# EIB World Trade Headlines

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## Department of Commerce Expands Entity List to Cover Affiliates of Listed Entities

September 29, 2025

**WASHINGTON, D.C.** – The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) today issued a new rule that closes a significant loophole in restricted party lists – strengthening the export control regime overall.

Under today's rule, any entity that is at least 50 percent owned by one or more entities on the Entity List or the Military End-User (MEU) List will itself automatically be subject to Entity List/MEU List restrictions. In addition, significant minority ownership by an Entity List/MEU List company is a red flag that triggers additional due diligence requirements for exporters. Previously, the Entity List and MEU List completely excluded all entities that were not specifically named on the Entity List/MEU List – even if there were extensive corporate and financial ties with listed entities.

Jeffrey I. Kessler, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, stated:

"For too long, loopholes have enabled exports that undermine American national security and foreign policy interests. Under this Administration, BIS is closing the loopholes and ensuring that export controls work as intended."

BIS's Entity List and MEU list impose stringent supplemental export license requirements on parties involved in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or whether there is an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to a military end use. While the license review policy for parties on the Entity List or MEU List is generally a presumption of denial, exporters can always apply for a license.

The public is invited to comment on today's rule within 30 days of publication in the Federal Register. The restrictions in the rule will be immediately effective, with some exceptions available up to 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

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## Department of Commerce Rescinds Biden-Era Firearms Rule, Restoring Common Sense to Export Controls on Civilian Firearms

September 29, 2025

**WASHINGTON, D.C.** — Today, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) rescinded an interim final rule (Firearms IFR) issued by the Biden Administration, which imposed onerous export controls on civilian firearms and related ammunition and components. The rescission of the Firearms IFR will allow U.S. firearms manufacturers to compete in overseas markets, creating hundreds of millions of dollars per year in export opportunities.

The now-defunct Biden-era Firearms IFR imposed a range of excessive and burdensome requirements, including:

- A "presumption of denial" for civilian firearms exports to 36 supposedly "high-risk" countries – effectively ceding overseas markets to foreign firearms manufacturers, with no benefit to national security.
- Export license requirements on sporting shotguns and optics to U.S. allies – despite no evidence of any national security risk.

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• Bureaucratic hurdles on firearms export licenses, such as extensive documentation requirements and short validity periods.

Today's rule revokes these requirements and restores the export rules for civilian firearms that existed under the first Trump Administration. Under these rules, exports of most pistols, rifles, and non-long-barrel shotguns will remain subject to a worldwide export license requirement. Long-barrel shotguns and most optics can be exported without a license to U.S. allies and certain partners. License application paperwork requirements for firearms will be streamlined and consistent with normal BIS practice. BIS and interagency partners will continue to screen firearms license applications to reduce the risk of weapons ending up in the hands of wrongdoers.

Jeffrey I. Kessler, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, stated:

"BIS strongly rejects the Biden Administration's war on the Second Amendment and law-abiding firearms users. With today's rule, BIS is restoring common sense to export controls and doing right by America's proud firearms industry, while also continuing to protect national security."

https://media.bis.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Department%20of%20Commerce%20Rescinds%20Biden-Era%20Firearms%20Rule%2C%20Restoring%20Common%20Sense%20to%20Export%20Controls%20on%20Civilian%20Firearms.pdf

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## Terrorist Designations of Iran-Aligned Militia Groups

Fact Sheet

Office of the Spokesperson

https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/terrorist-designations-of-iran-aligned-militia-groups/

September 17, 2025

The United States remains committed to countering Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and disrupting Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs) from conducting attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities.

Today, the Department of State announces the designations of IAMGs Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN)

- The Department of State designated HAN and its Secretary General Akram al-Kabi as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) in 2019. Established in 2013, HAN has openly pledged its loyalties to Iran and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the group is a leading member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), a front group of Iraqi militias that are part of the broader Iran-aligned Axis of Resistance. HAN officials have publicly threatened to attack U.S. military bases and personnel in the region.
- Iran supports HAN both militarily and logistically, and the group had close ties withIran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force's (IRGC-QF) former commander Qasem Soleimani and former Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS)

- The Department of State designated KSS and its Secretary General Hashim Finyan Rahim al-Saraji as SDGTs in 2023. KSS is a member of the IRI and the group's terrorist activity has threatened both U.S. and Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS personnel in Iraq and Syria.

Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (HAAA)

- The Department of State designated HAAA and its Secretary General Haydar Muzhir Ma'lak al-Sa'idi as SDGTs in 2024. HAAA was involved in the IRI's January 2024 drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan that killed three U.S. service members, and the group has publicly threatened to continue attacking U.S. interests in the region.

Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (KIA)

- The Department of State designated KIA as an SDGT in 2025. KIA is affiliated with the IRI, and has, in coordination with other IAMGs, planned attacks targeting U.S. military and diplomatic facilities as well as commercial projects. KIA has also facilitated kinetic operations against U.S. forces in Iraq and its members have trained in Iran and with Hizballah in Lebanon.
- KIA Secretary General Shibl al-Zaydi, designated in 2018 as an SDGT, served as a financial coordinator between the IRGC-QF and armed groups in Iraq, and assisted in facilitating Iraqi investments on behalf of Soleimani.

**IAMGs Previously Designated as FTOs**

Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)

- The Department of State designated KH as an FTO and an SDGT in 2009. The Department designated KH Secretary General Ahmad al-Hamidawi as an SDGT in 2020. Formed in 2006 as an anti-Western Shia group, KH has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. KH has also conducted attacks against Israeli, Iraqi, and Defeat-ISIS Coalition targets in Iraq and threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians. KH has ideological ties to and receives financial and military support from Iran.

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)

- The Department of State designated AAH as an FTO and SDGT in 2020, along with its leader Qays al-Khazali as an SDGT. Formed in 2006, AAH is extensively funded and trained by Iran. AAH has claimed responsibility for thousands of attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces, including an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five American soldiers.
- AAH seeks to promote Iran's political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over Iraq, and expel any remaining Western military forces from the country.

Terrorist designations expose and isolate entities and individuals, denying them access to the U.S. financial system and resources they need to carry out attacks.

All property and property interests of designated individuals or groups that are in the United States or that are in possession or control of a U.S. person are blocked. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from conducting business with sanctioned persons.

Persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with those designated today may expose themselves to sanctions risk. Notably, engaging in certain transactions with them entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to counterterrorism authorities.

*Today's actions are taken pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. FTO designations go into effect upon publication in the Federal Register.*

*Petitioners requesting removal of those designated from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List should refer to the Department of State's Delisting Guidance page.*

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## Man Arrested and Charged with Attempting to Provide Al-Qaida with Weapons

September 24, 2025

A criminal complaint was unsealed today after a Tulsa, Oklahoma, man appeared before a federal judge for attempting to provide 3-D printed weapons to an individual he believed was receiving them on behalf of al-Qaida.

Andrew Scott Hastings, 25, is charged with attempting to provide material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations and illegal possession or transfer of a machinegun.

In June 2024, the FBI learned that Hastings was on a social media app discussing committing acts of violence against U.S. civilians in furtherance of global jihad. Court records indicate that Hastings was enlisted in the U.S. Army National Guard (Guard) and worked as an aircraft powertrain repairer, and held a national security clearance. While employed with the Guard, Hastings traveled outside of the United States and failed to report his travel, as required.

Allegedly, Hastings told others within the social media group that they needed to develop cyberspace skills and to start physical training. During months of discussions, Hastings offered to provide anyone interested more than 500 pages of notes, as well as Army manuals related to tactics and the manufacture of weapons. Hastings claimed that he had previously been detained and interrogated by law enforcement and explained how to avoid law enforcement. Hastings further alleged that he made a firearm, was interested in creating a nuclear weapon, and discussed the advantages of using tunnels to protect armed militants, consistent with news reports about Hamas's use of tunnels in Gaza.

Hastings began communicating with an undercover agent who claimed to have contacts with al-Qaida. They discussed 3-D printed firearms, machinegun conversion devices known as "switches," and drones. Hastings eventually provided the undercover agent with a link to a website where he was offering 3-D printed switches for sale.

Court documents show that Hastings was seen on surveillance footage twice arriving at a postal facility to ship boxes that contained more than 100 3-D printed switches, two 3-D printed lower receivers for a handgun, one handgun slide, and various handgun parts to be supplied to al-Qaida for use in terrorist attacks.

During the pendency of this investigation, on June 6, 2025, Hastings agreed to voluntarily discharge from the Guard.

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg, U.S. Attorney Clinton J. Johnson for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and Assistant Director Donald Holstead of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division made the announcement.

