-130), highlights the Department's responsibility to protect the integrity of U.S. defense trade.

This notice is provided for purposes of making the public aware that these statutorily debarred persons are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in activities regulated by the ITAR. This includes any brokering activities and any export from or temporary import into the United States of defense articles, related technical data, or defense services in any situation covered by the ITAR.

The Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, working in collaboration with the Department of Justice, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, identified the persons subject to statutory debarment based on their criminal conviction by a court of the United States.

Under the terms of the statutory debarment, these individuals and entities are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in any activities that are subject to the ITAR. Each individual and entity on this list will remain debarred until the Department approves an application request for reinstatement. All persons engaged in activities subject to the ITAR should be vigilant in their compliance with all export control regulations and ensure that their activities do not involve debarred persons.

The notice of statutory debarment listing the names of the debarred individuals and entities was published in the Federal Register. A full list of all persons subject to statutory debarment is available on the website of the PM Bureau's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) at Statutory Debarment List.

For additional information, please contact the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security's Outreach at **t_outreach_pm@state.gov**.

SUMMARY:

Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has imposed statutory debarment under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on persons convicted of violating, or conspiracy to violate, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

DATES:

Debarment imposed as of August 19, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jae E. Shin, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State: *shinje@state.gov*, (202) 632-2107.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Section 38(g)(4) of the AECA, 22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(4), restricts the Department of State from issuing licenses for the export of defense articles or defense services where the applicant, or any party to the export, has been convicted of violating the AECA or certain other statutes, enumerated in section 38(g)(1) of the AECA, subject to a narrowly defined statutory exception. This provision establishes a presumption of denial for licenses or other approvals involving such persons. The Department refers to this restriction as a limitation on "export privileges" and implements this presumption of denial through section 127.11 of the ITAR.

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In addition, section 127.7(b) of the ITAR provides for "statutory debarment" of any person who has been convicted of violating or conspiring to violate the AECA. Under this policy, persons subject to statutory debarment are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in any activities that are regulated by the ITAR. Statutory debarment is based solely upon conviction in a criminal proceeding, conducted by a United States court, and as such the administrative debarment procedures outlined in part 128 of the ITAR are not applicable.

It is the policy of the Department of State that statutory debarment as described in section 127.7(b) of the ITAR lasts for a three-year period following the date of conviction and to prohibit that person from participating directly or indirectly in any activities that are regulated by the ITAR. Reinstatement from the policy of statutory debarment is not automatic, and in all cases the debarred person must submit a request to the Department of State and be approved for reinstatement from statutory debarment before engaging in any activities subject to the ITAR.

Department of State policy permits debarred persons to apply to the Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, for reinstatement beginning one year after the date of the statutory debarment. In response to a request for reinstatement from statutory debarment, the Department may determine either to rescind only the statutory debarment pursuant to section 127.7(b), or to both rescind the statutory debarment pursuant to section 127.7(b) of the ITAR and reinstate export privileges as described in section 127.11 of the ITAR. See 84 FR 7,411 (March 4, 2019) for discussion of the Department's policy regarding actions to both rescind the statutory debarment and reinstate export privileges. The reinstatement of export privileges can be made only after the statutory requirements of section 38(g)(4) of the AECA have been satisfied.

Certain exceptions, known as transaction exceptions, may be made to this debarment determination on a case-by-case basis. However, such an exception may be granted only after a full review of all circumstances, paying particular attention to the following factors: whether an exception is warranted by overriding U.S. foreign policy or national security interests; whether an exception would further law enforcement concerns that are consistent with the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States; or whether other compelling circumstances exist that are consistent with the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States, and that do not conflict with law enforcement concerns. Even if exceptions are granted, the debarment continues until subsequent reinstatement from statutory debarment.

Pursuant to section 38(g)(4) of the AECA and section 127.7(b) and (c)(1) of the ITAR, the following persons, having been convicted in a U.S. District Court, are denied export privileges and are statutorily debarred as of the date of this notice (Name; Date of Judgment; Judicial District; Case No.; Month/Year of Birth):

Aldalawi, Rawnd Khaleel; January 11, 2019; Western District of Washington; 2:18-cr-00025; April 1988.

Chan, Lionel; June 1, 2021; District of Massachusetts; 1:19-cr-10064; August 1983.

