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## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

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### BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs  
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#### Commerce Stands Strong with Ukraine, Takes Further Action Against Ongoing Russian Aggression

***Two Years after Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and Following Navalny's Death, Commerce Adds 93 Entities to Entity List for Supporting War Effort, Updates High Priority Items List, and Releases Business Advisory with Interagency Partners***

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, following the death of opposition politician and anti-corruption activist Aleksey Navalny, and after two years of Russia's unprovoked and unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed additional export restrictions on 93 entities under 95 entries in Russia and seven other destinations. This action, along with others announced today, demonstrates the Biden-Harris Administration's unwavering commitment to supporting those affected by Russia's aggression.

"Our hearts are heavy that Russia's senseless and bloodthirsty war of choice is ongoing and we have to continue to show resolve and support the Ukrainian people," **said Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan Estevez**. "BIS will continue working with our international and interagency partners to tighten and enforce our restrictions, which will continue to limit Putin's military options by imposing substantial costs on his ability to repair, replenish, and rearm with high-tech, high-quality equipment."

"Russia's tragic determination to continue its war of aggression is impacting not only the people of Ukraine but also the Russian people. Russian children and prisoners are being exploited to build munitions. State surveillance, discrimination, and other forms of repression—including the deaths of challengers to Putin's regime like Aleksey Navalny—have increased. We must continue to stand against Putin, for our values, and with Ukraine, for as long as it takes," **said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler**. "BIS will continue to do its part by restricting Russia's access to items that can sustain its war effort, as well as by identifying entities—wherever located—that seek to provide support to Russia's war effort. We will continue our vital multilateral coordination to strengthen the global response to Putin's horrors."

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“With today’s actions, we have now placed more than 900 parties on our Entity List for their role in Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod. “That means over 900 parties who have bolstered the Russian war machine, over 900 parties who have contributed to the deaths of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers, over 900 parties who are now restricted from receiving U.S. exports. Two years in, our work is far from done, so we continue in our unceasing efforts to hold accountable both Russia and those who support its brutal war.”

#### **Additional Background on Today’s Actions:**

#### **Entity List Additions:**

Entity List additions continue efforts to cut off the Russian defense industrial base and military from even the low-technology consumer goods it seeks to sustain its war effort. Prior to today’s action, the Biden-Harris Administration had added 815 entities in Russia, Belarus, and numerous third countries to the Entity List since March 2nd, 2022, for reasons related to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine or for otherwise supporting Russia’s military and/or defense industry.

Today, BIS is adding an additional 93 entities under 95 entries (due to some entities operating in multiple countries) to the Entity List for a variety of reasons related to their activities in support of Russia’s defense-industrial sector and war effort. Sixty-three of the entities are based in Russia, eight in the People’s Republic of China, sixteen in Turkiye, four in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), two in the Kyrgyz Republic, and one each in India and South Korea.

More than 50 of the entities added to the list today will also receive a “footnote 3” designation as Russian-Belarusian military end users. A footnote 3 designation subjects these entities to some of the most severe restrictions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of denial, apart from food and medicine designated as EAR99, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

These rules are meant to serve as a response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. BIS is adding entities in several allied and partner countries, but it is not an action against the countries in which the entities are located or registered or the governments of those countries. The restrictions imposed in today’s rule serve as an action against those entities listed, which have supported the Russian military industrial base and other activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

The text of the rule released today, which includes the list of entities, is available on the Federal Register’s website here: <https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current>. The effective date for the rule is February 23, 2024.

Additional information on the Entity List is available on BIS’s website at: <https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/faqs>.

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#### **Continued Multilateral Efforts and Updating Common High Priority Items List:**

Since February 24, 2022, BIS has implemented a series of stringent export controls that restrict Russia’s access to the technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its brutal war against Ukraine. These restrictions also apply to Belarus in response to its substantial enabling of Russia’s destabilizing conduct. While BIS’s controls cover a vast array of items necessary to fuel Russia’s war machine, certain items are more significant to Russian weaponry than others.

Working with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, BIS has identified “common high priority items” by six-digit Harmonized System (HS) Codes that Russia seeks to procure for its weapons programs. BIS and its international partners have increased the common high priority items on the list from 45 to 50 to highlight for industry that certain machine tools pose a heightened risk of being diverted illegally to Russia because of their importance to Russia’s war efforts.

In addition, BIS has issued a communique reiterating steadfast commitment to sustaining the unprecedented approach to export control cooperation against Russia that has been broader in scope, more substantial in participation, and more rapid in execution than any effort before it. The communique notes that as the war has progressed, international export control partnerships have continued to grow stronger, with more sophisticated cooperation and more comprehensive controls.

A link to the full, updated Common High Priority Items List is available online at: <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/2011-09-14-14-10-06/russia-export-controls>

The BIS communique is available online at: <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3450-2024-02-22-bis-communique-russia-export-controls/file>

#### **Release of U.S. Government Business Advisory:**

The U.S. government is releasing an official Business Advisory titled, “**Risks and Considerations for Doing Business in the Russian Federation and Russia-Occupied Territories of Ukraine.**” This advisory is a joint product of the Departments of Commerce, the Treasury, and State and provides information for businesses regarding the risks of Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. The advisory provides summary information on the state of the market and related concerns, and on topics including:

- U.S. sanctions and export controls;
- U.S. import prohibitions;
- Concerns regarding anti-money laundering (AML) and corruption;
- Summaries of concerns with Russia’s conduct in Ukraine, as well as domestically, including: forced labor, including child labor; discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity; restrictions on freedom of expression; and state surveillance; and;
- Resources for compliance due diligence for human rights considerations and sanctions and export controls

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A link to the full advisory is available online at: <https://www.state.gov/imposing-measures-in-response-to-navalyns-death-and-two-years-of-russias-full-scale-war-against-ukraine/>.

**Additional Background:**

Since February 2022, BIS has taken dozens of regulatory and enforcement actions in response to Russia's war against Ukraine and has worked to build, strengthen, and sustain international allies and partners' responses as well. Additional information about the actions taken to date is available on BIS's website at: <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/russia-belarus>.

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**Launch of United States-People's Republic of China Counternarcotics Working Group**

02/01/2024 04:53 PM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

On January 30, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor Jen Daskal led a U.S. interagency delegation to Beijing, the People's Republic of China, to coordinate efforts to counter the global manufacturing and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, including fentanyl. The delegation included representatives from the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D. Robinson also met separately with PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General of the North American and Oceanian Affairs Department Yang Tao and Ministry of Public Security Director General of the International Cooperation Department Hu Binchen. In these meetings, Assistant Secretary Robinson discussed the need for deeper counternarcotics collaboration between the United States and the PRC at all levels, including policymaking, law enforcement coordination, and the sharing of technical information and best practices that can benefit both countries and the world.

The U.S.-PRC Counternarcotics Working Group complements other ongoing efforts by the State Department to counter the scourge of fentanyl, including the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. It is a mechanism for ongoing bilateral communication and policy and law enforcement coordination to support and implement concrete enforcement actions and exchange information on counternarcotics efforts, which will help to save lives in the United States and around the world.

## House approves bill to block Biden's pause on new gas export projects

by [Rachel Frazin](#) - 02/15/24 2:26 PM ET

The House on Thursday approved a bill that would ax the Biden administration's pause on new natural gas export projects by removing its ability to reject export projects altogether.

The vote was 224-200. Nine Democrats voted with Republicans in favor of the bill. Those Democrats are: Reps. [Yadira Caraveo](#) (Colo.), Jim Costa (Calif.), Henry Cuellar (Texas), Jared Golden (Maine), Vicente Gonzalez (Texas), Rick Larsen (Wash.), Mary Peltola (Alaska), Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (Wash.) and Marc Veasey (Texas).

The legislation would remove the Energy Department's authority to reject projects that would export natural gas, instead giving the power to approve or reject a project solely to the independent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

Currently, projects need approval from both FERC and the Energy Department to begin construction. The legislation would also require FERC, when it makes such decisions, to have the underlying assumption that exporting natural gas is in the public's interest.

While the bill won majority support in the House, it is unlikely to advance through the Democrat-controlled Senate or the White House.

The vote comes after the Biden administration paused approvals for some new export projects so that it can decide whether to change its criteria for whether to permit them.

The pause does not impact existing exports or projects that are under construction, but could delay proposed projects that are currently under review.

The delay ignited significant Republican pushback, with the GOP arguing that any moves to halt U.S.-produced gas would allow for more fuel produced by countries such as Russia.

"[President Biden's](#) politically-motivated ban on American LNG exports is a monumental mistake that benefits our adversaries and dirty global polluters like Iran and Russia," GOP Reps. August Pfluger (Texas) and Kevin Hern (Okla.) said in a written statement after the vote.

"Unleashing U.S. LNG exports means more American jobs, a more secure world for America and our allies, and lower emissions," they added, and also called on the Senate to "immediately" take up the bill.

Though the issue has recently come into the spotlight, getting rid of the Energy Department's authority to block projects has been on Republicans' wish list for a while. They included it in their [H.R. 1 energy package](#) that passed the House last year.

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The White House, in a [written statement](#), said it “strongly opposes” the bill, but stopped short of an explicit veto threat. It said that the bill would “undermine the ability of the United States to ensure that export of a critical and strategic resource is consistent with our economic, energy security, foreign policy, and environmental interests.”

“Doing so would also strip back important safeguards that prevent price pressure on industrial and residential consumers, as well as vital consumer, domestic manufacturing, and energy security protections,” it said.

Updated at 3:11 pm.

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## Secretary Antony J. Blinken, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, And Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar At the Munich Security Conference

02/17/2024 03:49 PM EST

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State  
Munich, Germany  
Bayerischer Hof

**MODERATOR:** (In progress) for Germany. Welcome. (Applause.)  
Antony Blinken, Secretary of State of the U.S. (Applause.) Nice to have you.

And Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs, Republic of India. Minister. (Applause.)

I hope that based on the topic of the session that you will not all agree with each other and we can have some sparks. We have about 43 minutes, and I will prepare your questions because I’ll ask a few questions and then I’ll turn to the audience.

Minister Baerbock, I’m going to start with you. Germany’s national security strategy calls for expanding global partnerships and is quite open about the multipolarity of the world today. How do you go about it at a time when there are so many divisions, and particularly when increasingly we feel the Global South and the Western world are not on the same page?

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** Well, first of all, good afternoon. Very good to have this important session with my dear colleagues.

In a nutshell, it’s more important than ever. Because we are not naïve: Obviously, there are ruthless actors who don’t want to – to drub up the title of our panel – negotiate the slice of the pie, but they want to rob the whole bakery. And having that in mind, I believe it’s even more important than ever that those who are at the table negotiating about the slices of the pie stay there, first of all, resolute, respectfully, and also reflective. And this is the core also of our national security strategy, which we have drafted as the German government, making very clear in the light of this ruthless war of aggression against Ukraine that we are resolute in defending international law. It’s the best protection for everybody around the world.

