



# EIB World Trade Headlines

Evolutions In Business • [www.eib.com](http://www.eib.com) • (978) 256-0438  
P.O. Box 4008, Chelmsford, MA 01824

May 1 - Volume 14, Issue 7

CELEBRATING OVER  
**30**  
YEARS

## US Cracks down on Exports to Russia

And while it's good news that most companies have complied with the new controls, we're taking vigorous action against those that don't. That's where my team comes in. We're the enforcement side of the house. We have 130 federal agents stationed in 30 cities nationwide, including Chicago.

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EXPORT ENFORCEMENT MATTHEW S. AXELROD DELIVERS REMARKS TO THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA, ILLINOIS DIVISION, ON ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TO DISRUPT RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE**  
Chicago, Illinois - Thursday, April 21, 2022

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY**  
April 21, 2022 Office of Congressional and Public Affairs  
[www.bis.doc.gov](http://www.bis.doc.gov) [OCPA@bis.doc.gov](mailto:OCPA@bis.doc.gov)

*Remarks as Prepared for Delivery*

I'd like to begin with words from the Ukrainian poet and writer, Taras Shevchenko.

*When I am dead, then bury me  
In my beloved Ukraine,  
My tomb upon a grave mound high  
Amid the spreading plain,  
So that the fields, the boundless steppes,  
The Dnieper's plunging shore  
My eyes could see, my ears could hear  
The mighty river roar.  
When from Ukraine the Dnieper bears  
Into the deep blue sea  
The blood of foes... then will I leave  
These hills and fertile fields —  
I'll leave them all and fly away  
To the abode of God,  
And then I'll pray... But till that day  
I nothing know of God.  
Oh bury me, then rise ye up  
And break your heavy chains  
And water with the tyrants' blood  
The freedom you have gained.  
And in the great new family,  
The family of the free,  
With softly spoken, kindly word  
Remember also me.*

(\*Continued on The Following Page)

## NEWSLETTER NOTES

While these words could have been written just this past week, they're actually from Shevchenko's poem "Zapovit" or "Testament," written in 1845, as later translated by John Weir. Two years after this poem was written, Shevchenko was criminally convicted. His crime? Advocating for Ukrainian independence from the Russian Empire. As the famous American writer, Mark Twain, once purportedly said, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes." Thank you to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Illinois Division, for hosting me here today.

It is an honor to be in Chicago - home to what I believe is the second-largest Ukrainian-American community in the United States - to discuss the United States' response to Russia's brutal and unprovoked war against the people of Ukraine and, in particular, to tell you what those of us who enforce our country's export laws are doing to help degrade the Russian military. I know how deeply personal this is for you and for the Ukrainian-American community as a whole. It's not just another foreign policy issue to be discussed and analyzed. It's a senseless and barbaric attack on your homeland, your relatives, and your friends. I want you to know that, in your grief and your anger, your federal government stands with you.

One year ago, at the Munich Security Forum, President Biden spoke of being at an "inflection point between those who argue that . . . autocracy is the best way forward . . . and those who understand that democracy is essential." Today, a little over a year later, we are tragically witnessing this battle between democracy and autocracy in real time. We are in a global struggle between these two competing worldviews, where autocracies like Russia challenge the rules-based international order to get ahead. In democracies like the United States and Ukraine, we believe in a government where people get to choose their political leaders, where people are free to voice their opinions and practice their chosen religion, where people choose how they earn a living, where capital flows to the best ideas, where laws and rules govern behavior - not just of the populace but of the government as well. We believe that is the best way to govern. But countries like Russia reject those democratic values. Vladimir Putin rejects the freedom and the rule of law embraced by the United States and by Ukraine. He violates the international rules-based order by engaging in this unprovoked and barbaric war against his peaceful neighbor.

His military targets and kills civilians. His troops commit war crimes against innocent Ukrainian men, women, and children. Meanwhile, back in Russia, he uses propaganda and censorship to stymie internal dissent and wage disinformation and mass surveillance campaigns against his own people

The Biden Administration and the Department of Commerce stand with Ukraine, and we are committed to holding Russia accountable. In fact, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is meeting with the Executive Vice President for the European Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, in Washington, D.C. today to further reaffirm our nation's support. To that end, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, where I serve as the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, plays an important role in preventing Russia from obtaining tools of war.

*(\*Continued on The Following Column)*

Our mission is to ensure that bad actors like Russia can't get and use sensitive U.S. goods and technologies for destructive or malicious purposes. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, my Commerce colleague Assistant Secretary Thea Kendler and her team have worked in close coordination with an unprecedented coalition of U.S. allies and partners to impose far reaching export restrictions that limit Russia's ability to obtain the goods and technologies it needs to wage war. This includes both expansive controls on dual-use items - items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes - in the fields of electronics, marine, and aerospace; controls on oil-field refinery equipment; controls on luxury goods like alcohol and cigarettes; and embargoes on U.S. goods and technologies to specific Russian and Belarusian military groups that are helping Putin wage war.

These stringent and sweeping export controls are designed to cut off Russia's access to the tools of war and undermine its strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.

These expansive controls are not just being imposed by the United States, but also by 37 allies and partners around the globe. The European Union, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland have all implemented substantially similar restrictions on Russia and Belarus in close coordination with the United States. This powerful international response will have serious consequences for the Russian military and defense sector. These heightened export controls have had significant impact to date. Since February 24th, when the first new rule came into effect, total U.S. exports to Russia have decreased almost 90 percent compared with the 30 days prior.

We have seen public reporting of Russian defense industries, including tank, space, and unmanned aerial vehicle companies, being unable to obtain the spare parts needed to support warfighting in Ukraine. Chinese telecom company Huawei has suspended all orders in Russia and furloughed part of its staff in the country to avoid U.S. and allied sanctions.

Experts predict that Aeroflot, Russia's leading airline and flag carrier, will soon be unable to sustain even domestic flights due to Boeing and Airbus halting exports of spare parts.