The FBI Oklahoma City – Tulsa Resident Agency Joint Terrorism Task Force,

the Army Counterintelligence Command, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Tulsa Police Department are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nathan E. Michel, Matthew P. Cyran, and Christopher J. Nassar for the Northern District of Oklahoma are prosecuting the case with support from Trial Attorney Elisa Poteat of the National Security Division's Counterterrorism Section.

*A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.*

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## Treasury Targets Financial Network Supporting Iran's Military

September 16, 2025

**WASHINGTON —** Today, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating a pair of Iranian financial facilitators and more than a dozen Hong Kong- and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based individuals and entities for their roles in coordinating funds transfers, including from the sale of Iranian oil, that benefits the IRGC-Qods Force (QF), and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Iranian "shadow banking" networks like these—run by trusted illicit financial facilitators—abuse the international financial system, and evade sanctions by laundering money through overseas front companies and cryptocurrency. The IRGC-QF and MODAFL use these proceeds to support regional terrorist proxy groups and develop advanced weapons systems, including ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which threaten the security of U.S. forces and those of our allies.

"Iranian entities rely on shadow banking networks to evade sanctions and move millions through the international financial system," said **Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley**. "Under President Trump's leadership, we will continue to disrupt these key financial streams that fund Iran's weapons programs and malign activities in the Middle East and beyond."

Today's action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and marks the second round of sanctions targeting Iran's shadow banking infrastructure since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, directing a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran. The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for its support to multiple terrorist organizations, and its parent organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 13, 2017 for its support to the IRGC-QF. MODAFL was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on March 26, 2019 for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of the IRGC-QF. Treasury has acted against multiple shadow banking networks, including on July 9, 2025 when OFAC designated a similar shadow banking network shadow banking network involved in the movement of oil proceeds on behalf of the IRGC-QF, and June 6, 2025, OFAC designated a large network tied to the Iranian Zarginhalam brothers that laundered billions through exchange houses and front companies on behalf of the IRGC-QF and other sanctioned Iranian entities.

**IRGC-QF FINANCIAL FACILITATORS**

Between 2023 and 2025, Iranian nationals **Alireza Derakhshan** and **Arash Estaki Alivand** (Alivand) coordinated to facilitate the purchase of over $100 million worth of cryptocurrency for oil sales for the Iranian government. Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand used a network of front companies in multiple foreign jurisdictions to transfer the cryptocurrency funds.

Alivand has worked as a financial facilitator and oil broker for the Syria-based Al-Qatirji Company, which has served as a primary partner of the IRGC-QF in the sale of Iranian oil. In 2023, Alivand coordinated a payment from **Minato Commercial Brokers**, a front company currently utilized by Alireza Derakhshan, to an Al-Qatirji Company account.

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Alivand was also involved in transactions worth millions of dollars with Tawfiq Muhammad Sa'id al-Law, a Hizballah-associated money changer who provided Hizballah with access to digital wallets in order to receive funds related to IRGC-QF commodity sales, and who conducted cryptocurrency transfers on behalf of the Al-Qatirji Company.

Al-Qatirji Company was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on November 14, 2024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of the IRGC-QF. Tawfiq Muhammad Sa'id al-Law designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on March 26, 2024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hizballah.

Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of the IRGC-QF.

**ALIREZA DERAKHSHAN AND MODAFL**

In 2025, Alireza Derakhshan remained in communication with sanctioned Iranian currency exchanger Ramin Jalalian, who was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on June 25, 2024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, MODAFL. Jalalian, who has remained active since his designation, manages UAE-based **Powell Raw Materials Trading L.L.C** and **Powell International FZE**.

As of mid-2025, Derakhshan is responsible for the day-to-day operations of a group of UAE- and Hong Kong-based front companies that includes UAE-based **Alpa Trading – FZCO**. While Derakhshan is not associated with the companies on paper, Derakhshan manages their accounts and arranges transactions.