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So there is no question about negotiating whether Ukraine has right of self-defense or not. We all agreed not only – I don’t like that word, but “Western” actors – we all agreed in our Charter of the United Nations there is the right of self-defense, and we all agreed on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Having said that, obviously we have to be respectful that especially within Ukraine – and I think this is the lesson we have learned, and it was very important to speak to partners like India and so many around the world – Brazil, South Africa – we have to be respectful that obviously, in this moment when we said we need the whole international security, others asked some questions, like: Where have you been when we needed you? Or asked some question, so actually what does it mean for the future? Do you also stand with us? And this is, I would say, maybe something you in the attitude – at least from our foreign politics from Europe to say, okay, we cannot take for granted that everybody just agrees with our European or transatlantic vision.

And the third part, I think it’s the most easy, but it’s the strongest asset for democracies. The strength of democracy, in my point of view, is that we can be self-reflective and self-critical. So asking in a moment when others – for example, war of aggression – were not saying automatically, okay, we support you, not saying why don’t you get it, but asking ourself why they cannot support us.

And I think this is the critical part but the most powerful part, and at least, again, in our national security strategy we try to do it, talking about, for example, our colonialism past. Understanding why South Africa was mentioning the whole time their ties with Russia in the Apartheid regime. And being self-critical and saying, oh, yeah, not all democracies have stood back in time at their side, and taking that as something where we said, yes, we might have made a mistake in the past, but we cannot change the past; we can only change the future together. I think this is the strength of multilateralism, and we see around the world the majority believes in it.

**MODERATOR:** Do you find that increasingly people are questioning more when it comes to – let’s stick to Ukraine and we’ll get to Gaza in a minute. But on Ukraine, are people coming around to your point of view or are they distancing themselves more?

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** Well, to see it over the least three years, I mean, we have seen the 142 voting in the General Assembly, so it is a majority of states. Because most of the countries in the world, like mine – we’re not the biggest country in the world; we don’t have the biggest military means. And this is for most of the countries: They know that the Charter of the United Nations, the rule of law is their life insurance.

So we see this big majority there when you see also the support. Many have traveled – and I think this is really important to give always the question of war of aggression a human face. It was not that we convinced some other actors in the world by saying now you have to stand with that, but when a delegation traveled to Kyiv – and not only Kyiv, to Bucha, to Irpin – when they spoke, like we did, to the parents of those where their child had been kidnapped by Russia, then we give this ideation a human face, and that’s all about. And this is why it’s so important to not only talk about state, but we talk about the people, talk about also the question of the rule of law in front of the International Criminal Court, for example, bringing crimes against humanity in front of the court. And there we see again the majority of the states is pushing for that one.

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**MODERATOR:** Secretary Blinken, there is a – there is a feeling that – it’s more than a feeling, it’s what we see on – happening on the ground, that the U.S.-China tensions are leading to greater fragmentation and that you’re almost competing for alliances: who’s our ally? And we see this within the UN, in various UN institutions, but we just see it all around the globe. To what extent do you feel that you are challenged in your travels around the world on the fundamental questions?

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** Well, first, it’s wonderful to be with my friends, wonderful to be back in Munich at the Security Conference, known among all of us as speed dating for diplomats. (Laughter.)

But we’ve done a couple of things, and I’ll come quickly to your question. From the start of this administration, we’ve made an investment, a reinvestment, in our alliances, in our partnerships, and in the multilateral system. We’ve reinvested, we’ve re-engaged, we’ve tried to rejuvenate, we’ve even reimagined. And the reason for that is simple: it’s because it’s in our interest to do it. Not a single one of the challenges that we have to face and that are so important to the interests of the American people can we effectively deal with alone, as powerful and as resourceful as we are. And so across the board, we’ve seen our comparative advantage as having a strong network of voluntary alliances, voluntary partnerships. And if you’re not at the table in the international system, you’re going to be on the menu. So it was very important for us to re-engage multilaterally, and we’ve done that.

When it comes to strategic competition – and there’s no doubt that we have one with China – there are a few things to be said. First, we have an obligation to manage that relationship responsibly, and I think that’s something that we hear from countries around the world, and it’s clearly in our interest to do so, and that’s exactly what President Biden is doing. And when it comes to other countries, the point is not to say to country X, Y, or Z, “You have to choose;” the point is to offer a good choice. And if we can do that – and I believe we can and we have and will continue – then I think the choice becomes fairly self-evident.

Over the last six or seven months, we have engaged in a sustainable way with China. I just met my counterpart Wang Yi here in Munich, but that follows a series of meetings, notably and most importantly President Biden and President Xi, and I think we’ve brought greater stability to the relationship, not moving away from or ignoring the fact that, yes, we have a competition, there are areas where we are contesting each other, but there are also areas where we can and should cooperate because it’s in our interest to do that.

One of the best examples of that is the agreement reached with China on fentanyl. The single largest – the number one killer, number one killer of Americans aged 18 to 49 is the synthetic opioid, fentanyl. Now we have meaningful cooperation from and with China on fentanyl. That’s going to make a difference in the lives of Americans.

**MODERATOR:** And do you think it is sustainable to have cooperation on – in some areas, climate being one of them, but to have a strategic competition – the strategic competition that defines geopolitics today and that will go on for a very long time? Do you think that that is sustainable that both sides sort of can find rules of engagement? This is where we compete and this is where we cooperate? *(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** Some fundamentals haven’t changed. Countries will act in their self-interest. Where we have to compete, we will. Where we have to contest, we will. Where it makes sense to cooperate, we will. And I think you can do all of the above at the same time.

But there’s something else that’s, I think, changed, and it goes back to the first part of the question. The very fact that we’ve re-engaged and rejuvenated as well as reimagined some of our alliances and partnerships, along with the investments that we’ve made at home in the United States – the investments we’ve made in our infrastructure, the investments we’ve made in science and technology and chips, the building blocks of the 21st century economy, the investments we’ve made in climate technology – you put those two things together: investments at home, much greater alignment with partners and allies across the board in Europe, in the Indo-Pacific, in Asia on how to approach a question as complicated as relations with China – that puts us in a position of much greater strength in dealing with all of the challenges that we have to deal with.

**MODERATOR:** Minister Jaishankar, India has more of a multiple-choice mindset. Is – would that be – would that be right? From nonalignment to – I think you may have called it or somebody else called it “all-alignment.” So you can pick and choose alliances, but you can also pick and choose topics. On Russia, for example, you still buy Russian oil. Is that okay with your counterpart from the U.S.? Everything is – your relationship is fine? You can do whatever you want whenever you want? (Laughter.)

**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** Okay. First of all –

**MODERATOR:** I mean, you’re sitting next to each other, so –

**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** No, no. First of all, delighted to be here, and I couldn’t find a better set of people to be with on the stage. So thank you for whoever put us on together.

Your question: Do we have multiple options? The answer is yes. Is that a problem? Why should it be a problem? If I’m smart enough to have multiple options, you should be admiring me, you shouldn’t be criticizing me. (Laughter and applause.)

Now, is that a problem for other people? I don’t think so. I don’t think so, certainly in this case and in that case. Because, look, we try to explain what are the different pulls and pressures which countries have. And it’s very hard to have a unidimensional relationship. Now, again, different countries and different relationships have different histories. If I were to look, say, between the U.S. and Germany, it is rooted – there’s an alliance nature to it; there’s a certain history on which that relationship is grounded. In our case it’s very different. So I don’t want you to even inadvertently give the impression that we are purely and unemotionally transactional. We are not. We get along with people. We believe in things, we share things, we agree on some things. But there are times when you’re located in different places, have different levels of development, different experiences – all of that gets into it. So life is complicated. Life is differentiated. And I think it’s very important today not to reduce the entire complexity of our world into very sweeping propositions. I think that era is today behind us.

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So I agree very much with what Tony said, which is good partners provide choices. Smart partners take some of those choices. But sometimes there will be choices on which you say, well, I think I'll pass up on that one.

**MODERATOR:** It's a very good point, which brings me to the BRICS and the rise of middle powers, because that is one of the shifts that we see today. To what extent do you think that that is a challenge to the West, or maybe that can be sort of the bridge, especially in a world where we will see continued competition between the U.S. and China? And I'm going to ask Minister Jaishankar first and – but I'd love for both of you to comment as well.

**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** Yeah, I thought maybe the BRICS one you wanted the U.S. to –

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** After you, Jai, please. (Laughter.)

**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** But look, again, I think it's important to go back to how it began. The BRICS started in an era where Western dominance was very strong. The premier gathering of the world was the G7, and you had a number of significant powers in the world who felt that, well, they were not part of the G7 but maybe they also brought value to the table by sitting and discussing with others.

So in a sense you had a collection of these countries. It was originally four; South Africa joined later. And if you look at it, it's a very interesting group because it's geographically as disparate as it can be. Yet it is bound by the fact that these discussions we've had over a decade and a half have been very useful for all of us.

Now, like any product, you test it in the market at some point. We tested it last year and asked people, so how many of you want to join BRICS? And we got almost 30 countries who were willing to join BRICS. So clearly, if 30 countries saw value in it, there must be something good we have done.

So I think it's important today to make a distinction between being non-West and anti-West. I would certainly characterize India as a country which is non-West, but which has an extremely strong relationship with Western countries getting better by the day. Not everybody else necessarily in that grouping might qualify for that description.

But the contribution the BRICS has made – if one looks at the G7 and how it evolved into the G20, I think in a way those additional 13 members who came into this bigger grouping, five of them are BRICS members. The fact that there was another group which was meeting regularly and discussing and debating I think certainly was an input into the expansion of the G7 into the G20. So I think we did a service to the world.

**MODERATOR:** Yeah. Secretary Blinken?

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** I'm tempted to say what my friend said and leave it at that. Look, the – what we don't need to do and what we're not doing is trying to somehow design the world into rigid blocks. Each and every one of the issues that we have to deal with, and deal with in the interests of the American people, may have different collections and coalitions of countries that are focused on it, that bring certain experiences, certain capacities, and I think about it as variable geometry. We're putting together a puzzle with collections of countries, and not just countries, organizations of different sizes and different shapes to deal with a given problem. (*\*Continued On The Following Column*)

As Jai said, we have – and of course the fact that the relationship between our countries, I would argue, is the strongest it's ever been, it makes no difference that India happens to be a leading member of BRICS. We're a leading member of the G7. We have the G20 and we have a multiplicity of things that we're doing together every single day in different ways of organizing ourselves. India and the United States working together in AUKUS, working together – I mean, excuse me, in the Quad, working together in a variety of other fora. All of this goes to the point that the complexity and the multiplicity of the challenges that we have demands that we find different ways to work together, and this shouldn't be done on an exclusive basis.

Look, our default, of course, is to work in the first instance with fellow democracies. That's only normal and natural. But we are not only willing, we are actively working with any country that wants to solve a particular problem and wants to do so within the context of a rules-based order. That's the way we approach things.

**MODERATOR:** Speaking of a rule-based order, major powers today are criticized for sort of upholding the rule-based order and upholding values in certain areas but not in others, and a lot of people around the world – and particularly in the Global South but I would say not only in the Global South; even within our Western democracies – are confused. They look at what's happening in Gaza and at the intensity of the killing, and they ask: Where are human rights? Where are these Western values? I'm sure you're having here today and yesterday a lot of similar discussions, Minister Baerbock.