U.S.-based semiconductor companies Intel and AMD have halted all sales to Russia. Microsoft announced that it would suspend sales and support services in Russia in order to maintain compliance with U.S. and international sanctions.

Toyota, Ford, Nissan, Mazda, Volvo, Honda, BMW, and Jaguar Land Rover have also halted or suspended exports to Russia, reflecting the companies' concerns about the possibility of violating U.S. and allied export controls. Heavy equipment manufacturer Caterpillar has halted all production in Russia, and John Deere announced that it would halt all shipments of machinery to Russia and Belarus to ensure compliance.

And while it's good news that most companies have complied with the new controls, we're taking vigorous action against those that don't. That's where my team comes in. We're the enforcement side of the house. We have 130 federal agents stationed in 30 cities nationwide, including Chicago.

*(\*Continued on The Following Page)*

Our mission is to ensure that bad actors like Russia can't get and use sensitive U.S. goods and technologies for destructive or malicious purposes.

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, my Commerce colleague Assistant Secretary Thea Kendler and her team have worked in close coordination with an unprecedented coalition of U.S. allies and partners to impose far reaching export restrictions that limit Russia's ability to obtain the goods and technologies it needs to wage war. This includes both expansive controls on dual-use items - items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes - in the fields of electronics, marine, and aerospace; controls on oil-field refinery equipment; controls on luxury goods like alcohol and cigarettes; and embargoes on U.S. goods and technologies to specific Russian and Belarusian military groups that are helping Putin wage war.

These stringent and sweeping export controls are designed to cut off Russia's access to the tools of war and undermine its strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. These expansive controls are not just being imposed by the United States, but also by 37 allies and partners around the globe. The European Union, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland have all implemented substantially similar restrictions on Russia and Belarus in close coordination with the United States. This powerful international response will have serious consequences for the Russian military and defense sector.

These heightened export controls have had significant impact to date. Since February 24th, when the first new rule came into effect, total U.S. exports to Russia have decreased almost 90 percent compared with the 30 days prior.

We have seen public reporting of Russian defense industries, including tank, space, and unmanned aerial vehicle companies, being unable to obtain the spare parts needed to support warfighting in Ukraine. Chinese telecom company Huawei has suspended all orders in Russia and furloughed part of its staff in the country to avoid U.S. and allied sanctions.

Experts predict that Aeroflot, Russia's leading airline and flag carrier, will soon be unable to sustain even domestic flights due to Boeing and Airbus halting exports of spare parts.

U.S.-based semiconductor companies Intel and AMD have halted all sales to Russia. Microsoft announced that it would suspend sales and support services in Russia in order to maintain compliance with U.S. and international sanctions.

Toyota, Ford, Nissan, Mazda, Volvo, Honda, BMW, and Jaguar Land Rover have also halted or suspended exports to Russia, reflecting the companies' concerns about the possibility of violating U.S. and allied export controls. Heavy equipment manufacturer Caterpillar has halted all production in Russia, and John Deere announced that it would halt all shipments of machinery to Russia and Belarus to ensure compliance.

And while it's good news that most companies have complied with the new controls, we're taking vigorous action against those that don't.

That's where my team comes in. We're the enforcement side of the house. We have 130 federal agents stationed in 30 cities nationwide, including Chicago.

*(\*Continued on The Following Column)*

Here's what we've done so far to enforce the new Russia rules. **First, we've put in screening mechanisms to identify all relevant exports to Russia. When someone files paperwork saying they're shipping something that's potentially covered by the new controls, we'll see it and then we can stop it. So far, since the first Russia rule went into effect on February 24, we've prevented 145 shipments worth nearly \$76 million from going to Russia. Included in that total is a jet valued at \$11.6 million that was detained just last week by our Chicago Field Office, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, for potential violation of the new controls.**

Second, we've publicly identified 176 airplanes that we believe were illegally exported to Russia and an additional 7 airplanes that we believe went illegally to Belarus. By publicly identifying these airplanes, we are putting the world on notice that if they service these aircraft, they are in violation of our laws and do so at their peril. Two weeks ago, I issued Temporary Denial Orders against three of Russia's biggest airlines. These orders mean that those airlines cannot receive U.S. parts for their airplanes. Over time, Aeroflot, Utair, and Azur Air will be unable to continue flying, either internationally or domestically, as they are now cut off from the international support, and the U.S. parts and related services they need to maintain and support their fleets. And we have another enforcement action to share today.

This morning, I signed a new temporary order denying export privileges for the Russian airline Aviastar due to ongoing violations of the comprehensive export controls the Commerce Department has imposed on Russia.

This order terminates the right of Aviastar to receive exports of United States items. This is especially important because Aviastar is a cargo carrier, which means that it can no longer access U.S. technology or parts to ferry goods to Russia, including military cargo.

Third, we've put almost 260 companies with Russian defense affiliations on what we call our Entity List, which means that they can't receive U.S. exports without a license (and that those license applications will be denied). These companies include: Russia's two leading indigenous integrated circuit manufacturers; Russian space-based and satellite-based component manufacturers and suppliers; Russian unmanned aerial vehicle manufacturers and suppliers; and Russian shipbuilding factories.

Fourth, we know from data which U.S. companies had been exporting items to Russia prior to the imposition of the new controls and that are now restricted. We're reaching out to these companies both to educate them on the new controls and to make sure they're in compliance with them. We've conducted 412 of those outreaches so far.

And fifth, our staff overseas is regularly conducting physical inspections to make sure that banned items aren't making their way to Russia. These inspections can lead to the imposition of criminal and civil penalties.

That's what we have been doing to prevent exports of controlled items from going to Russia. But what about exports of items that supporters want to send into Ukraine? The team I mentioned earlier that put in the new Russia rules also plays a role in ensuring that Ukraine promptly obtains support for its defense by providing licenses to those who have been collecting body armor and other goods for Ukraine.