**Vahid Derakhshan** and **Leila Karimi** are involved in Alpa Trading - FZCO, UAE-based **Alpa Investment L.L.C**, and Hong Kong-based **Alpa Hong Kong Limited**'s financial activities. Alireza Derakhshan, Vahid Derakhshan, and Leila Karimi are linked to a slate of front companies, including UAE-based **Paul AD Sons Trading FZE**, **Unique Station Trading**, **Minato Investment L.L.C**, **Minato Goods Wholesalers**, **Minato Commercial Brokers**, **Everest Investment L.L.C**, and **Alliance First Trading L.L.C**. Alireza Derakhshan, Vahid Derakhshan, and Leila Karimi use this group of front companies to knowingly facilitate illicit flows of funds including for the purchase of products on behalf of MODAFL and the IRGC, and these companies collectively handle hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in transactions.

Alpa Trading – FZCO is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Ramin Jalalian. Powell Raw Materials Trading L.L.C and Powell International FZE are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ramin Jalalian.

Vahid Derakhshan, Leila Karimi, and Alpa Investment L.L.C are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Alpa Trading – FZCO. Unique Station Trading, Minato Investment L.L.C, Minato Goods Wholesalers, Minato Commercial Brokers, and Alliance First Trading L.L.C are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,

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or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Alpa Trading – FZCO.

Everest Investment L.L.C is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Alireza Derakhshan. Alpa Hong Kong Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Alireza Derakhshan. Paul AD Sons Trading FZE is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.

**SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS**

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

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## Completion of UN Sanctions Snapback on Iran

Press Statement

September 27, 2025

This evening, at 8:00 p.m. EDT, the United Nations reimposed sanctions and other restrictions pursuant to six UN Security Council Resolutions – 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929 – based on Iran's continuing "significant non-performance" of its nuclear commitments. Their reactivation concludes the snapback process initiated on August 28, 2025, in an act of decisive global leadership on the part of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

The provisions enumerated in the restored resolutions address the threats posed by Iran's nuclear, ballistic missile, conventional arms, and destabilizing activities. Notably, they require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment-, heavy water-, and reprocessing-related activities; prohibit Iran from using ballistic missile technology; embargo the export of conventional arms to Iran; reimpose travel bans and global asset freezes on listed individuals and entities; and authorize the seizure of weapons and other prohibited cargo being transferred by Iran to state and non-state actors.

The Security Council's decision on September 19 – reaffirmed on September 26 – to restore these restrictions sends a clear message: the world will not acquiesce to threats and half measures – and Tehran will be held to account.

President Trump has been clear that diplomacy is still an option—a deal remains the best outcome for the Iranian people and the world. For that to happen, Iran must accept direct talks, held in good faith, without stalling or obfuscation. Absent such a deal, it is incumbent on partners to implement snapback sanctions immediately in order to pressure Iran's leaders to do what is right for their nation, and best for the safety of the world.

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## ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF TIMBER, LUMBER, AND THEIR DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS INTO THE UNITED STATES

September 29, 2025

1. On July 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effects of imports of timber, lumber, and their derivative products (collectively, wood products) on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862 (section 232). Based on the facts considered in that investigation, the Secretary found and advised me of his opinion that wood products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States and provided recommendations for action under section 232 to adjust the imports of wood products so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States.

2. The Secretary found that present quantities and circumstances of wood product imports are weakening our economy, resulting in the persistent threats of closures of wood mills and disruptions of wood product supply chains, among other things, and diminishing the utilization of production capacity of our domestic wood industry. Because of the state of the United States wood industry, the United States may be unable to meet demands for wood products that are crucial to the national defense and critical infrastructure. Taking into account the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security and other relevant factors, *see* 19 U.S.C. 1862(d), the Secretary found that the

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present quantities and circumstances of the imports of wood products threaten to impair the national security as defined in section 232.

3. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretary found that wood products serve as essential inputs across multiple sectors, supporting national defense, critical infrastructure, economic stability, and industrial resilience in the United States.

4. The Secretary found that wood products are used in critical functions of the Department of War, including building infrastructure for operational testing, housing and storage for personnel and materiel, transporting munitions, as an ingredient in munitions, and as a component in missile-defense systems and thermal-protection systems for nuclear-reentry vehicles. Further, the Secretary found that wood products support multiple critical infrastructure sectors of the United States, sectors that involve assets, systems, and networks considered so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on the national security, economic welfare, or national public health or safety of the United States. Wood products are particularly important to communications, energy, transportation, defense, and manufacturing, especially in supporting the United States power grid and transportation infrastructure.