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** Yes, and they are so productive because many of them are not only speed dating, but behind closed doors, very trustfully. And I think the most important job for those who believe in a rules-based international order, be it politicians, be it journalists, be it citizens, is to not be pushed into this speed dating, into this black-and-white world in all of our bubbles. Because easily – and this is a double-standard question, yeah – if you only look – and you mentioned the situation in Gaza. If I only see the whole time on YouTube what's happening in Gaza, and I do that every second day – every day I cannot stand it because otherwise I couldn't get out of my bed anymore – yeah, your reality is obviously – the only thing what we can and have to do right now is to go in a total ceasefire to rescue these innocent children dying there every day. Yeah?

So, and you're 100 percent right by that. But the question is to really come to this reality is to force myself – not myself, but all these persons who are saying this is the moral right thing to do – to then also ask: So how do we come to that? And this is then when some might ask: So why you, German foreign minister, didn't call for immediate ceasefire the last – months ago? Because I also looked at the other side, at the other YouTube videos, at the other bubbles, yeah, where we saw, I saw for days after the 7th of October – I didn't only see it, I spoke to the father whose wife and two little girls had been kidnapped by terrorists from Hamas. I saw the video where women have been not only raped, but murdered afterwards. And in that moment for me it was clear, again, that we can also not only relate to the past saying, okay, we know how negotiations about – with terrorists are working. Because if you saw that video and if you were ready to see this woman suffering there, you understand that this is not only a military logic. Because those people who are doing this, raping a woman and killing her afterwards, they don't want to exchange soldiers for political prisoners. They enjoy slaughtering women.

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I'm saying that because I think this is really important, bringing it down to the people. Because then you understand in this kind of situation, how do we come now to a ceasefire? That the release of hostages, the release of these women is crucial because otherwise we can never save the children in Gaza.

So this comes all back to what my dear colleague Jaishankar has said. If we are not capable of stepping out of right or wrong, yes or no, black or white, we will in this world of dilemmas never do what our job – I would say the three of us here – is: to do all the best to rescue people. And this is why we have been working so intensively for those partners, Arab partners, in the last three months to see how we can come together for the most important point right now: freeing the hostages, having a humanitarian pause to bring in humanitarian support into Gaza, and not stopping even though the headlines are there every day: You cannot fix it anyhow.

I think the biggest favor for those who do not care for human rights and the international order is that we are giving up and that we are not being ready to look at these different topics from our different side. And this is why – at least for me; I would say for all the three of us – use our competences, use our channels we are having. And there again diversity is beneficial. If we are not all the same, but if we are trying to solve this horrible war in the Middle East from our different perspectives, then we can also bring security both for the people in Israel and the people in Gaza.

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** I have to say I fully subscribe – (applause) – fully subscribe to everything that Annalena said. And I think as people in positions, for a brief period of time, of responsibility, but also, and maybe foremost, as human beings – as mothers, fathers, children, brothers, and sisters – we're intensely driven to try to prevent or stop human suffering, including the suffering of men, women, and children in Gaza. The question is how to do it most effectively and how to take account of the incredible complexity that Annalena just outlined so well.

But there's another element to this that we have a responsibility to do something about. The greatest poison in our common well is dehumanization. And we see that in all directions. And if you lose sight of the humanity of someone else, then your heart is hardened to a point where anything is acceptable and anything is possible. Part of our responsibility is to do what we can to push back, to avoid, to call out dehumanization wherever it's coming from, in whatever direction. Because if we can't get at that, it's very hard, if not impossible, to do other things.

**MODERATOR:** One other criticism that I think I'm sure you hear a lot is U.S. policy has, of course, shifted in the last couple of months, but yet you want the fighting to stop, but there is no sign whatsoever that you're not willing to send weapons to Israel, for example. So that also confuses people. When they look at the rhetoric versus the action, what would you say to that?

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** Well, first, we're committed to Israel's security. That's been clear from day one. It remains clear. And we understand and support the proposition that Israel has to find ways to make sure that what happened on October 7th never happens again. (Applause.) So we start there.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** May I add one thing on that?

**MODERATOR:** What is – yes, sure.

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** Because for the full picture – and this is what we are discussing, and this is a good thing. In these horrible times, I'm always trying to see the glimpse of hope at the horizon. The good thing is that over the last three months, yeah, all these discussions were helpful in a way. First we didn't have any humanitarian support; now we have at least a few trucks – not enough trucks. But also from the other understanding – and this is why I totally agree with the security guarantees for Israel – you cannot just say we need a ceasefire and the Israeli government, the IDF has to stop, and then we just wait and see what happens through the regrouping of Hamas. No, we have to give an answer to both legitimate security concerns.

So our part of discussion is, for example, in the north, yeah? If people go back to the north, how do we as an international community secure that Hamas is not regrouping there, using, misusing against civilians as human protection shield? And this is also part of our common international security response. (Applause.)

**MODERATOR:** Minister Jaishankar, what is the view from India? What would you – if you had some advice for your colleagues, what would you be – what would you tell them?

**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** Well, I don't have advice for my colleagues, though I – particularly, I think all of us follow the enormous efforts which Tony is putting in right now. But look, the way we look at it, there are different dimensions, different elements to this.

Number one, we must be clear that what happened on October 7th was terrorism. No caveats, no justification, no explanation. It was terrorism.

Number two, as Israel responds, it is important that Israel should be – should have been very mindful of civilian casualties, that it has an obligation to observe international humanitarian law.

Number three, the return of hostages is today imperative.

Number four, there is a need for a humanitarian corridor, a sustainable humanitarian corridor to provide relief. And eventually, there has to be a permanent fix, a long-term fix, otherwise we're going to see a recurrence.

And I think today, suddenly – India has long believed in a two-state solution; we have maintained that position for many decades. And I think today, many more countries in the world today feel not just that a two-state solution is necessary, but it is more urgent than it was before.

**MODERATOR:** Let me take a couple of questions. I think there is a gentleman there, and then there and there. Okay, three. Let's take – let's take all three questions. Actually, we'll take four questions very quickly.

*(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

**PARTICIPANT:** Four is here?

**MODERATOR:** Yes, four is there.

**QUESTION:** Nathalie Tocci, Rome. A question – in fact, both to Secretary Blinken and to Foreign Minister Baerbock. I mean, the logic of the argument of being somewhat reticent on pushing for a ceasefire, as far as I understand, is basically that of saying, well, one needs to make sure that what happened on the 7th of October does not happen again. And so the question that I ask you is, do you think that what is happening now, what has happened over the last four months, will actually reduce the chances of what happened on the 7th of October happening again? Will it actually make Israel more secure or not?

**MODERATOR:** Okay, so there is —

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** And I (inaudible).

**MODERATOR:** Okay, so I thought that question was that side, but okay.

**QUESTION:** Okay, thank you very much. Oleksiy Goncharenko, a member of the parliament of Ukraine. Secretary Blinken, you said those who are not at the table are in the menu. Ukraine was at the table in Budapest when we voluntarily gave up our nuclear weaponry. Now we are in the menu. So the question is, what is the way for us? We are confronted with a nuclear power. Either we will become a member of NATO Alliance with a nuclear power or we should restore our nuclear status. I don't see any other option. What option do you prefer and what you will answer on this? Thank you very much.

**MODERATOR:** Okay. There's a question here, question there, and then we'll do one round. Would that be okay?

**PARTICIPANT:** Do you want me to get —

**MODERATOR:** Yes, I mean, I have said — yeah, here we go.

**QUESTION:** Thank you. My name is Shafik Gabr, from Egypt. My question is to Secretary Blinken. You've invested an incredible amount of time trying to bring a settlement in the issue of Gaza, and at the very same time we all feel in the region that things can spill over in a very dramatic way. Especially, there are many excuses of why not to have a solution, but to do things step by step. That is not going to work. So my question to you is, sir, why, with all the countries, including the United States, including the UK, just what Cameron has just said, proclaiming a two-state solution is not something the United States puts on the floor now and be able to achieve that?

**MODERATOR:** Okay, thank you. Thank you. Finally, there's a question there, and then I'm afraid —

**QUESTION:** I have a loud voice; I don't need a microphone. Hello, my name is Masih Alinejad. I'm an Iranian troublemaker for mullahs, and I have a simple question. We cannot talk about global security by forgetting about Iran, by burying the human rights abuses under the carpet. I am here today with a woman who was in the front line of last year's uprising. She was shot in her eye; she lost her eyes because of the Revolutionary Guards. So my question is very clear: How we can reach to peace and security in the world without designating the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization, which the United States of America did that — thanks — but why the allies are not following the United States? The democratic countries are not as united as autocracy, because Islamic Republic is helping Putin, is helping Hamas, all the proxies in Yemen. So as we see, unfortunately, dictators are more united than democratic countries. Do you have any common strategy to isolate Islamic Republic and address Khamenei and his gang of killers the way that you address Putin? Thank you so much.

**MODERATOR:** Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.) All three of you, you can pick the question you want to answer. I know one was directed — a couple were directed at Secretary Blinken. So maybe —

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**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** Want me to start?

**MODERATOR:** Maybe you start. Yeah.

**SECRETARY BLINKEN:** Good. So to the question, is Israel more secure now after — four months after October 7th, I think the answer is, in the near term, in the immediate, yes it is, in terms of dealing with the immediate threat, the horrific terrorist group that attacked it in the most unimaginable ways on October 7th. Is it more secure for the long term? That's a different question. Because the fundamental question we have to ask ourselves is — and Jai mentioned this — how do we make sure that the cycle one way or another doesn't repeat itself, whether it's a year from now, five years from now, or 10 years from now?

I think there's an extraordinary opportunity before Israel in the months ahead to actually once and for all end that cycle. And it's because there are some new facts that didn't exist before when there were efforts to make peace between Israelis and Palestinians, starting with the fact that virtually every Arab country now genuinely wants to integrate Israel into the region, to normalize relations if they haven't already done so, to provide security assurances and commitments so that Israel can feel more safe and more secure. At the same time, there are genuine efforts underway led by Arab countries to reform, revitalize, revamp the Palestinian Authority so that it can be more effective in representing the interests of the Palestinian people and could be a better partner for Israel in that future. And there's also, I think, the imperative that Jai mentioned that's more urgent than ever: to proceed to a Palestinian state, one that also ensures the security of Israel and makes the necessary commitments to do so.

If you put all of that together, you have an integrated region where people are actually working together for the common good, a region in which Israel is secure in ways that it's never been before, and where the number one threat to its security as well as the security of many of us — just alluded to in the last question, Iran — is isolated along with all of its proxies. That future, that path is there, it's clear, it's hard, it's complicated, but it's real.