*(\*Continued on The Following Page)*

Together, our licensing and enforcement teams have been educating the public, including through our agents here in Chicago, on how to submit license applications for such items. And I would urge UCCA members to continue to reach out to Aaron Tambrini, our Special Agent in Charge of our Chicago Field Office, for guidance on those efforts. Back in Washington, D.C., the licensing team is committed to expediting license applications for the protection and support of Ukraine and the people of Ukraine. We have done so in the recent past and will continue these efforts for as long as necessary.

Thank you, again, for inviting me here today to discuss the critical role of the Commerce Department and our export controls as we work alongside other U.S. government partners to degrade the Russian military for its unprovoked and unwarranted brutality against the Ukrainian people.

Earlier, I quoted from President Biden's speech from last year's Munich Security Forum. Elsewhere in that speech, the president said: "Democracy doesn't happen by accident. We have to defend it, fight for it, strengthen it, renew it. We must prove that our model isn't a relic of our history; it's the single best way to revitalize the promise of our future. And if we work together with our democratic partners, with strength and confidence, I know that we'll meet every challenge and outpace every challenger." The United States government now stands with the people of Ukraine to meet the current and existential challenge to their democracy.

Let me close on a personal note. This past weekend, I gathered with my family to observe the Jewish holiday of Passover. Passover is the time of year where Jews the world over, for thousands of years, in peacetime and in wartime, in homelands and in exile, have celebrated the Jews' freedom from oppression at the hands of a foreign autocrat - the Egyptian Pharaoh. My thoughts during the seder this year were with the people of Ukraine. The parallels between the story of the Exodus, and the current crisis in Ukraine, are stark.

As we sat around our dinner table, conducting our Passover seder, we recited: "For more than one enemy has risen against us to destroy us. In every generation, in every age, some rise up to plot our annihilation. But a Divine Power sustains and delivers us." May you and your relatives in Ukraine be sustained and delivered from the latest enemy who has risen against you. And may those of us in the United States government continue to stand alongside you and alongside the people of Ukraine in their fight for freedom and self-determination.

**BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY**  
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs  
[OCPA@bis.doc.gov](mailto:OCPA@bis.doc.gov)  
**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**  
April 14, 2022  
[www.bis.doc.gov](http://www.bis.doc.gov)

**WASHINGTON, D.C.** - Today, the U.S. Commerce Department, through its Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), publicly identified 10 additional aircraft in likely violation of U.S. export controls, including the first seven Belarusian owned/operated commercial aircraft identified since restrictions on Belarus were tightened via regulation effective on April 8, 2022. BIS is also updating the tail numbers of 32 planes already on the list to account for the planes' purported re-registration in Russia. BIS has also authorized two planes to leave Russia and they will be removed from the list. The aircraft identified on the list have flown into Russia and/or Belarus in apparent violation of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

BIS is continuing its efforts to notify the public that providing any form of service to these aircraft requires authorization. Absent such authorization, any person anywhere—including within Belarus or Russia—risks violating the EAR and would be subject to BIS enforcement actions, which could include substantial jail time, fines, loss of export privileges, or other restrictions. By restricting these aircraft from receiving any service, for example including from abroad, international flights from Belarus or Russia on these aircraft are effectively grounded. This ongoing effort is part of BIS's response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, which Belarus has enabled and supported.

"Maintaining this list reinforces to Putin and his enablers that they are isolated from the world, and anyone who seeks to enable their aggression or flout our export controls, does so at their own peril," said **Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo**. "The Department of Commerce will continue to exercise our legal authorities and ensure this message remains clear. We will continue working with our allies and partners to cut Russia and Belarus off from the global economy to maximize pressure on Putin and his military operations."

"Vladimir Putin and his enablers have made themselves pariahs as a result of their brutal violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. The Commerce Department, along with our growing coalition of allies and partners, will continue to ensure that they pay the price for the untold devastation they are wreaking upon the region and the people of Ukraine." said **Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves**. "By rejecting the international rule of law, Russia and Belarus have made it clear that they do not deserve the benefits of participating in the global economy, and that includes international travel. So long as Russia continues this unwarranted assault, Commerce will continue to take consequential actions to hold them to account."

*(\*Continued on The Following Page)*

“New restrictions on Belarusian aircraft were put in place just last Friday, and less than a week later we’re already telling the world that servicing specific Belarusian planes is a no go,” said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod. “As U.S. export controls continue to ratchet up given Russia’s continued brutal war in Ukraine, we will continue to swiftly and vigorously enforce them.”

Effective March 2, 2022, BIS imposed expansive and stringent controls on aviation-related items destined to Belarus, including for specified aircraft or aircraft parts, similar to those imposed on Russia on February 24, 2022. The March 2, 2022, rule also removed license exception availability for any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia, thus imposing a license requirement for Russian owned/operated aircraft

On April 8, 2022, BIS issued a rule that similarly removed license exception availability for any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Belarus or a national of Belarus, also imposing a license requirement for these Belarusian owned/operated aircraft. As a result, any aircraft manufactured in the United States, or that is manufactured in a foreign country and includes more than 25% U.S.-origin controlled content, is subject to a license requirement if such aircraft is destined for Belarus or Russia.

Since April 9, 2022, based on publicly available information, BIS has identified a number of commercial aircraft being reexported from third countries to Belarus, all of which are owned or controlled by, or under charter or lease to, Belarus or Belarusian nationals, and has listed those aircraft below (in **bold**). This is in addition to BIS’s on-going identification of Russian aircraft via public listing that have likely violated the EAR since March 2, 2022.