5. The Secretary also found that while the United States possesses ample raw materials and industrial capacity to meet domestic wood products demand, wood production in the United States remains underdeveloped. At the same time, imports of wood products continue to rise, signaling foreign dependence and creating vulnerabilities in the domestic industry. Foreign subsidies and unfair trade practices are eroding the competitiveness of the United States wood products industry and disincentivizing investment and modernization. These circumstances have weakened domestic manufacturing capacity for wood products, and have increased reliance on foreign imports, weakening United States industrial resilience and placing national security and economic stability at risk.

6. The Secretary identified that these practices are threatening the United States wood products industry in a way that increases mill closures and weakens domestic capacity and employment across the United States. These closures and the attendant loss of jobs will raise costs and could inhibit the United States from fulfilling its national-security needs and demands for wood products.

7. In light of these findings, the Secretary recommended a range of actions, including actions to adjust the imports of wood products so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States.

8. After considering the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232 (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant factors and information, I concur with the Secretary's finding that wood products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. In my judgment, and in light of the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant factors and information, I also determine that it is necessary and appropriate to adopt a plan of action that imposes tariffs, as described below, to adjust imports of wood products so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States.

9. In my judgment, the actions in this proclamation will, among other things, strengthen supply chains, bolster industrial resilience, create high-quality jobs, and increase domestic capacity utilization for wood products such that the United States can fully satisfy domestic consumption while also creating economic benefits through increased exports.

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These actions will also encourage capital investment and drive innovation across the United States wood products industry, and strengthen the ability of the military and national-defense industry to domestically produce key munitions and defense systems and perform other required critical national-security functions. Modernization and renewed investment will curb further erosion of the United States wood industry and improve its efficiency, resource utilization, and product yield. These actions will adjust the imports of wood products and are necessary and appropriate to address the threat to impair the national security of the United States posed by imports of such articles.

10. To ensure the tariffs on wood products in this proclamation are not circumvented or that the purpose of this action to eliminate the threat to the national security of the United States by imports of wood products is not undermined, I deem it necessary and appropriate to establish processes to identify and impose tariffs on additional wood products, as further described below.

11. To ensure the effectiveness of the actions in this proclamation, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to address undervaluation, as further described below. In my judgment, when there is a threat of undervaluation, it may be appropriate for specific, compound, or mixed tariffs to be imposed.

12. Consistent with the General Terms for the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Economic Prosperity Deal (May 8, 2025), the United States intends to coordinate with the United Kingdom to adopt a structured, negotiated approach to addressing the national security threat in the wood-products industry. Furthermore, pursuant to the terms of the framework agreements I have negotiated with the European Union and Japan, I intend to ensure that the tariff rate that applies to originating wood-products of the European Union and Japan subject to this proclamation shall not exceed 15 percent.

13. Section 232 authorizes the President to take action to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. Section 232 includes the authority to adopt and carry out a plan of action, with adjustments over time, to address the national-security threat. That initial plan of action may include negotiations of agreements with foreign trading partners along with other actions to adjust imports to address the national security threat, including tariffs. If action under section 232 includes the negotiation of an agreement, such as one contemplated in section 232(c)(3)(A)(i), 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A)(i), then section 232 also directs the President to take other actions he deems necessary to adjust imports and eliminate the threat that the imported article poses to national security if such an agreement is not entered into within 180 days of the date of this proclamation or is not being carried out or is ineffective, *see* 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A).

14. The Secretary and the United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative) have advised me that there are ongoing negotiations of agreements with foreign trading partners that at least in part include discussions over wood products. In my judgment, and after considering the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232(d), 19 U.S.C. 1862(d), the additional information provided to me by the Secretary and the Trade Representative, and other relevant factors and information, I have decided to include in my plan of action negotiations, with adjustments to tariffs depending on the status or outcome of such negotiations. I therefore direct the Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary, to pursue negotiation of agreements or continue current negotiations of agreements, such as agreements contemplated in section 232(c)(3)(A)(i), 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A)(i), to address the threatened impairment of the national security with respect to imported wood products.

CONTINUE READING AT:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/adjusting-imports-of-timber-lumber-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states/

***MISSION STATEMENT:***

***Given the geopolitical state of affairs with China, Russia, and Crimea, the Occupied territories of UKRAINE, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, embargoed countries and other specific threatening end users and entities, located in the United States and around the globe;***

***Evolutions in Business and the companies we serve, armed with robust compliance to the Export Administration Regulations, will adhere to best practices to protect our revenue and yours, and ensure the national security interests of the United States.***



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