The alternative is an endless repetition of the cycle that we've seen year after year, decade after decade, generation after generation. It's incumbent upon all of us who have relationships with and responsibility for different countries in the region, things that we bring to the table ourselves, to make the hard decisions, do the difficult things to actually make that path clear, real, and one that — whose attraction is overwhelmingly powerful. I think the more we're able to do that and the more we distinguish between that path and the alternative, the greater the chance we'll actually see movement in that direction.

I'll say just very quickly on Ukraine, I think you've heard throughout this conference, including by the fact that we have an extraordinary delegation from the United States Congress here — Republicans, Democrats, Senate, House — that there is enduring support for Ukraine, and that's not just from the United States, it's from country after country in Europe and well beyond, for a whole variety of reasons, starting of course with the aggression that the Ukrainians have suffered, but also because that aggression has gone to the very principles at the heart of the international system that each of us has a stake in preserving, and that's not going away.

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So there's a tremendous determination on the part of dozens of countries to do two things. First, to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to deal in the immediate with the ongoing Russian aggression; but second, to put Ukraine on a path where increasingly in the months and years to come it's able to stand strongly on its own two feet militarily, economically, and democratically. That is the strongest possible rebuke to Putin. It's the strongest possible rebuke to all those who would seek to undermine Ukraine.

And I'll just conclude with this: The real lesson to be drawn from what we've seen – including, as you rightly said, Russia tearing up and then spitting on the Budapest Memorandum, among many, many other agreements – is that this aggression against Ukraine has been an absolute strategic debacle for Vladimir Putin and for Russia. Russia is weaker militarily, it's weaker economically, it's weaker diplomatically. Europe has ended its energy dependence on Russia in the space of two years. Ukrainians are more united than they've ever been, including against Russia, which was not the case certainly in 2014 – not desirable, but it's the result of Russia's actions – and certainly since 2022. We have the NATO Alliance, a defensive Alliance with no intent of ever attacking Russia, only there to defend its members, that is now stronger and larger. All of this a result of actions that Russia has taken, precipitating the very things it said it wanted to prevent.

So I think as those lessons are digested, not to mention the horrific losses that Russia has suffered as a result of Vladimir Putin throwing its young men into a meatgrinder of his own making, I think the more those lessons are digested, the more you're going to see that this is not repeated. But that requires all of us to maintain the solidarity that we've demonstrated with Ukraine, a solidarity that is important not just for Ukraine, but for all of us. The stakes couldn't be higher. So my belief, again, listening to everyone here over the last couple of days, talking to our members of Congress who are with us, is that not only is that support there, it will be sustained, and Ukraine will succeed.

**MODERATOR:** Thank you, Secretary. Minister Baerbock.

**FOREIGN MINISTER BAERBOCK:** Well, I guess the question from Iran was for us. So the question was, why do you not follow the example and list them as terrorists, in a terrorist sanction regime, the Revolutionary Guard? We have discussed it quite often, but the quick answer is because I'm defending rule of law, trying without any double standards. And our legal situation in the European Union – and you can like it or not, but this is how – in which context we are working – in our European legal system, we have a sanction system for listing under terrorism if terrorism occurs in another country, especially in the European Union. It was after the attacks on the U.S. on the 9th of September.

So we need a legal ground to list them. So far, we do not have the evidence and proof that there have been these terrorist attacks in the European Union. There were different cases. It's a different legal system in the U.S.

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But – and this is important for me because I hear this argument again and again – this is not because we shy away with regard to the Revolutionary Guard or the crimes against women, youth, civil society, its own population. No. We use the instruments we are having as a European Union to defend human rights. And we set up for the first time in history of the European Union a sanction systems because of human rights violation. And for me this is even stronger. In the past, it was the same with Daesh and the crimes against Yezidi women, yeah? They have been brought to court not slaughtering women, not saying these are the worst sexual violence crimes you commit, but under terrorism.

I think this is wrong. We have to name the crimes, and the crime is targeted directly to women, directly to human rights. We say we sanction you because of what you have done to you shooting in your eyes, killing your friends, killing your sisters. And it's the same effect. And this it comes all down to me – for me, politics, it's not about symbolic action. It's about what matters for the people.

And under the sanction system, human rights sanctions from the EU, Revolutionary Guard – we named them – cannot enter the European Union. We have frozen their assets. So the result is exactly the same what the U.S. has done under the terrorist sanction system. So if you're asking, do we act as a result in the same way? Yes, we do, but we call it human rights sanction system because these are the worst human rights violations you can see.

And this comes also back to the other question about symbolic politics or what matters in reality. We would have been at a total different stage if, after the 7th of October – this was a question from Italy – after the 7th of October, we could have had a common resolution. We were in Cairo at the so-called peace summit together with different countries, many Arab partners, and also from the European Union. We tried to fix a text where we would say, okay, after these horrible crimes of the 7th of October, there could be the momentum now for whatever generations have dreamt of: a two-state solution pathway. But in order to do that, we have to guarantee that the 7th of October never happens again to Israel and we have to guarantee that Palestinians have the security to live in peace and security for them.

Unfortunately, those meeting there together, not everybody was ready to name the 7th of October what it was: a terrorist attack from Hamas on Israeli people. And this is why we passed this momentum. I regret it, but this is how life is. So now again we have to work again if we now, after four months where we see that the current situation only brings misery for everybody, if we can regroup again. And this is why what we have described before, for us it's so important to work together as European Union, as the U.S., with Arab partners to find what we need: guarantees that Israelis can live forever in security; that the 7th of October can never happen again; and the same counts for Palestinian people – it has to be an irreversible path towards a two-state solution. And this is our job which we have to do right now, and we can only do it together with the different partners.

Neither the U.S., definitely not Germany, but also not one Arab country alone can go this path. We have to group and unite together for the peace in the Middle East. (Applause.)

**MODERATOR:** *Inshallah*, as they would say in the Middle East. One —  
**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** So I'll just take a minute.

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**MODERATOR:** One minute, yes.

**FOREIGN MINISTER JAISHANKAR:** I think a very large number of countries, especially of the Global South, believe that terrorism shouldn't be countenanced or justified. But they equally strongly believe that a two-state solution should not be delayed. These are not choices. These are both musts. And unless we are able to address both these issues, we are not going to really solve the problem.

**MODERATOR:** Well, thank you all. I know that we've gone over time, so apologies for that. And thank you to the audience. (Applause.)

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## DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

### OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations

31 CFR part 587

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 83A

Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof Prohibited by Executive Order 14068

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by the determination of December 22, 2023 made pursuant to section 1(a)(i)(B) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14068, as amended by E.O. 14114 ("Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof"), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of seafood derivative products that were loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading prior to 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 20, 2024, pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered into prior to December 22, 2023, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 31, 2024.

(b) This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

(c) Effective February 20, 2024, General License No. 83, dated December 22, 2023, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 83A.

Bradley T. Smith

Director

Office of Foreign Assets Control

Dated: February 20, 2024

Bradley T. Smith Digitally signed by Bradley T.

Smith

Date: 2024.02.20 12:38:24 -05'00'

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## RTX's Pratt & Whitney announces further capacity expansion at Singapore Manufacturing Facility

News provided by [RTX](#)

Feb 19, 2024, 8:15 PM ET

*Investment to significantly increase the facility's output yield of turbine disks and headcount*

Pratt & Whitney's Singapore facility currently produces 2,400 turbine disks annually, and the expansion is expected to increase annual output yield of the disks by approximately 45% by January 2026. The expansion will also improve the facility's capacity to intake raw materials, maintain inventory, and keep production and deliveries on schedule.

"This is a critical expansion to enable us to keep pace with the fleet of GTF engines and high-pressure turbine disks. With this latest development we are focused on automation and connectivity as part of our commitment to Industry 4.0 principles that aim to enhance operational efficiency and productivity," said Marc Paquet, general manager for P&W NGPF Manufacturing Company Singapore Pte Ltd. Pratt & Whitney's Singapore manufacturing facility achieved full operational capability in June 2023, and plays a key role in the company's production of critical components for the GTF™ engine family. The facility uses wall-to-wall closed-door machining and actively integrates the latest technology and automation into the manufacturing process.

The 20,500 square meter facility produces hybrid metallic fan blades and highly complex turbine components. The Singapore facility, a joint venture between Pratt & Whitney and Hanwha Aerospace Co., Ltd., is the second Pratt & Whitney fan blade and HPT disk production facility in the world, playing a critical role in supporting customer needs in Asia Pacific and beyond.

### About Pratt & Whitney

Pratt & Whitney is a world leader in the design, manufacture and service of aircraft engines and auxiliary power units. To learn more, visit [www.prattwhitney.com](http://www.prattwhitney.com).

### About RTX

RTX is the world's largest aerospace and defense company. With more than 185,000 global employees, we push the limits of technology and science to redefine how we connect and protect our world. Through industry-leading businesses – Collins Aerospace, Pratt & Whitney, and Raytheon – we are advancing aviation, engineering integrated defense systems for operational success, and developing next-generation technology solutions and manufacturing to help global customers address their most critical challenges. The company, with 2023 sales of \$68.9 billion, is headquartered in Arlington, Virginia.

**For questions or to schedule an interview, please contact [corporatepr@rtx.com](mailto:corporatepr@rtx.com)**

## New Visa Restriction Policy for Transportation Operators Facilitating Irregular Migration to the United States

02/21/2024 09:35 AM EST

Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson

The State Department is today implementing a new visa restriction policy under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 212(a)(3)(C) that targets owners, executives, and senior officials of charter flight, ground, and maritime transportation companies providing transportation services designed for use primarily by persons intending to migrate irregularly to the United States. This new policy expands and supersedes the Nicaragua 3C policy on charter flights issued in November 2023.

The policy targets transportation operations that prey on vulnerable migrants and facilitate irregular migration around the world and to the United States. Those who come to the United States without a legal basis often pay extortion-level prices and put themselves and accompanying family members at risk, only to be placed into removal proceedings pursuant to U.S. immigration laws.

No one should profit from vulnerable migrants—not smugglers, private companies, public officials, or governments. We will continue engaging with governments and the private sector, both within and outside the region, to eliminate this exploitative practice.

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## Leaked files from Chinese firm show Beijing's vast international hacking effort against foreign governments and companies

Leaked documents from iSoon, a Shanghai-based private hacking firm working for the Chinese government, detail cyber operations against government agencies and companies in more than 20 countries. Hackers are vying for lucrative government contracts by pledging ever more devastating and comprehensive access to sensitive information.

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### **Report: North Korean missile fired by Russia against Ukraine contained US and European components**

CNN Nastasha Bertrand

4 minute read

Published 8:06 AM EST, Tue February 20, 2024

CNN —

A North Korean ballistic missile fired last month by the Russian military in Ukraine contained hundreds of components that trace back to companies in the US and Europe, according to a new [report](#).

The findings mark the first public identification of North Korea's reliance on foreign technology for its missile program and underscore the persistent problem facing the Biden administration as it tries to keep cheap, Western-made microelectronics intended for civilian use from winding up in weapons used by North Korea, Iran and Russia.

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The findings mark the first public identification of North Korea's reliance on foreign technology for its missile program and underscore the persistent problem facing the Biden administration as it tries to keep cheap, Western-made microelectronics intended for civilian use from winding up in weapons used by North Korea, Iran and Russia.