The list below has been updated (with additions in **bold**) and currently totals 153 aircraft with 146 Russian-owned/operated aircraft and seven Belarusian owned/operated aircraft. Accordingly, any subsequent actions taken with regard to any of the listed aircraft, including, but not limited to, refueling, maintenance, repair, or the provision of spare parts or services, are subject to the prohibitions outlined in General Prohibition Ten of the EAR (Section 736.2(b)(10)), which provides:

*(10) General Prohibition Ten - Proceeding with transactions with knowledge that a violation has occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported with knowledge that a violation of the Export Administration Regulations, the Export Administration Act or any order, license, License Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with the item. Nor may you rely upon any license or License Exception after notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that license or exception. There are no License Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 740 of the EAR.*

(\*Continued on The Following Column)

Please note this list is not exhaustive and the restrictions also apply in any situation in which a person has knowledge that a violation of the EAR has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with an aircraft or other item that is subject to the EAR, whether or not such aircraft or other item is included on this list. This list will continue to be updated as circumstances warrant.

BIS has also updated the tail numbers of aircraft previously identified in the table below to reflect their purported re-registration in Russia (also in **bold**) and also modified the list to remove aircraft that have been authorized by BIS to leave Russia. Accordingly, the following aircraft have been removed from the list: **VQ-BTK (Azur Air) and VP-BJR (Nordwind)**.

Additional BIS resources on export controls implemented in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are available at: <https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/Russia-belarus>

The public may submit confidential enforcement tips via the BIS website: <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/rsform/form/14?task=forms.edit>, or by calling the Enforcement Hotline at 1-800-424-2980.

These BIS actions were taken under the authority of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and its implementing regulations, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

For more information, visit [www.bis.doc.gov](http://www.bis.doc.gov)

**FULL LIST AS OF APRIL 14, 2022**

Owner or Operator	Country	Tail Number	Serial Number	Aircraft Type
Abramovich, Roman	Russia	LX-RAY	6417	G650ER
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VQ-BFK / RA-73158</b>	65308	777-300 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VP-BMM / RA-73107</b>	44439	737-8MC (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VQ-BWD / RA-73128</b>	41211	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BON	41200	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BMB	41231	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VP-BCD / RA-73093</b>	41215	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VP-BMO / RA-73108</b>	41233	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VP-BNC / RA-73109</b>	41234	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VP-BNP / RA-73110</b>	44438	737-8MC (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	<b>VQ-BVP / RA-73122</b>	41204	737-8LJ (B738)

(\*Continued on The Following Page)

Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BFC / RA-73141	65312	777-300 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGB / RA-73140	41679	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGC / RA-73139	41680	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGD / RA-73138	41681	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGF	41686	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BFL / RA-73146	65309	777-300 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BFN / RA-73143	65310	777-300 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BFO / RA-73142	65311	777-300 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BQB	41687	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BQC / RA-73130	41688	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BQD / RA-73131	41682	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BQE / RA-73132	41683	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)

Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BQF / RA-73133	41684	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BQG / RA-73134	41689	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BUA / RA-73135	41685	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BUB / RA-73144	41690	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BPF / RA-73113	44436	737-8MC (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BUC / RA-73145	41691	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGI / RA-73097	41223	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BNQ / RA-73111	44432	737-8MC (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BWA / RA-73123	41207	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VQ-BWC / RA-73125	41210	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BPG / RA-73147	41693	777-3M0 (ER) (B77W)
Aeroflot	Russia	RA-73094	41216	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	RA-73104	44443	737-8MC (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	RA-73121	41203	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BCG / RA-73095	41217	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGG / RA-73096	41222	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	VP-BGN / RA-73098	41225	737-8LJ (B738)
Aeroflot	Russia	RA-73105	44433	737-8MC (B738)

(\*Continued on The Following Column)

AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VQ-BGZ	37580	747-8HV(F) (B748)
AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VQ-BVR	60687	747-8HV(F) (B748)
AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VQ-BLR	37668	747-8HV(F) (B748)
AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VQ-BRH	37669	747-8HV(F) (B748)
AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VQ-BRJ	37670	747-8HV(F) (B748)
AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VQ-BLQ	37581	747-8HV(F) (B748)
AirBridgeCargo	Russia	VP-BBY	63781	747-83Q(F) (B748)
Aviastar-TU	Russia	VQ-BCB / RA-78003	27056	757-223(PCF) (B752)
Aviastar-TU	Russia	VQ-BKK / RA-73352	25731	757-223(PCF) (B752)
Aviastar-TU	Russia	VQ-BSX / RA-73354	27053	757-223(PCF) (B752)
Aviastar-TU	Russia	VQ-BBU / RA-73351	25696	757-223(PCF) (B752)
Aviastar-TU	Russia	VQ-BON / RA-73355	27054	757-223(PCF) (B752)
Alrosa	Russia	EI-FCH	32576	737-83N (B738)
Azur Air	Russia	VP-BLV	30043	757-28A (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BEY	29382	757-2Q8 (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	RA-73030	24746	767-3Q8(ER) (B763)
Azur Air	Russia	VP-BIS	30045	757-2QB (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BEZ	29377	757-2QB (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BEN	28140	767-33A(ER) (B763)
Azur Air	Russia	VP-BYC	30338	757-231 (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BQA	30044	757-2QB (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BKB	26268	757-2QB (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	RA-73032	27614	767-306(ER)
Azur Air	Russia	RA-73034	27612	767-306(ER)
Azur Air	Russia	VP-BRA	27477	767-33A(ER) (B763)

Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BKF	26268	757-2QB (B752)
Azur Air	Russia	VP-BUX	24947	767-3Y0(ER) (B763)
Azur Air	Russia	VP-BUV	24745	767-3Q8(ER) (B763)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BZA	32728	777-31H(ER) (B77W)
Azur Air	Russia	VQ-BUO	27909	767-33A(ER) (B763)

(\*Continued on The Following Page)