Cox, Michael; May 27, 2021; Western District of Pennsylvania; 2:18-cr-00050; May 1975.

(*Continued on the Following Page)

Duroseau, Jacques Yves Sebastien; March 2, 2021; Eastern District of North Carolina; 4:20-cr-3; May 1986.
Garza-Solis, Jacobo Javier; November 4, 2020; Southern District of Texas; 7:17-cr-00360; December 1996.
Issa, Jean Youssef; December 20, 2023; Northern District of Ohio; 1:16-cr-00102; June 1974.
Koyshman, Josef; February 7, 2020; District of Columbia; 1:19-cr-00267; June 1967.
Kuznetsov, Vladimir; May 1, 2024; Eastern District of New York; 1:21-cr-00099; October 1961.
Man, Cho Yan Nathan; a.k.a Nathan Man; May 19, 2020; District of Columbia; 1:19-cr-00218; December 1985.
Palomares, Jr., Rafael; May 13, 2021; District of Arizona; 2:19-cr-00089; July 1989.
Radzi, Muhammad Mohd; June 1, 2021; District of Massachusetts; 1:19-cr-10064; June 1993.
Rhoomes, Jermaine Craig; a.k.a. Rhoomas, Jermain; a.k.a. Rhoomas, Jermaine Craig; a.k.a. Rhooms, Jermaine; a.k.a. Hall, Craig; a.k.a. Hall, Kreig; a.k.a. Cow; February 5, 2020; Middle District of Florida; 8:19-cr-00078; April 1973.
Rincon-Avilez, Gardenia Marlene; December 16, 2024; District of Arizona; 4:18-cr-01141; July 1986.
Schultz, Korbein; April 28, 2025; Middle District of Tennessee; 3:24-cr-00056; May 1999.
Senbol, Yuksel; October 31, 2024; Middle District of Florida, 8:23-cr-00384; May 1987.
Shifrin, Elena; a.k.a Belov, Alexander; a.k.a Ivanov, Lena; a.k.a Gohkman, Elena; a.k.a. Elena Leonidovna Shifrin; July 23, 2024; Central District of California; 2:21-cr-00259; February 1962.
Stashchyshyn, Michael; July 20, 2021; Western District of Pennsylvania; 2:18-cr-00050; July 1962.

At the end of the three-year period following the date of this notice, the above-named persons remain debarred unless a request for reinstatement from statutory debarment is approved by the Department of State.

Pursuant to section 120.1(c) of the ITAR, debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in activities regulated under the ITAR. Also, under section 127.1(d) of the ITAR, any person who has knowledge that another person is ineligible pursuant to section 120.1(c)(2) of the ITAR may not, without disclosure to and written approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, participate, directly or indirectly, in any ITAR-controlled transaction where such ineligible person may obtain benefit therefrom or have a direct or indirect interest therein.

This notice is provided for purposes of making the public aware that the persons listed above are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in activities regulated by the ITAR, including any brokering activities and any export from or temporary import into the United States of defense articles, technical data, or defense services in all situations covered by the ITAR. Specific case information may be obtained from the Office of the Clerk for the U.S. District Courts mentioned above and by citing the court case number where provided.

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New Jersey Resident Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison for Role in Global Export Control and Sanctions Evasion Scheme

August 18, 2025

Defendant Facilitated Russia's Acquisition of Millions of Dollars' Worth of U.S.-Made Dual-Use Electronics, as Well as Military-Grade Ammunition

BROOKLYN, NY – Earlier today, in federal court in Brooklyn, dual U.S. and Russian national Vadim Yermolenko was sentenced by United States District Judge Hector Gonzalez to 30 months in prison for his role in an illicit procurement and money laundering network that sought to acquire ammunition and sensitive dual-use electronics for Russian military and intelligence services. In addition to the term of imprisonment, Judge Gonzalez ordered Yermolenko to pay a forfeiture money judgment of $75,547.00. Yermolenko pleaded guilty in November 2024 to conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act, bank fraud conspiracy, and conspiracy to defraud the United States.

Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, John A. Eisenberg, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, and Christopher G. Raia, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office; Jonathan Carson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, New York Field Office (OEE), and Harry T. Chavis, Jr., Special Agent-in-Charge, Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, New York (IRS-CI New York) announced the sentence.