The UK-based investigative organization Conflict Armament Research, or CAR, directly examined 290 components from remnants of a North Korean ballistic missile recovered in January from Kharkiv, Ukraine, and found that 75% of the components were designed and sold by companies incorporated in the United States, according to the report shared first with CNN.

A further 16% of the components found in the missile were linked to companies incorporated in Europe, the researchers found, and 9% to companies incorporated in Asia. These components primarily comprised the missile's navigation system and could be traced to 26 companies headquartered in the US, China, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland and Taiwan, the report says.

Last year, [as CNN previously reported](#), CAR determined that 82% of components inside Iranian-made attack drones fired by Russia inside Ukraine were made by US companies.

Along with extensive sanctions and export controls aimed at curbing access to Western-made technology, in late 2022 the Biden administration also set up an expansive task force to investigate how US and Western components, including American-made microelectronics, were ending up in Iranian-made drones Russia has been [launching by the hundreds into Ukraine](#).

It is not clear how much progress that task force has made — the National Security Council did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

### **Circumventing 20 years of sanctions**

The latest CAR report does not name the specific companies that produced the components, because there is no evidence the firms deliberately shipped the parts to North Korea — instead, the components were likely diverted somewhere in the vast global supply chain once the companies sold them to various international distributors. CAR therefore prefers to work with the companies to try to fix the problem rather than to name and shame them, a CAR spokesperson told CNN

The tail section of the ballistic missile examined by the group Conflict Armament Research, which includes the missile's navigation system, and the countries where the components originated.

### **Courtesy Conflict Armament Research**

The research also shows that North Korea was able to produce the missile and ship it over to Russia quickly. The components examined by the researchers were manufactured between 2021 and 2023. Based on those production dates, the researchers say the missile "could not have been assembled before March 2023" and was being used by Russia in Ukraine by January.

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The fact that North Korea's missile production appears to be fueled by parts originating in the West underscores how difficult it is for the US and its allies to control where commercial electronics are going, particularly semiconductor components that are extremely challenging to track once they enter the global supply chain.

The findings indicate North Korea "has developed a robust acquisition network capable of circumventing, without detection, sanction regimes that have been in place for nearly two decades," the CAR report says.

And while Russia continues to be supplied by North Korea and Iran, the Biden administration has been unable to send new weaponry and equipment to the Ukrainian military because Congress has not approved the required supplemental funding to do so.

#### More evidence of Russia, North Korea ties

The White House confirmed last month that Russia has been firing North Korean missiles at Ukrainian cities. North Korea has also likely provided Russia with "millions of artillery rounds" over the last year, according to a report published last week by the Pentagon's inspector general.

Intelligence officials in Washington are increasingly concerned about the growing ties between North Korea and Russia, CNN previously reported, and the long-term implications of what appears to be a new level of strategic partnership between the two nations.

CAR said its examination of the North Korean missile "shows that North Korea has been able to produce advanced weapons, integrating components produced as recently as 2023, in spite of United Nations Security Council sanctions in place since 2006 that prohibit the production of ballistic missiles by North Korea."

Russia's use of North Korean missiles on the battlefield in Ukraine may also give Pyongyang data it can't get from a testing program that has seen dozens of the weapons fired over the past few years under leader Kim Jong Un.

North Korea may also be seeking military assistance from Russia including "fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment, war materials and other advanced technologies," National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said last month.

"This would have concerning security implications for the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region," he added.

## Letter to the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate on the Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Libya

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Madam President:)

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the *Federal Register* for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to Libya declared in Executive Order 13566 of February 25, 2011, and expanded in Executive Order 13726 of April 19, 2016, is to continue in effect beyond February 25, 2024.

Libyans confront ongoing instability originating from actions Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, his government, and close associates took against the people of Libya in 2011. Civil conflict in Libya will continue until Libyans resolve their political divisions and foreign military intervention ends. Because many of these divisions relate to access to resources, a serious risk remains that, if not protected, Libyan state assets will be misappropriated by parties determined to undermine the ongoing United Nations peace process, including former members of the Qadhafi government, members of the Qadhafi family, or Qadhafi's close associates. The diversion of these resources could prolong and deepen the current instability in Libya, which benefits ISIS and other terrorist groups that pose a serious threat to the national security of the United States and the security of regional partners. We run the risk of military escalation if sanctions do not remain in effect, particularly since those who reject dialogue and obstruct and undermine Libya's democratic transition remain interested in exploiting the wealth of the Libyan people to advance their narrow self-interest and perpetuate conflict in the country.

The situation in Libya continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and we need to protect against the diversion of assets or other abuse by persons hindering Libyan national reconciliation, including Qadhafi's family and associates. Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13566 with respect to Libya.

Sincerely, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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## On-the-Record Press Call on the Biden-Harris Administration Initiative to Bolster the Cybersecurity of U.S. Ports

Via Teleconference (February 20, 2024)

5:38 P.M. EST

MODERATOR: Good afternoon, everyone. And thank you for joining our background call to preview a series of actions that the Biden-Harris administration will announce tomorrow, Wednesday, February 21st.

For awareness, today's call will now be held fully on the record. That means both the opening statements and Q&A all on record. And it will be attributable to Anne Neuberger, Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies; Iranga Kahangama, Assistant Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk, and Resilience at the Department of Homeland Security; and Rear Admiral John Vann, who is the Commander of Coast Guard Cyber Command. **(\*Continued On The Following Page)**

One flag that today's call will be embargoed until tomorrow, Wednesday, February 21st, at 5:00 a.m. Eastern.

I will now turn it over to Anne for opening remarks.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you so much, Sam. Good evening, everyone. Thank you for joining us this evening.

Right now, America's ports employ 31 million Americans, contribute \$5.4 trillion to our economy, and are the main domestic point of entry for cargo entering the United States.

The continuity of their operations has a clear and direct impact on the success of our country, our economy, and our national security. And that's why the Biden-Harris administration is taking a series of actions to strengthen the cybersecurity of our nation's ports to not just shore up our cyber defenses, but fortify our supply chains and deliver for the American people.

Tomorrow, we'll be announcing a set of four actions.

First, President Biden will sign an executive order that will bolster the Department of Homeland Security's authority to address maritime cyber threats. You see, most critical infrastructure owners and operators have a list of safety regulations they have to comply with, and we want to ensure that there are similar requirements for cyber, when a cyberattack can cause just as much, if not more, damage than a storm or another physical threat.

So this executive order will give the Coast Guard the authority to respond to malicious cyber activity by requiring maritime transportation vessels and facilities to shore up their cybersecurity and institute mandatory reporting of cyber incidents.

The Coast Guard will also issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish minimum cybersecurity requirements that meet international and industry-recognized standards to best manage cyber threats.

The administration is also excited to announce that we will invest over \$20 billion into U.S. port infrastructure over the next five years through the President's Investing in America agenda. As part of that, PACECO Corporation, a U.S.-based subsidiary of Mitsui E&S, is planning to onshore domestic manufacturing capacity for American and Korean production for the first time in 30 years, pending final site and partner selection.

Finally, the Coast Guard will announce a maritime security director, which Admiral Vann will outline in greater detail, regarding the security of ports related to these cranes.

Tomorrow's actions are clear examples of the President's work to invest in America to secure the country's supply chain and strengthen cybersecurity of our nation's critical infrastructure — priorities this administration is focused on relentlessly since taking office.

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And before I turn it over, I'd like to begin just by recognizing individuals on the NSC, Caitlin Clarke and Jon Murphy, at DHS and at the Coast Guard, who have put in a great deal of work into this effort over the last number of months.

So now I'd like to turn it over to my colleague, Iranga Kahangama, to detail more the actions of DHS, and then over to the Coast Guard. Thank you.

MR. KAHANGAMA: Thank you, Anne. And thanks, everyone, for being here this evening.

Really to foot-stomp what Anne had mentioned, the department is really excited about the actions that we're taking as a comprehensive whole-of-DHS approach to mitigating cyber threats to our critical infrastructure, particularly in the maritime sector and port infrastructure, which have downstream implications to our supply chains.

Specifically regarding the notice of proposed rulemaking on DHS regulations and minimum cybersecurity standards, we are excited to put this out for public comment. We believe it is an exemplar of our commitment to partnership in developing these regs and building off of lessons learned as part of the administration's approach to instituting mandatory cybersecurity minimum standards.

The department worked closely with entities such as TSA, who have done some of this work through some of its emergency directives, and in close partnership and consultation with industry partners to ensure that the cybersecurity requirements are in line with expectations.

And so, we enthusiastically welcome public comment on these as we develop cybersecurity standards in line with the Biden-Harris administration's approach to identifying and using mandatory regulations to improve critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, where we deem it most necessary.

Also in line with the department's approach to harmonization, we are attempting to make sure that those rules and regulations align with other efforts that we're taking underway, and are doing our best to align those with existing frameworks instituted by CISA and partners at NIST as well.

I just wanted to emphasize that the department also sees that the threat posed to critical infrastructure, particularly maritime and port infrastructure, is a whole-of-department approach, not only leveraging the Coast Guard's authorities and announcements tomorrow, but as mentioned, the department's newly announced Supply Chain Resilience Center last November as part of a White House rollout, but that this component is going to seek to bolster U.S. supply chain security, harness and maximize the department's capabilities related to lawful trade and travel, and manage critical infrastructure security, leveraging its unique resources around the department.

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In its inaugural effort, we have done things like convene with members of industry and government organizations to share information and guidance to advance supply chain resilience and hosting department-wide tabletop exercises to better understand what causes supply chain disruptions and provide recommendations and develop policy to leadership to mitigate impacts to our domestic supply chain.

The Supply Chain Resilience Center was also created as a recommendation from our Homeland Security Advisory Committee. And just as we are excited about the actions of the Coast Guard, we're also looking forward to leveraging the Supply Chain Resilience Center to push forward port security and maritime security throughout the industry.

So, with that, I want to turn it over to Admiral Jay Vann to deep-dive on some of the specific Coast Guard actions.

Thank you.

ADMIRAL VANN: Thank you, Iranga. And thanks to everyone for joining us this evening. I'm going to jump right in.

My name is Rear Admiral Jay Vann, and I'm the Commander of the United States Coast Guard Cyber Command. Coast Guard Cyber is responsible for conducting cyberspace operations in support of the administration, DHS, DOD, and Coast Guard priorities.

I want to reemphasize the criticality of the Marine Transportation System that we seek to protect. I'll refer to it as the MTS. This interconnected system within our transportation critical infrastructure is vital to national security and economic prosperity.

As was mentioned, America's system of ports and waterways accounts for over \$5.4 trillion of our nation's annual economic activity, and our ports serve as a gateway for over 90 percent of all overseas trade.

The MTS enables critical national security sealift capabilities that enable the U.S. Armed Forces to project and maintain power around the globe. Any disruption to the MTS, whether man-made or natural, physical or in cyberspace, has the potential to cause cascading impacts to our domestic or global supply chains.