Belavia	Belarus	EW-254PA	26294	737-3Q8 (B733)
Belavia	Belarus	EW-366PA	29058	737-31S (B733)
Belavia	Belarus	EW-455PA	61421	737-8ZM (B738)
Belavia	Belarus	EW-456PA	31422	737-8ZM (B738)
Belavia	Belarus	EW-457PA	61423	737-8ZM (B738)
Belavia	Belarus	EW-527PA	40877	737-82R (B738)
Belavia	Belarus	EW-544PA	35139	737-8K5 (B738)
Nordstar	Russia	VP-BKT / RA-73259	28871	737-33R (B733)
Nordwind	Russia	VP-BJL	32639	777-35E(ER) (B77W)
Nordwind	Russia	VP-BSC	40233	737-8KN (B738)
Nordwind	Russia	VP-BJH	28533	777-212(ER) (B772)
Nordwind	Russia	VQ-BJA	28520	777-212(ER) (B772)
Nordwind	Russia	VP-BJO	32640	777-35E(ER) (B77W)
Nordwind	Russia	VP-BSE	40236	737-8KN (B738)
Nordwind	Russia	VP-BJJ	32719	777-2Q8(ER) (B772)
Pegas Fly	Russia	RA-73272	27608	777-2Q8(ER) (B772)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BFB	41219	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BGQ	41227	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BGR	41228	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BOD	41238	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BOH	41244	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQB	64862	737-8MC (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQC	64863	737-8AL (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQE	64864	737-8MC (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQH	64866	737-8MC (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQJ	64867	737-8MC (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQM	64868	737-8MC (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VP-BQQ	64869	737-8MC (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BHC	41220	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BHD	41221	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BHQ	41226	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BHT	41235	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BHU	41229	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BHW	41241	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BWG	41205	737-8LJ (B738)
Pobeda	Russia	VQ-BWH	41206	737-8LJ (B738)

Rossiia	Russia	VP-BOB	41236	737-8LJ (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VP-BOI	41224	737-8LJ (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VP-BUS	44435	737-8MC (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VQ-BPX	35278	737-8Q8 (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VQ-BSR	33622	737-8AS (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VQ-BSS	33602	737-8AS (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VQ-BVU	41202	737-8LJ (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VQ-BVV	41201	737-8LJ (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	VQ-BWJ	41212	737-8LJ (B738)
Rossiia	Russia	RA-73283	27100	747-446 (B744)
Rossiia	Russia	RA-73284	26360	747-446 (B744)

Rossiia	Russia	EI-XLE	26362	747-446 (B744)
Rossiia	Russia	EI-XLF	27645	747-446 (B744)
Rossiia	Russia	EI-XLH	27650	747-446 (B744)
Rossiia	Russia	EI-XLJ	27646	747-446 (B744)
Rossiia	Russia	EI-UNL	28515	777-312 (B773)
Rossiia	Russia	RA-73282	28516	777-312 (B773)
Rossiia	Russia	RA-73292	28531	777-312 (B773)
Royal Flight	Russia	VP-BGZ	30881	737-86J (B738)
Royal Flight	Russia	VQ-BTR	28171	757-28A (B752)
Royal Flight	Russia	VP-BRE	28149	767-3W0(ER) (B763)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BKV	37084	737-8ZS (B738)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BKW	37085	737-8ZS (B738)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BMG	41841	737-8LP (B738)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BRK	41708	737-8LP (B738)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BRQ	41710	737-8LP (B738)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BRR	41836	737-8LP (B738)
S7 Airlines	Russia	VQ-BVM	41400	737-8GJ (B738)
Utair	Russia	VQ-BJJ	29937	737-8AS(B738)
Utair	Russia	VQ-BQQ / RA-73089	37552	737-8GU (B738)
Utair	Russia	VQ-BQP / RA-73088	37553	737-8GU (B738)
Utair	Russia	VQ-BQR / RA-73090	36386	737-8GU (B738)
Utair	Russia	VP-BXY / RA-73037	27328	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73048	29685	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73081	30435	767-224(ER) (B762)
Utair	Russia	VQ-BJF / RA-73084	32778	737-8AS(B738)
Utair	Russia	VQ-BQS / RA-73091	36387	737-8GU (B738)
Utair	Russia	VP-BAI/ RA-73082	30437	767-224(ER) (B762)
Utair	Russia	VP-BAG	30435	767-224(ER) (B762)
Utair	Russia	RA-73035	27315	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73067	28476	737-45S (B734)

Utair	Russia	RA-73044	28900	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73061	28907	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73063	27532	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73045	28901	737-524 (B735)
Utair	Russia	RA-73049	28906	737-524 (B735)

(\*Continued on The Following Column)

## BIS Takes Enforcement Actions Against Three Russian Airlines Operating Aircraft in Violation of U.S. Export Controls

Today, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod issued orders denying the export privileges of three Russian Airlines - Aeroflot, Azur Air, and UTair - due to ongoing export violations related to comprehensive export controls on Russia imposed by the Commerce Department. These three Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs) terminate the right of these airlines to participate in transactions subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including exports and reexports from the United States. Today's TDOs are issued for 180-days and may be renewed.

"The Biden Administration has imposed historic sanctions on Russia for its unwarranted aggression in Ukraine. With today's temporary denial orders, the Department of Commerce takes another significant action to hold Putin and his enablers accountable for their inexcusable actions," said Commerce Secretary Gina M. Raimondo. "We are cutting off not only their ability to access items from the United States but also reexports of U.S.-origin items from abroad. Any companies that flout our export controls, specifically those who do so to the benefit of Vladimir Putin and the detriment of the Ukrainian people, will feel the full force of the Department's enforcement."

"The images we are seeing coming out of Ukraine demonstrate Vladimir Putin's barbarism, brutality, and blatant disregard for human life. The Department of Commerce, along with the entire Biden-Harris Administration, have taken swift and unprecedented action to ensure that Russia, and its enablers, pay a price for their actions," said Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves. "We are already seeing the impact of the Commerce Department's export controls, with U.S. exports to Russia of items subject to new licensing requirements having decreased by 99 percent by value compared to the same time period last year. With today's action we send a clear message to those who deliberately disobey those same controls: defy our export controls at your own peril.