"The defendant lied to banks, facilitated the illegal export of ammunition and sensitive technology, and evaded income taxes, all as part of a global procurement and money laundering network operated on behalf of the Russian government," stated United States Attorney Nocella. "Today's sentence should send a message to all who would consider abusing the financial system to commit crimes on behalf of foreign nations: This Office will find you, prosecute you, and, if you are convicted, seek a significant prison sentence."

"Vadim Yermolenko violated several US laws while endeavoring to help the government of Russia acquire dual-use technology and weapons to bolster its military. Today's sentencing should signal to all those attempting to evade US sanctions that the US government will work tirelessly to prevent American manufactured goods from being illegally procured and used to advance the militaries of adversarial foreign governments. The FBI will continue to be unrelenting in our efforts to defend the homeland, identity those responsible, and bring them to justice," stated FBI Assistant Director in Charge Raia.

"Through a sophisticated network of shell companies and bank accounts, Yermolenko laundered more than $12 million and purchased highly sensitive military equipment for Russia—aiding Russia's military and intelligence agencies in violation of U.S. laws. Yermolenko's greed and misplaced foreign allegiance created a potential threat to our national security, and law enforcement's collaboration on this case ensures that our communities are safe from this potential vulnerability," stated IRS-CI New York Special Agent in Charge Chavis.

Mr. Nocella expressed his appreciation to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs, and the Estonian authorities for their valuable assistance.

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As alleged in court documents, the defendant was affiliated with Serniya Engineering (Serniya) and Sertal LLC (Sertal), two Moscow-based procurement companies. Serniya and Sertal operated a vast network of shell companies and bank accounts throughout the world, including in the United States, that were used in furtherance of the scheme to conceal the involvement of the Russian government and the true Russian end users of U.S.-origin equipment.

The defendant and his co-conspirators unlawfully purchased and exported highly sensitive, export controlled electronic components, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing, and other military applications. Serniya, Sertal, and several individuals and companies involved in the scheme were designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in February 2022.

To carry out the scheme, Yermolenko helped set up numerous shell companies and bank accounts in the U.S. to illicitly move money and export-controlled goods. During the period charged in the indictment, more than $12 million passed through accounts owned or controlled by the defendant, which he failed to report to the IRS. These funds were used in part to purchase sensitive equipment used in radar, surveillance, and military research and development. In one instance, money from one of the defendant's accounts was used to purchase export-controlled sniper bullets, which were intercepted in Estonia before they could be smuggled into Russia.

Co-defendant Nikolaos Bogonikolos previously pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act and was sentenced to 15 months' incarceration. Co-defendant Alexey Brayman previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and is awaiting sentence.

The government's case is being handled by the Office's National Security and Cybercrime Section. Assistant United States Attorneys Andrew D. Reich and Matthew Skurnik are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from Trial Attorney Derek Shugert of the National Security Division's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section. Former Assistant United States Attorney Artie McConnell, former Litigation Analysts Emma Tavangari and Mary Clare McMahon, and former National Security Division Trial Attorney Scott A. Claffee contributed to the prosecution.

The Defendant:
Vadim Yermolenko
Age: 43
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey

Other Defendants:
Alexey Ippolitiov
Age: 59
Moscow, Russia

Yevgeniy Grinin
Age: 47
Moscow, Russia

Boris Livshits
Age: 55
St. Petersburg, Russia

Svetlana Skvortsova
Age: 44
Moscow, Russia

(*Continued On The Following Column)

Alexey Brayman
Ag: 38
Merrimack, New Hampshire

Nikolaos Bogonikolos
Age: 62
Athens, Greece

E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 22-CR-409 (S-3) (HG)

Contact
John Marzulli
Denies Taylor
United States Attorney's Office
(718) 254-6323

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Joint Statement on a United States-European Union Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade
The White House
August 21, 2025

The United States and the European Union are pleased to announce that they have agreed on a Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade ("Framework Agreement"). This Framework Agreement represents a concrete demonstration of our commitment to fair, balanced, and mutually beneficial trade and investment. This Framework Agreement will put our trade and investment relationship – one of the largest in the world – on a solid footing and will reinvigorate our economies' reindustrialization. It reflects acknowledgement by the European Union of the concerns of the United States and our joint determination to resolve our trade imbalances and unleash the full potential of our combined economic power. The United States and the European Union intend this Framework Agreement to be a first step in a process that can be further expanded over time to cover additional areas and continue to improve market access and increase their trade and investment relationship.