The executive order to be signed tomorrow ensures Coast Guard authorities are aligned with emerging cybersecurity threats and reflects the commitment of the administration, DHS, and the Coast Guard to safeguard maritime critical infrastructure.

The EO directly amends federal regulations and provides a Coast Guard captain of the port with clear authority to take action in the face of cyber threats. This includes controlling the movement of vessels that present a known or suspected cyber threat, requiring facilities to correct unsatisfactory cyber conditions that may endanger port safety and security, or inspection and search of vessels and waterfront facilities to include their cyber systems and networks. The update also empowers the Commandant of the Coast Guard to prescribe measures to prevent, detect, assess, and remediate an actual or threatened cyber incident.

As we undertake measures to prevent cyber incidents, let me address a specific, acute MTS cyber vulnerability that was mentioned earlier. The People's Republic of China-manufactured ship-to-shore cranes make up the largest share of the global market and account for nearly 80 percent of cranes at U.S. ports. By design, these cranes may be controlled, serviced, and programmed from remote locations. These features potentially leave PRC-manufactured cranes vulnerable to exploitation.

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On the heels of this executive order, the Coast Guard is issuing a Maritime Security, or MARSEC, Directive based on the prevalence of PRC-manufactured cranes in the U.S. and threat intelligence related to PRC's interests in disrupting U.S. critical infrastructure.

The MARSEC Directive will impose a number of cybersecurity requirements on the owners and operators of PRC-manufactured cranes. The specific requirements are deemed sensitive security information and cannot be shared publicly. Our captains of the port around the country will be working directly with crane owners and operators to deliver the directive and verify compliance.

Finally, also as was mentioned, we're announcing a notice of proposed rulemaking that will establish baseline cybersecurity requirements to protect the entire MTS from cyber threats. Those draft requirements are primarily based on the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's cross-sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, which the maritime industry should already be familiar with.

The proposed regulations would require a number of cybersecurity measures to be implemented by all regulated entities. The Coast Guard highly encourages MTS stakeholders to provide feedback and input during the period of public comment, which begins tomorrow. A federal register notice will outline the process for submitting comments through the federal decision-making portal, and the public comment period will be open until April 22nd of this year.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone, for those remarks there at the top. If you have a question, please use the hand-raising feature. If you are on your cell, please use \*6 and you should be able to raise your hand.

Our first question will go to Justin with Bloomberg.

Q Hey, guys. Thanks for doing this call. I was wondering if you could talk about the extent to which this is or isn't a response to the notice that you guys — or the advisory you published earlier this month about Volt Typhoon and concerns that you have there.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you so much, Justin.

So, since the — really, since the beginning of administration, we've put a focus on securing critical infrastructure. Certainly critical infrastructure that also has ties to national security in terms of our ports from which our military deploys, from which our materiel deploys, as well as through which our economy operates are at the top of the list. So we've been working on this notice of proposed rulemaking and executive order for the last 18 months.

So while it certainly ties to particular concerns about Chinese cyber activity, we also have concerns regarding criminal activity.

One of Japan's largest ports, the port of Nagoya, was disrupted by a criminal ransomware attack for several days. So, Chinese threats are one key threat that this executive order and notice of proposed rulemaking will help protect ports against, and certainly the focus on cranes and the risks, as Admiral John Vann talked about, of remote access to cranes and to their operations.

There's a reason that we not only are issuing cybersecurity minimum requirements for ports, but also putting in place a maritime directive focused on cyber risk management for ship-to-shore cranes manufactured by China.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question will go to Colleen with the AP.

Q Hi there. I wanted to ask about enforcement — enforcement of requirements for reporting a cyberattack and then also, potentially, you know, enforcement of the cybersecurity requirements that will be put into place.

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Can you just talk a little bit about how it would work, how people would be — or, I guess, companies and governments would be encouraged to do, in particular cyberattack reporting, particularly because there's such an unwillingness to come publicly when people are hit with a cyberattack?

MS. NEUBERGER: Colleen, that's a great question. The core aspect we have here is ensuring that the regulatory agencies — in this case, the Coast Guard for ports — have the authority to directly require minimum cybersecurity requirements and require that reporting. And as a regulator, that can be enforced.

I'll turn it over to Admiral Vann, if you'd like to elaborate on that.

ADMIRAL VANN: Yes. Thanks for the question, Colleen.

So, the notice of proposed rulemaking will not only include those requirements but enhanced definition of reporting requirements to include specific regulated facilities and vessels reporting to Coast Guard — Coast Guard sharing reports with CISA and other government agencies.

So, as far as enforcing reporting, is that really your question?

Q Yeah. I'm just wondering how you — you know, if you're asking people to report when they have a cyberattack, how do you enforce that reporting.

MS. NEUBERGER: It's a requirement rather than a request. The Coast Guard is the regulator for ports, and the executive order takes their existing physical authorities to set security rules for ports and extends that to the cybersecurity domain.

So, ports will be required to report that to the Coast Guard. As Admiral Vann noted, the Coast Guard can then share that with other entities, including CISA and the FBI.

So it's a shift from requesting to requiring.

Q Got it. Thank you.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you, Colleen.

MODERATOR: Thank you both. Our next question will go to Sean with CNN.

Q Hey, thanks all. Just to follow up quickly on Colleen's question: What's the punishment for failure to report?

And then a second question for the Admiral about the cranes trying to track, other mentions of that concern in open source. I'm not seeing a ton. How many — roughly, how many cranes are out there that U.S. officials are concerned about? And is there any effort to sort of rip and replace, if you will, these machines? Or is it all a case of just trying to manage what's already out there?

ADMIRAL VANN: Okay, thanks for the question, Sean. I'll take the second part first.

There are over — by our count, over 200 PRC-manufactured cranes across U.S. ports and regulated facilities. Our Coast Guard cyber protection teams have assessed cybersecurity or hunted for threats, as of today, on 92 of those cranes.

And so, those assessments determine the cybersecurity posture, and the hunt missions actually look for malicious cyber activity on the cranes. And so, we've almost canvassed about 50 percent of the existing cranes.

I don't have an answer for your rip and replace. I might refer that question to Deputy National Security Advisor Neuberger regarding other manufacturers and where we're heading, as far as that goes.

As for punishments for failure to report, again, what will go out after the EO is signed tomorrow is a notice of proposed rulemaking. And so, after we receive public comment and input on the regulations, regulations will be finalized to include enforcement actions being defined.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you very much, Admiral Vann.

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Sean, I'll come in on the rip and replace question. At this point, we're not exploring rip and replace for ports. What we are focused on is ensuring that all the investment in port infrastructure that I mentioned at the outset, that's part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, can go to buying trusted cranes and to bringing back manufacturing to the United States, given how important cranes are to port operations.

So our goal is focused that new investment is secure, and then the steps are being outlined here — minimum cybersecurity requirements, the Maritime Security Directive — being used to secure the existing infrastructure.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question will go to Alex with GovExec.

Q Hi, thank you very much for taking my question. Very briefly, I heard the Admiral outline the specific forms of maritime critical infrastructure that the new executive order will apply to, but I did want to clarify that any new cybersecurity provisions and protocols pursuant to the executive action will not cover landing stations that govern undersea cables. Is that correct?

MS. NEUBERGER: Admiral Vann, do you want to speak to that?

ADMIRAL VANN: Alex, thanks for the question.

So what is in the executive order is an enhancement — an addendum, if you will — to the Magnuson Act, which surrounds the captain of the port's authority to prevent and respond to cyber incidents. The specifics of what is covered by regulations are really what will be covered by the rulemaking process. And so that process, while it will be initiated immediately, will need to play out to its end to determine what is covered and what is not.

Q Okay, thank you very much.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question will go to Christian with CyberScoop.

Q (Inaudible) the infrastructure bill, will there be new markers or, you know, you have to have (inaudible) or some kind of added security benefits in order to receive the funds or something along those lines? Thank you.

MS. NEUBERGER: Hi, Christian. Thank you. That's exactly what will be in the notice of proposed rulemaking in terms of what the minimum cybersecurity requirements are for products — for technology products that are being used at ports.

MODERATOR: Thank you. We have time for one more question. We'll go to David with Inside Cybersecurity.

David Jones, you should be able to unmute yourself. Hey, we see you're unmuted, but we can't hear you.

Okay, if you want to shoot me your e-mail — I mean, your question over e-mail — we'll get back to you as soon as we can. And that goes for the rest of the folks. If you start writing your pieces and have any other questions, feel free to reach out and we'll get back to you as soon as we can.

As a reminder — actually, sorry, I think Anne had one thing that she wanted to mention before we close the call.

Over to you, Anne.

MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you so much, Sam. I'd given a shout-out to some of the folks here at the White House who have worked on this initiative over the last 18 to 24 months, but I didn't have a complete list. I want to make sure that I say that here, because as you can tell by the actions we're rolling out tonight, it's been a lot of work, both on the executive order, on the notice of proposed rulemaking, on the Maritime Security Directive, and working with trusted vendors around the world to see which would be interested in onshoring some crane capacity to ensure that new cranes that were purchased and deployed across our critical port infrastructure could be trusted.

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MS. NEUBERGER: Thank you so much, Sam. I'd given a shout-out to some of the folks here at the White House who have worked on this initiative over the last 18 to 24 months, but I didn't have a complete list. I want to make sure that I say that here, because as you can tell by the actions we're rolling out tonight, it's been a lot of work, both on the executive order, on the notice of proposed rulemaking, on the Maritime Security Directive, and working with trusted vendors around the world to see which would be interested in onshoring some crane capacity to ensure that new cranes that were purchased and deployed across our critical port infrastructure could be trusted. So in addition to the names I mentioned, I want to thank Celina Ladyga, Robert Obayda, and William Hennigan here at the White House, and Rob Le Monde at DHS, and Captain Andy Meyers at the U.S. Coast Guard, for the partnership and hard work over the last number of months.

Thank you all for joining us this evening. We're excited to roll this out, and appreciate your time.

MODERATOR: Okay. And thank you to all of our speakers. As a reminder, today's call is embargoed until tomorrow, Wednesday, February 21st, at 5:00 a.m. Eastern. And everything here tonight was on record. Thanks.