"Companies that violate the expansive export controls we have imposed on Russia will find themselves the target of Commerce Department enforcement action," said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod. "With our allies and partners, we will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine as they respond to Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion of their country."

The TDOs issued today represent the first enforcement actions taken by BIS in response to Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine, and the severe restriction in export privileges of these companies is a reminder to parties in Russia as well as throughout the rest of the world that U.S. legal authorities are substantial, far-reaching, and can have a meaningful impact on access to global commerce by parties found to be in violation of U.S. law.

*(\*Continued on The Following Column)*

BIS has led the Department of Commerce's efforts in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine by taking a number of powerful regulatory actions and issuing public notice to the global community as to potential violations of the EAR in the civilian aerospace sector.

On February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related items to Russia, including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts on the Commerce Control List.

On March 2, 2022, BIS further excluded any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS). Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content is subject to a license requirement if, for example, it is Russian-owned or operated and exported to Russia.

On March 18, 2022, BIS publicly released a list of private and commercial aircraft it had been tracking as likely operating in violation of the EAR. This action notified the public that, absent authorization from BIS, the operation of, or service to, any aircraft on the list or owned by Russian parties in violation of the EAR may lead to enforcement actions from BIS, which may include substantial jail time, fines, loss of export privileges, or other restrictions. BIS further updated the list on April 30, 2022 and will continue to maintain and update the list as circumstances warrant.

The list and additional information on BIS's actions in response to the Russian invasion is available online here: <https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/russia-belarus>.

[Aeroflot, Utair, and Azur Air engaged in and continue to engage in recent conduct prohibited by the EAR by operating controlled aircraft subject to the EAR without the required BIS authorization. Pursuant to Section 746.8 of the EAR, all international flights conducted by the aforementioned airlines into Russia would have required export or reexport licenses from BIS. Additionally, any domestic Russian flights by the same airlines on aircraft reexported to Russia after March 2, 2022 without the required BIS license are also in violation of General Prohibition Ten \(GP10\). GP10 prohibits continuing with transactions knowing that a violation has occurred or is about to occur.](#)

- [Aeroflot operated multiple aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Moscow, Russia from/to Beijing, China; Delhi, India; Antalya and Istanbul, Turkey; and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, respectively. Aeroflot subsequently operated some of the same aircraft on domestic flights between Moscow, Russia and Vladivostok, Russia and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Russia, respectively.](#)

*(\*Continued on The Following Page)*

- Azur Air operated multiple aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Moscow, Russia from/to Antalya, Turkey; Male, Maldives; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Nha Trang, Vietnam, respectively. Azur Air subsequently operated some of the same aircraft on domestic flights between Moscow, Russia and Samara, Russia; Irkutsk, Russia; Kaliningrad, Russia; Mineralnye Vody, Russia; and Novosibirsk, Russia, respectively.
- UTair operated multiple aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Khujand and Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Yerevan, Armenia; Baku and Ganja, Azerbaijan; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; and Tashkent, Uzbekistan, respectively. UTair subsequently operated some of the same aircraft on domestic flights between Moscow, Russia and Syktykar, Russia and Ukhta, Russia, respectively.

The issuance of a TDO is one of the most significant civil sanctions under the EAR and is issued by the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement to deny the export privileges of a company or individual to prevent an imminent or on-going export control violation. These BIS TDOs were issued under the authority of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and the EAR.

BUREAUS AND OFFICES  
Bureau of Industry and Security

## **Two Companies have Successfully Provided the U.S. Navy Small, Modular UUVs with Increased Endurance to Assist Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Professionals in De-Mining Operations**

April 4, 2022 (Mountain View, CA)—The U.S. Navy PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants is moving forward with production of the first iteration of the Lionfish program’s small unmanned underwater vehicle (UUVs). The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), partnering with PMS 408 and Naval Information Warfare Center-Pacific (NIWC-PAC), completed this prototype to replace the Navy’s Mk 18, Mod 1 UUV with more capable, and modular UUV systems for mine countermeasure (MCM) operations providing the Fleet with greatly improved capabilities to keep sealanes free and clear of the threat of subsea mines. Using DIU’s Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO), the Navy’s PMS-408 was able to concurrently evaluate multiple UUV solutions with developed hardware and software, open systems architecture, and future-proof modularity. In two years, DIU, PMS-408 and NIWC-PAC prototyped and tested the Huntington Ingalls Remus 300 and L3Harris Iver4-900 UUVs. The program used a fast and iterative process to successfully bring forth two highly capable UUV solutions. Compared to similar UUV programs, the DIU-PMS 408 effort leveraging the CSO cut the delivery timeline in half. This effort has provided the Navy with UUVs that can detect and clear mines with more than 2 times the endurance of the current models, providing a new capability for mine detection, allowing fleets to operate freely and transport sailors safely. “DIU is PMS-408’s key partner to evaluate emerging technology and rapidly transition next-generation capability inside the acquisition system and budget cycle,” said CAPT (sel) Jon Haase of PMS 408.

## **Pentagon Plans to Publish CMMC ‘Interim Rule’ by May 2023**

By Sara Friedman / April 8, 2022

Tweet

[Editor’s note: This article has been updated to clarify how the waiver process will work, based on additional information from the Defense Department.]

CMMC director Stacy Bostjanick says the Pentagon is planning to release the “interim rule” to implement its Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program by May 2023, with initial requirements showing up in DOD contracts 60 days after the rule publication.

“The CMMC team is in Groundhog Day because now we have to go through the 32 CFR rulemaking activities and relook at the 48 [CFR] that we did last time to update it for what is going to happen with CMMC 2.0,” Bostjanick said at an event on Thursday.

Bostjanick said, “We estimated when we started this journey [in November 2021] that it would take us nine to twenty-four months. The nine months has gone away. We hope to have everything ready to submit to OMB to start the rulemaking process by July.”

Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations is focused on the CMMC program, while Title 48 is an update to the original interim final rule that went into effect in November 2020.