The key terms include:

1. The European Union intends to eliminate tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and to provide preferential market access for a wide range of U.S. seafood and agricultural goods, including tree nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foods, planting seeds, soybean oil, and pork and bison meat. The European Union will immediately take the necessary steps to extend the Joint Statement of the United States and the European Union on a Tariff Agreement announced on August 21, 2020, with respect to lobster (that expired 31 July 2025), coupled with an expanded product scope to include processed lobster.

2. The United States commits to apply the higher of either the U.S. Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate or a tariff rate of 15 percent, comprised of the MFN tariff and a reciprocal tariff, on originating goods of the European Union. Additionally, effective as of 1 September 2025, the United States commits to apply only the MFN tariff to the following products of the European Union:

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unavailable natural resources (including cork), all aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients and chemical precursors. The United States and the European Union agree to consider other sectors and products that are important for their economies and value chains for inclusion in the list of products for which only the MFN tariffs would apply.

3. The United States intends to promptly ensure that the tariff rate, comprised of the MFN tariff and the tariff imposed pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, applied to originating goods of the European Union subject to Section 232 actions on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber does not exceed 15 percent. When the European Union formally introduces the necessary legislative proposal to enact the tariff reductions set forth in Section 1 of this Framework Agreement, the United States will reduce tariffs on automobiles and automobile parts originating from the European Union subject to Section 232 tariffs as follows: No Section 232 automobile or automobile parts tariffs will apply to covered European Union goods with an MFN tariff of 15 percent or higher; and for covered goods with an MFN rate lower than 15 percent, a combined rate of 15 percent, comprised of the MFN tariff and Section 232 automobile tariffs, will be applied. These tariff reductions are expected to be effective from the first day of the same month in which the European Union's legislative proposal is introduced. The United States expects the European Union's legislative proposals will be consistent with this Framework Agreement and enacted by the necessary legislatures. All modifications to U.S. Section 232 tariffs will be executed in a manner that reinforces and is consistent with U.S. national security interests. With respect to steel, aluminum, and their derivative products, the European Union and the United States intend to consider the possibility to cooperate on ring-fencing their respective domestic markets from overcapacity, while ensuring secure supply chains between each other, including through tariff-rate quota solutions.

4. The United States and the European Union will negotiate rules of origin that ensure that the benefits of the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade accrue predominately to the United States and the European Union.

5. The United States and the European Union commit to cooperate on ensuring secure, reliable, and diversified energy supplies, including by addressing non-tariff barriers that might restrict bilateral energy trade. As part of this effort, the European Union intends to procure U.S. liquified natural gas, oil, and nuclear energy products with an expected offtake valued at $750 billion through 2028. In addition, the European Union intends to purchase at least $40 billion worth of U.S. AI chips for its computing centers. The European Union further plans to work with the United States to adopt and maintain technology security requirements in line with those of the United States. in a concerted effort to avoid technology leakage to destinations of concern. The United States will endeavor to facilitate such exports once such requirements are in place.

6. The United States and the European Union share one of the world's largest economic relationships, supported by mutual investment stocks exceeding $5 trillion, and intend to promote and facilitate mutual investments on both sides of the Atlantic. In this context, European companies are expected to invest an additional $600 billion across strategic sectors in the United States through 2028. This investment reflects the European Union's strong commitment to the transatlantic partnership and its recognition of the United States as the most secure and innovative destination for foreign investment.

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7. The European Union plans to substantially increase procurement of military and defense equipment from the United States, with the support and facilitation of the U.S. government. This commitment reflects a shared strategic priority to deepen transatlantic defense industrial cooperation, strengthen NATO interoperability, and ensure that European allies are equipped with the most advanced and reliable defense technologies available.

8. The United States and the European Union commit to work together to reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers. With respect to automobiles, the United States and the European Union intend to accept and provide mutual recognition to each other's standards. Cooperation on standards plays a crucial role in enhancing the transatlantic marketplace. The European Union and United States commit to enhance opportunities for technical cooperation between EU- and U.S.-domiciled standards development organizations with the objective of identifying and developing standards for the transatlantic marketplace in key sectors of mutual interest. The United States and the European Union commit to facilitate conformity assessments to cover additional industrial sectors.