6:02 P.M. EST

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## **Executive Order on Amending Regulations Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront Facilities of the United States**

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 1 of title II of the Act of June 15, 1917, as amended (46 U.S.C. 70051) (the "Act"), and in addition to the finding in Executive Order 10173 of October 18, 1950, and any other declaration or finding in force under section 1 of the Act, I find that the security of the United States is endangered by reason of disturbances in the international relations of the United States that exist as a result of persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns against the United States, and that such disturbances continue to endanger such relations, and hereby order that:

Section 1. Amendments. Part 6 of title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended by:

(a) Amending section 6.01-3 to read as follows:

"6.01-3. Captain of the Port. *Captain of the Port*, as used in this part, means the officer of the Coast Guard, under the command of a District Commander, so designated by the Commandant for the purpose of giving immediate direction to Coast Guard law enforcement activities within the Captain of the Port's assigned area. In addition, the District Commander will be Captain of the Port with respect to the remaining areas in the District not assigned to officers designated by the Commandant as Captain of the Port.";

(b) Amending section 6.01-5 to read as follows:

"6.01-5. Security zone. *Security zone*, as used in this part, means all areas of land, water, or land and water, which are so designated by the Captain of the Port for such time as the Captain of the Port deems necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility, to safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the United States or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States.";

(\*Continued On The Following Column)

(c) Adding after the existing section 6.01-6 the following new section:

"6.01-7. Damage. *Damage*, as used in this part in connection with any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure, has the meaning ascribed to "damage" under 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(8).";

(d) Adding after the new section 6.01-7 the following new section:  
"6.01-8. Cyber incident. *Cyber incident*, as used in this part, has the meaning ascribed to an "incident" under 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(2).";

(e) Amending section 6.04-5 to read as follows:

"6.04-5. Preventing access of persons, articles, or things, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure, to vessels, or waterfront facilities. The Captain of the Port may prevent any person, article, or thing, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure, from boarding or being taken or placed on board any vessel or entering or being taken into or upon or placed in or upon any waterfront facility whenever it appears to the Captain of the Port that such action is necessary in order to secure such vessel from damage or injury or to prevent damage or injury to any vessel, or waterfront facility, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure therein or thereon, or waters of the United States, or to secure the observances of rights and obligations of the United States.";

(f) Amending section 6.04-6 to read as follows:

"6.04-6. Establishing security zones; prohibitions with respect thereto. The Captain of a Port may establish security zones subject to the terms and conditions specified in § 6.01-5. No person or vessel shall enter a security zone without the permission of the Captain of the Port. No person shall board or take or place any article or thing, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure, on board any vessel in a security zone without the permission of the Captain of the Port. No person shall take or place any article or thing upon any waterfront facility in any such zone without such permission.";

(g) Amending section 6.04-7 to read as follows:

"6.04-7. Visitation, search, and removal. As consistent with law, the Captain of the Port may cause to be inspected and searched at any time any vessel, waterfront facility, or security zone, or any person, article, or thing, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure thereon or therein, within the jurisdiction of the United States, may place guards upon any such vessel, waterfront facility, or security zone and may remove therefrom any and all persons, articles, or things, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure, not specifically authorized by the Captain of the Port to go or remain thereon or therein.";

(h) Amending section 6.04-8 to read as follows:

"6.04-8. Possession and control of vessels. The Captain of the Port may supervise and control the movement of any vessel and shall take full or partial possession or control of any vessel or any part thereof, within the territorial waters of the United States under the Captain of the Port's jurisdiction, whenever it appears to the Captain of the Port that such action is necessary in order to secure such vessel from damage or injury, including damage to any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure thereon or therein, or to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of rights and obligations of the United States.";

(i) Amending section 6.10-7 to read as follows:

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“6.10-7. Identification credentials. The identification credential to be issued by the Commandant shall be known as the Coast Guard Port Security Card, and the form of such credential, and the conditions and the manner of its issuance shall be as prescribed by the Commandant after consultation with the Secretary of Labor. The Commandant shall not issue a Coast Guard Port Security Card unless the Commandant is satisfied that the character and habits of life of the applicant therefor are such as to authorize the belief that the presence of such individual on board a vessel or within a waterfront facility would not be inimical to the security of the United States. The Commandant shall revoke and require the surrender of a Coast Guard Port Security Card when the Commandant is no longer satisfied that the holder is entitled thereto. The Commandant may recognize for the same purpose such other credentials as the Commandant may designate in lieu of the Coast Guard Port Security Card.”;

(j) Amending section 6.14-1 to read as follows:

“6.14-1. Safety measures. The Commandant, in order to achieve the purposes of this part, may prescribe such conditions and restrictions relating to the safety of waterfront facilities and vessels in port as the Commandant finds to be necessary under existing circumstances. Such conditions and restrictions may extend, but shall not be limited to, the inspection, operation, maintenance, guarding, and manning of, and fire-prevention measures for, such vessels and waterfront facilities. Such conditions and restrictions relating to the safety of waterfront facilities and vessels in port may also extend to measures the Commandant finds to be necessary under existing circumstances to prevent, detect, assess, and remediate an actual or threatened cyber incident that could cause damage or injury to vessels, harbors, ports, or waterfront facilities.”

(k) Amending section 6.14-2 to read as follows:

“6.14-2. Condition of waterfront facility a danger to vessel. Whenever the Captain of the Port finds that the mooring of any vessel to a wharf, dock, pier, or other waterfront structure would endanger such vessel, or any other vessel, or the harbor or any facility therein by reason of conditions existing on or about such wharf, dock, pier, or other waterfront structure, including inadequate guard service, insufficient lighting, fire hazards, inadequate fire protection, unsafe machinery, internal disturbance, damage to any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure, actual or threatened cyber incident, or unsatisfactory operation, the Captain of the Port may prevent the mooring of any vessel to such wharf, dock, pier, or other waterfront structure until the unsatisfactory condition or conditions so found are corrected, and the Captain of the Port may, for the same reasons, after any vessel has been moored, compel the shifting of such vessel from any such wharf, dock, pier, or other waterfront structure.”;

(l) Amending section 6.16-1 to read as follows:

(m) Amending section 6.16-3 to read as follows:

“6.16-3. Precautions against sabotage. The master, owner, agent, or operator of a vessel or waterfront facility shall take all necessary precautions to protect the vessel, waterfront facility, and cargo, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure thereon or therein, from sabotage.”; and

(n) Amending section 6.19-1 to read as follows:

**(\*Continued On The Following Column)**

“6.19-1. Primary responsibility. Nothing contained in this part shall be construed as relieving the masters, owners, operators, and agents of vessels or other waterfront facilities from their primary responsibility for the protection and security of such vessels or waterfront facilities, including any data, information, network, program, system, or other digital infrastructure thereon or therein.”.

Sec. 2. Coordination. In enforcing regulations amended by this order, the Commandant shall coordinate with the Department of Justice and other relevant executive departments and agencies, as appropriate under applicable law or policy.

Sec. 3. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 21, 2024.

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## **On-the-Record Regional Press Call by APNSA Jake Sullivan on the National Security Supplemental**

1:06 P.M. EST

MODERATOR: Good morning, or good afternoon — wherever in the country you are. Thank you for joining today’s White House regional press call on the urgent need for Congress to pass the National Security Supplemental.

Today you will be hearing from Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor to President Biden.

Following remarks, we will take questions from reporters. As a reminder, the content of this call is on the record but embargoed until its conclusion. By participating, you are agreeing to these ground rules. I will now turn it over to Mr. Jake Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Dhara. And thanks, everybody, for joining this call. Really appreciate it.

I’m joining you from the White House, where we are asking Congress to urgently pass the National Security Supplemental bill and provide vital support to Ukraine so that it can continue to defend itself from Putin’s vicious onslaught.

This week, unfortunately, the House is on recess, having left town without taking action on this critical piece of legislation, which overwhelmingly passed the Senate last week with strong bipartisan support from senators of both parties.

Over the weekend, as you all have seen, Ukrainian troops were forced to withdraw from Avdiivka, a town in eastern Ukraine where they’d been battling Russia for many months, handing Putin his first notable battlefield victory in a year. This happened in large part because Ukraine is running out of weapons due to congressional inaction. And Ukrainian troops didn’t have the supplies and ammunition they needed to stop the Russian advance.

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First, it will allow the United States to continue to support the people of Ukraine, alongside our allies and partners, and to send them the weapons they desperately need as they fight every single day to defend their freedom and independence. These weapons that we've been sending to Ukraine are being made in America, by American workers, in 40 states across our country. American workers are producing Javelins in Alabama and Arizona; tanks in Ohio; armored and tactical vehicles in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; HIMARS rockets in Arkansas; artillery ammunition in Pennsylvania and Texas; and rockets in West Virginia — just to name a few.

This bill continues these important investments in the U.S. defense industrial base, expanding production in these factories, revitalizing our submarine industrial base, and supporting jobs across our country, all while improving our own military readiness thanks to an enhanced defense industrial base.

It's also in our strategic interest, our cold-blooded national security interest, to help Ukraine stand up to Putin's vicious and brutal invasion. We know from history that when dictators aren't stopped, they keep going. The cost for America rises, and the consequences get more and more severe for our NATO Allies and elsewhere in the world.

We know that Putin doesn't just dream of conquering Ukraine. He has threatened our NATO Allies, who we are treaty bound to defend. In addition to standing up to Putin, this bill will help our ally, Israel, protect itself against Hamas terrorists and replenish Israel's air defenses so they are prepared against threats they face from Hamas rockets as well as from Iran and Iranian-backed militias like Hezbollah.

This legislation will also provide resources for our troops in the Middle East who have faced their own attacks from Iranian-backed militias as they continue the important mission of defeating ISIS, as well as our naval forces who are protecting international commerce in the Red Sea from persistent attacks by the Houthis.

The bill will provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance for vulnerable people who have been impacted by conflicts around the world. That includes millions of Ukrainians who have been displaced by Russia's war of conquest, as well as conflicts in Sudan and Nagorno-Karabakh. It will also support the urgent needs of the more than 2 million Palestinian civilians in Gaza, the vast majority of whom have nothing to do with Hamas and are suffering acutely as a result of this conflict.

We are engaged every single day, directly and at the highest levels, on getting more aid into Gaza. And we're working around the clock to find a way forward that brings peace, security, and dignity for both the Palestinian people and the Israeli people, with the security of the State of Israel guaranteed.

This bill also increases our support to our allies and partners in Asia amid our strategic competition with the People's Republic of China and threats from an increasingly aggressive North Korea.

President Biden is urging the Speaker of the House to quickly bring this bill to the floor of the House of Representatives for a vote. We know that it will pass on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, just as it did in the Senate.

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And as the President has said, we cannot afford to wait any longer. Every day Congress delays comes at a cost to the national security interests of the United States.

To close where I started, we are increasingly getting reports of Ukrainian troops rationing ammunition on the frontlines as Russian forces continue to attack both on the ground and from the air, trying to wear down the Ukrainian defenses that we've worked so extensively to build up over the past two years.

American factories are producing more weapons and ammunition than they had in years thanks to our investments. But in order to keep that up, we need Congress to act.

As National Security Advisor, I will tell you that our allies and our adversaries alike are watching what Congress does very closely. There are those here and abroad who say U.S. leadership and our alliances and partnerships with countries around the world don't matter. I'm here to tell you they do. Our alliances make us stronger; they make us safer. And passing this bill will send an important message of unity and strength, as well as American resolve, to the rest of the world.

President Biden is determined to get this done. And we're asking Congress to do their part.

And with that, I'd be happy to take your questions.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Jake. We will now take questions from reporters. A reminder to please use the "Raise Hand" feature, and please state your name and news outlet when called on. We will begin with Kellan Howell with Scripps News.