Bostjanick said DOD is going to submit the 32 CFR rulemaking to the Office of Management and Budget to “get it started and then we [will] ask for an interim and then we [will] follow up with [the] 48 [CFR]. Our hope and prayer is that we are accepted for an interim rule and by May of 2023 we will be able to have that interim rule and CMMC requirements will show up in contracts 60 days later.”

Bostjanick spoke Thursday at a cyber event hosted by the New England chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association. The event featured industry speakers talking about various CMMC topics and a presentation from DOD chief software officer Jason Weiss on the Pentagon’s Software Bill of Materials “vision.”

The Pentagon expects CMMC requirements to show up first in requests for information that will provide details on what maturity level is needed before a request for proposal is released, Bostjanick said.

Bostjanick provided details on the interim period where the companies will be able to get a CMMC assessment ahead of the rule going into effect.

The goal is to be able to obtain a three-year certification that goes into effect when a contract is awarded, but Bostjanick told attendees, “Legal counsel says I cannot promise that we will be able to do that because we don’t know what is going to happen with rulemaking. One of your compatriots may complain about it and we may not be able to allowed to do it.”

Bostjanick said, “So we have to think that threw but we are encouraging companies to move forward and get that CMMC certification today. We have eight C3PAOs that are already” approved on the CMMC-AB’s Marketplace website.

She added, “We need to finish a couple of documents on the government side to get the LTPs [licensed training providers] and LLPs [licensed partner publishers] running and we are close to that. We are working as fast as we possibly can so we can get the ecosystem kicked into gear.”

DCMA’s Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center is working with the CMMC program management office on “early adoption,” Bostjanick said.

*(\*Continued on The Following Page)*

The DIBCAC started conducting assessments of contractors against NIST Special Publication 800-171 in 2019. CMMC level two is closely aligned with the NIST publication.

At an event in March, DCMA's John Ellis said he expects the early adopter assessments to start "later this summer." His thinking is that the initial assessments will be for the companies who passed a DIBCAC NIST 800-171 audit in 2019. Bostjanick said the current plan is to allow a certified third party assessment organization to do the assessment "and the DIBCAC team would do a bit of oversight." She added, "They would be able to accept the DIBCAC High assessment and move forward."

Under CMMC 2.0, the Pentagon announced plans for CMMC level two to have a bifurcated assessment regime where third party assessments are only needed for some DOD contracts with information critical to national security. Level two focuses on controlled on classified information. Bostjanick said, "What we are doing shortly is a tabletop exercise to be able to map it to provide the proper instruction to the DIB and our program managers to make sure we recognize which CUI is considered not as important as the other."

The DOD "program manager is going to be the one who will deconstruct and work through the CUI as we go through the program," Bosjanick said, adding that she realized when CMMC started "program managers need a desk guide to figure out how" to establish the requirements in a contract. Bostjanick created the guide, but she said "my guide probably needs a little bit more refinement to make sure we've got the instructions down so they understand and we understand."

CMMC 2.0 allows for companies to have a plan of action and milestones for the first time as well as waivers.

"We heard a lot of squawking from the services who said 'Hey I may have a brand new innovative capability where none of the participants could possibly be ready for CMMC by the time we have to award this because it is such an emerging thing' so we want to be able to waive it," Bosjanick said.

The acquisition official would have to go to the DOD service acquisition executive (SAE) "to get approval" for the waiver, Bostjanick said. "The company that gets the contract is going to have to pursue and close out their CMMC certification. We are thinking the 180-day timeline again and we are going to expect the program and contractor to have some sort of risk mitigation plan for that data while it is exposed because [they] don't have the CMMC requirements in place." -- Sara Friedman

([sfriedman@iwpnews.com](mailto:sfriedman@iwpnews.com))

## NH EXPORTS Hit Record High 2021

New Hampshire's #exports hit record-breaking figures of \$6.4 billion last year, a 16.7% increase from 2020! Export sectors driving the growth were industrial machinery (valued at \$1.5B), electrical machinery – which includes vital components used in automobiles, computers and more (valued at \$1.46B) – and aircraft/aircraft parts (valued at \$1.23B). Check out my LinkedIn article below to learn more.

[#NHEconomy](#) [#NHBEA](#) | [New Hampshire Department of Business & Economic Affairs](#)

## BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY WELCOMES UNDER SECRETARY ALAN ESTEVEZ

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY  
April 19, 2022 Office of Congressional and Public  
Affairs [www.bis.doc.gov](http://www.bis.doc.gov) [OCA@bis.doc.gov](mailto:OCA@bis.doc.gov)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Today, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo welcomed President Biden's nominee to serve as Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Alan Estevez, following his unanimous confirmation by the United States Senate.

"I'm excited to welcome Alan to the Department to lead the Bureau of Industry and Security. He brings an exceptional record of federal leadership and experience navigating some of the most complex national security challenges of the past three decades," said Secretary Gina M. Raimondo. "These will be invaluable assets for our nation, the Department, and the Bureau as it continues to play a leading role in the Biden-Harris Administration's national security and foreign policy, from holding Russia accountable for its brutal, unjustified invasion of Ukraine and winning the long-term strategic competition with China, to protecting critical supply chains and ensuring the advancement of U.S. technological leadership."

"I have operated at the nexus of national security and technology for a long time, and I understand the complex challenges we face from foreign adversaries," said Mr. Estevez. "I look forward to leading the dedicated, expert staff of the Bureau of Industry and Security in protecting our national security and foreign policy interests."

Estevez, a recognized leader in the defense and aerospace community, brings substantial federal government experience to the Department of Commerce. Prior to his confirmation as Under Secretary of Commerce, Estevez served for 36 years at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), including in Senate-confirmed leadership positions such as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. His duties included overseeing the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and DoD's laboratory infrastructure and representing DoD on the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). In these roles, he was also responsible for the successful management of complex missions including leading efforts to support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the contingency and humanitarian responses to Hurricane Sandy and the West African Ebola response.