9. Recognizing the importance of continued engagement to resolve longstanding concerns, the European Union and the United States commit to work together to address non-tariff barriers affecting trade in food and agricultural products, including streamlining requirements for sanitary certificates for pork and dairy products.

10. Recognizing that production of the relevant commodities within the territory of the United States poses negligible risk to global deforestation, the European Union commits to work to address the concerns of U.S. producers and exporters regarding the EU Deforestation Regulation, with a view to avoiding undue impact on U.S.-EU trade.

11. Taking note of the U.S. concerns related to treatment of U.S. small and medium-sized businesses under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the European Commission, in addition to the recently agreed increase of the de minimis exception, commits to work to provide additional flexibilities in the CBAM implementation.

12. The European Union commits to undertake efforts to ensure that the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) do not pose undue restrictions on transatlantic trade. In the context of CSDDD, this includes undertaking efforts to reduce administrative burden on businesses, including small- and medium-sized enterprises, and to propose changes to the requirement for a harmonized civil liability regime for due diligence failures and to climate-transition-related obligations. The European Union commits to work to address U.S. concerns regarding the imposition of CSDDD requirements on companies of non-EU countries with relevant high-quality regulations.

13. The European Union reaffirms that U.S. conformity assessment bodies can be designated as Notified Bodies in accordance with the Sectoral Annex for Telecommunications Equipment to the Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the European Community and the United States (1998) to carry out the tasks in relation to all essential requirements, including cybersecurity, in the Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU. In addition, the United States and the European Union will commit to negotiate a mutual recognition agreement on cybersecurity.

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14. The European Union and the United States commit to strengthen cooperation and action related to the imposition of export restrictions on critical mineral and other similar resources by third countries.
15. The United States and the European Union commit to discuss high-standard commitments related to intellectual property rights protection and enforcement.
16. The European Union and the United States commit to work together to ensure strong protection of internationally recognized labor rights, including with regard to the elimination of forced labor in supply chains.
17. The United States and the European Union commit to address unjustified digital trade barriers. In that respect, The European Union confirms that it will not adopt or maintain network usage fees. The United States and the European Union will not impose customs duties on electronic transmissions. The United States and the European Union intend to continue to support the multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organization and seek the adoption of a permanent multilateral commitment.
18. The European Union intends to consult with the United States and U.S. traders on digitalization of trade procedures and implementation of the legislation currently proposed on EU Customs Reform.
19. The United States and the European Union agree to strengthen economic security alignment to enhance supply chain resilience and innovation by taking complementary actions to address non-market policies of third parties as well as cooperating on inbound and outbound investment reviews and export controls, as well as duty evasion. This includes addressing non-market practices, unfair competition, and lack of reciprocity in public procurement with respect to third countries. The United States and the European Union will cooperate on further implementation measures.

The United States and the European Union, in line with their relevant internal procedures, will promptly document the Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade to implement this Framework Agreement.

Department of Commerce Closes Export Controls Loophole for Foreign-Owned Semiconductor Fabs in China

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) closed a Biden-era loophole that allowed a handful of foreign companies to export semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technology to China license-free. Now these companies will need to obtain licenses to export their technology, putting them on par with their competitors.

The loophole is known as the Validated End-User (VEU) program. In 2023, the Biden Administration expanded the VEU program to allow a select group of foreign semiconductor manufacturers to export most U.S.-origin goods, software, and technology license-free to manufacture semiconductors in China. No U.S.-owned fab has this privilege — and now, following today's decision, no foreign-owned fab will have it either.

Former VEU participants will have 120 days following publication of the rule in the Federal Register to apply for and obtain export licenses. Going forward, BIS intends to grant export license applications to allow former VEU participants to operate their existing fabs in China. However, BIS does not intend to grant licenses to expand capacity or upgrade technology at fabs in China.

MISSION STATEMENT:

Given the geopolitical state of affairs with China, Russia, and Crimea, the Occupied territories of UKRAINE, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, embargoed countries and other specific threatening end users and entities, located in the United States and around the globe;

Evolutions in Business and the companies we serve, armed with robust compliance to the Export Administration Regulations, will adhere to best practices to protect our revenue and yours, and ensure the national security interests of the United States.

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