He has been recognized over the course of his service with three Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medals, two Presidential Rank Awards, and the National Security Service to America Medal.

Mr. Estevez has served as a national security strategy and logistics executive with Deloitte Consulting since June 2017. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in political science from Rutgers University and a Master of Science in national resource strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University.

For more information, visit: [www.bis.doc.gov](http://www.bis.doc.gov).

## Earth Day Spotlight: Our Ocean, Our Blue Economy

For more than half a century, communities worldwide have gathered in late April to take part in acts of science, service and stewardship in celebration of Earth Day. At the Department of Commerce, Earth Day—and Earth Month—offer an important moment to shine a spotlight on the global ocean, the lifeblood of our planet’s most vital functions and the power source of global commerce and trade.

The bureaus that we represent—the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—are distinct in their missions, but share the Biden-Harris Administration and Department of Commerce’s commitment to coupling sustainability with economic growth and unleashing the power of the U.S. private sector to combat climate change. Just as President Biden has implemented an all-of-government approach to tackling the climate crisis, the Department of Commerce is activating its bureaus to act creatively and collaboratively to advance research, promote clean tech exports and rebuild more sustainable and equitable industries.

Of all the areas where ITA and NOAA’s work overlap, none is as crucial as the Blue Economy—the industries, jobs and economic growth that rely on and protect our precious ocean and Great Lakes resources. The United States is not just home to 95,000 miles of shoreline where half of our population lives, we’re also home to an enormous source of revenue and jobs generated by the interwoven sectors of marine transportation, offshore renewable energy, seafood, fishing, and coastal travel and tourism.

In 2018 alone, the American Blue Economy supported 2.3 million jobs and contributed \$373 billion to our GDP. By the start of the new decade, the Blue Economy across the globe is expected to double to \$3 trillion. It is nearly impossible for most Americans to go a single day without using, wearing, or eating something that has come from or through our ocean and coasts.

However, the ocean isn’t merely the moving force of commerce. Having absorbed as much as 90% of the planet’s warming in recent decades, the ocean disproportionately exhibits the impacts of climate change - from sea level rise to ocean acidification. We can learn so much from what the oceans are telling us and use that knowledge to prepare sectors of our economy for climate impacts.

NOAA’s observations of our oceans and coasts help provide crucial public data that help U.S. companies make informed decisions, stock store shelves, and reach customers worldwide. Thanks to NOAA’s work, the U.S. government has developed a strong track record of working with private sector companies to build satellites that track our weather, airplanes that hunt hurricanes, buoys that monitor water levels, and international partnerships that engage in research across borders.

*(\*Continued on The Following Column)*

That innovation has never been more exciting than today, with U.S. companies leading the way with tools like drones that deliver lifesaving data in real-time on extreme weather and insights to help us better understand climate change.

At the same time, ITA is helping to build a more robust, equitable, and sustainable economy by promoting U.S. trade and advocating for American workers and businesses. This begins with combatting the climate crisis at home and abroad through the power of U.S. innovation in the Blue Economy. It is more important now than ever before to ensure that American-made products, services and solutions are available to countries around the world to face the challenges posed by climate change. ITA helps U.S. companies big and small, including minority-owned enterprises, make inroads into international markets so they can provide the products and services the world needs to curb harmful emissions, mitigate natural disasters, and instill a new environmental legacy for future generations—which is why ITA is pursuing a Clean Tech Export Competitiveness Strategy. ITA seeks to build on the ingenuity of U.S. businesses and workers to help partners and allies to meet their climate goals while building high-paying jobs at home.

Despite vastly different portfolios, NOAA and ITA are enthusiastic about how our collaboration can provide solutions that protect, celebrate and care for our one beautiful Earth. We look forward to opportunities to spur innovation and further engage with our Blue Economy stakeholders. To that end, in September, we invite U.S. companies in the Blue Economy space to register for an important ITA forum to be held in Providence, Rhode Island. [Discover Global Markets: The Blue Economy](#) offers these businesses the opportunity to hear from and be matched with ITA-vetted foreign buyers, distributors, industry experts, U.S. commercial diplomats, and others from more than 20 countries-representing a truly global showcase.

A new age in ocean technology, sustainability, and logistics calls for a New Blue Economy that puts U.S. companies and our workforce at the center of climate solutions. With climate considerations at the center of the Biden Administration’s foreign policy and trade agenda, The New Blue Economy will enable the improved collection, analysis, and dissemination of ocean and coastal-derived data designed to help economies thrive and marine ecosystems flourish. Through bilateral engagements and international partnerships, the United States is leading the way to address the climate crisis, strengthen supply chains, end unfair trade practices, and foster global innovation and creativity. Our two bureaus are committed to helping the U.S. remain a leader in solutions to help Mother Earth. Happy Earth Day!

[Marisa Lago](#) is the Under Secretary for International Trade and leads the International Trade Administration.

[Dr. Richard Spinrad](#) is the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations

31 CFR part 587  
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26

Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Joint Stock Company SB Sberbank Kazakhstan or Sberbank Europe AG

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving Joint Stock Company SB Sberbank Kazakhstan or Sberbank Europe AG (collectively, “the blocked Sberbank subsidiaries”), or any entity in which the blocked Sberbank subsidiaries own, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 12, 2022.

(b) This general license does not authorize:

(1) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;

(2) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or

(3) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of this general license, unless separately authorized.

**MISSION STATEMENT:**

*Given the geopolitical state of affairs with China, Russia, and Crimea, the Occupied territories of UKRAINE, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, embargoed countries and other specific threatening end users and entities, located in the United States and around the globe.*

*Evolutions in Business and the companies we serve, armed with robust compliance to the Export Administration Regulations, will adhere to best practices to protect our revenue and yours, and ensure the national security interests of the United States.*

**NOTE:** *In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment for non-profit news reporting and educational purposes only.*

*Reproduction for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions.*

Evolutions in Business  
Celebrating more than  
30 Years