Q Hi, thanks so much for doing this call and for taking my question. I'm wondering, Jake, if you can talk about the impact you expect this new sanctions package to have that John Kirby earlier today said was being rolled out. I understand you can't talk about the details of the sanctions, but if you could speak to the impact those sanctions might have. And then, separate, could you also address consideration for a loan to Ukraine absent congressional action? Is that something that the White House is talking about? Thanks.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, on the first question, as you heard from John Kirby earlier today, we are planning to roll out a package of sanctions at the end of this week, which will come, obviously, in the wake of the tragic death of Aleksey Navalny. And you heard President Biden say that Putin is responsible for Navalny's death.

That sanctions package will also come on the eve of the two-year anniversary of the Ukraine war. And it will be a substantial package covering a range of different elements of the Russian defense industrial base and sources of revenue for the Russian economy that power Russia's war machine, that power Russia's aggression, and that power Russia's repression. So we believe it will have an impact.

I would point out that this is on top of a significant framework of sanctions that we have worked with our allies and partners to build over the course of the past two years.

But this is another turn of the crank, another turn of the wheel. And it is a range of targets — a significant range of targets that we have worked persistently and diligently to identify, to continue to impose costs for what Russia has done — for what it's done to Navalny, for what it's done to Ukraine, and for the threat that it represents to international peace and security. *(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

And I think any member of Congress who is doing right by their constituents needs to use this moment, this week, this day, to be vocal on this issue. And that is what we are asking everyone to do, whether they're a Democrat or a Republican, to speak out, to raise their voices, and to let it be known that they are looking for what the American people deserve, which is a straight up or down vote on this issue, because if there is a straight up or down vote, it will pass.

Q And just briefly, is the White House open to any further negotiations on border security measures along the lines of the Fitzpatrick/Golden proposal?

MR. SULLIVAN: We obviously want border action. Unfortunately, congressional Republicans walked away from a painstakingly negotiated border deal. President Biden asked Congress for the funding to hire 1,200 more Border Patrol agents, hundreds more immigration judges, asylum officers, and the resources to better detect fentanyl at our border crossings.

President Biden supported the bipartisan agreement that was reached in the Senate. It was the toughest but fairest bipartisan border security deal in a generation. And it is difficult for us to see now how congressional Republicans, having worked this through, can turn around and suggest that they're standing up for border security when they've abandoned or walked away from a package that could garner a substantial number of votes and that reflects the input of both Democrats and Republicans. So we think that's the right package for the Congress to support, and we would ask them to take it up in both the Senate and the House. And, you know, we have not walked away from our commitment on this issue. It's really been the congressional Republicans who have walked away from theirs.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Orion. Thank you, Jake.

For our next question, we'll head over to Elex Michaelson with Fox 11 in California.

Q Thank you very much. And thank you for taking our questions. What happens if the House doesn't pass this? Paint a picture of what that looks like. And is there a plan B of another way that you can get this money if Speaker Johnson just says no?

MR. SULLIVAN: So, in many ways, I don't even have to paint a picture because we're seeing the pictures live, in living color, from Ukraine — the Ukrainian forces having to move back from the town of Avdiivka, as I mentioned before, because they're not getting the level and tempo of supplies that they need and deserve. And they're not getting them because we have now gone weeks and months without the necessary funding. And that's been a result of congressional inaction.

So those challenges are only going to compound over time. Shortages in ammunition and air defense systems will simply lead to a further depleted Ukrainian defense and to a greater advantage for Russia as it continues this imperial war of conquest against its neighbor.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

As I've said before from the podium, and will reinforce here, there is no magic solution to this absent Congress appropriating funding. It's not like we have a piggy bank where we just keep cash lying around that we can provide to Ukraine. We need the Congress to discharge its constitutional obligation to appropriate and obligate funds that the President can then put to use to send American-made weapons, made by American workers and American states, to Ukraine to help defend the freedom and independence of that country.

And that's why our voice has gotten so intense and so urgent in recent days, because there's not another path for us to go down to get the kind of resources that we are asking Congress for here.

There's not another avenue to it that — and because of that, I think the Congress, and especially the Speaker, need to stare their responsibility square in the face and then meet that responsibility, meet that obligation to their voters and to the American people and to the American national security interest.

Q So what does the Speaker say to you? We all saw that picture of him with former President Trump recently. I mean, how does he respond when you make this argument to him?

MR. SULLIVAN: He says that he would like to find a way to provide support to Ukraine and to Israel and to Asia, and on the border. And then, dot-dot-dot, it doesn't happen. And one has to ask, "Well, why not?" And the answer is because he won't put it on the floor for a vote. And I don't think he has a good answer as to why he won't do that.

So, at this point, we've got to match the basic words of support for our allies and partners with the action of putting this up for a vote. That's the Speaker's obligation. That's what he has to do. And he can't shirk from that or hide from that. He's got to step up and do it.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Elex. Thank you, Jake. For our next question, we'll head over to Haley Bull.

Q Hey, thanks, Dhara. Thanks, Jake, for doing this.

One of the arguments we have heard the Ukrainians make as they push for this aid package to be passed, as well, is the support Russia is getting from Iran and North Korea. And I'm curious at this point if the administration has seen that advance further since the last time that was discussed and if there have been any changes in China's support for Russia as well. Thanks.

MR. SULLIVAN: We have been on the forefront of warning about and describing the forms of support from Iran and North Korea to Russia, going back to the beginning of this war. We first elaborated Iran's support by way of providing these one-way attack drones. We first elaborated North Korea's support by way of providing ammunition as well as short-range ballistic missiles. And we have seen the support from North Korea steadily advance over the course of the past few months to include these ballistic missiles that Russia is using on the battlefield in Ukraine. And we have seen a continuation of sustainment of Iranian support as well.

*(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

With respect to China, we have warned from the beginning about the need for China to refrain from providing weapons to Russia. We have not seen China provide weapons to Russia, but we have seen companies in the PRC providing inputs to Russia's defense industrial base, and that's something that has been of concern to us. And we have raised those concerns directly with our Chinese counterparts. Most recently, Secretary Blinken saw the Chinese foreign minister in Munich just a few days ago and raised these concerns. And we will continue to keep a close eye on that and watch as Beijing makes its decisions about whether and to what extent it's going to support Russia going forward.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Haley. Thank you, Jake. For our final question, we'll head over to Nick Schifrin with PBS.

Q Thanks, Jake, for doing this. Do you believe that Ukraine will lose without this supplemental? And do you believe that Ukraine can win with it?

And I know we're focused on Ukraine, but if you don't mind my asking about the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan drove away a Chinese coast guard boat that entered near the frontline islands of Taiwan today, as you know, after a Chinese boat boarded a Taiwanese tourist boat.

What do you think is the cause of the tension there? And do you believe the Chinese coast guard is acting appropriately? Thanks.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, in February of 2022, most observers didn't think Ukraine would last a month. So I'm going to have a lot of humility about ever predicting that Ukraine will fail at anything, given the bravery and skill and courage of its fighters and its forces.

I do believe that Ukraine can prevail in this conflict, that it can win. But it needs the resources and the support that it has, frankly, earned from its partners, including the United States. And that's why we're driving so hard at getting this vote.

With respect to Taiwan, I'm not going to comment specifically on these incidents, only to say that we have been very clear where we stand, the United States stands, and that is for the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. And we are against any kind of action, by any party, that undermines that peace and stability. That will be a message that we continue to send loud and clear.

MODERATOR: Thank you again, Jake. Thank you again to all of the reporters for joining today's call. For outstanding questions, please follow up with the White House.

1:27 P.M. EST

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## [A U.S. spacecraft successfully lands on the moon for the first time since the Apollo 17 flight 51 years ago](#)

Intuitive Machines' Odysseus spacecraft is part of a NASA program to send robotic landers to the moon in anticipation of a crewed mission there perhaps as soon as 2026

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 22, 2024

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**BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY**  
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**Readout On The Trilateral United States-Japan-Republic Of Korea Convening Of Commerce And Industry Export Control Principals In Tokyo**

**TOKYO, JAPAN** – Today, Commerce and Industry Export Control Principals from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) convened as a follow-up to the Commerce and Industry Ministerial initiative from the Trilateral Leaders' Summit at Camp David last August. This meeting is the first in-person meeting of its kind under the trilateral relationship focused on further aligning export controls, enhancing our ability to effectively collaborate on shared priorities. The United States hosted the convening at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.

The principals agreed to further align on Russia controls, collaborate on outreach to countries in Southeast Asia, and cooperate on controls for critical and emerging technologies.

"Collaboration among like-minded allies and partners who share our values and security outlook on multilateral export controls is a longstanding priority for BIS," said **Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce for Export Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler**. "Our trilateral relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea is a treasured relationship that cultivates the kind of trusted ecosystem that allows emerging technologies to develop in a safe space."

"We deepened our knowledge on how respective export control systems work in Japan, the ROK, and the U.S. in the first trilateral meeting," said **Director-General Katsuro Igari, Trade Control Department, Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry**. "We will further strengthen our export controls by further exchanging best practices, including engagement in industry and academia."

"Trilateral cooperation between Korea, the U.S., and Japan is crucial to respond to the changing global environment, including the instability of supply chains and export controls," said **Director General for Trade Control Policy Kamchan Kang, Republic of Korea Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy**. "Export control engagement with ASEAN countries should be enhanced to prevent the diversion of dual-use items and maintain international peace."

### **Background on the Trilateral Leaders' Summit at Camp David**

In August 2023, President Biden welcomed Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and ROK President Yoon to a historic trilateral summit at Camp David, the first-ever stand-alone summit of Leaders from the United States, Japan, and the ROK, and the first summit of foreign leaders at Camp David during the Biden-Harris Administration. The Leaders jointly inaugurated a new era of trilateral partnership and reaffirmed that cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the ROK advances the security and prosperity of our people, the Indo-Pacific region, and the world.

Among other priorities, the Leaders committed to focusing efforts on coordinating export controls for advanced technologies. Additional information is available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-at-camp-david/>

## Cyberattack At National Health Tech Giant Causes Outage At Pharmacies The health tech company services 30,000 pharmacies nationwide, affecting the ability to pay for prescriptions at some of those pharmacies.

Amanda Lumpkin

Posted Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 2:55 pm ET | Updated Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 5:42 pm ET

ACROSS AMERICA — The source of a cyberattack that targeted one of the nation's largest prescription processors — which services 30,000 pharmacies nationwide and left many unable to fulfill prescriptions Thursday — was likely associated with a nation-state, and the attackers likely gained access to some information technology systems, according to documents filed on the SEC's website.

UnitedHealth Group on Wednesday identified that a "suspected nation-state associated cyber security threat actor" gained access to some of the Change Healthcare information technology systems, the documents said. After learning of the attack, UnitedHealth "proactively isolated the impacted systems from other connecting systems" in the interest of protecting its partners and patients, as well as to contain, assess and remediate the incident.

UnitedHealth was working to restore the systems and resume normal operations "as soon as possible," but couldn't estimate how long the disruption would last.

"The Company has retained leading security experts, is working with law enforcement and notified customers, clients and certain government agencies," the SEC document said. "At this time, the Company believes the network interruption is specific to Change Healthcare systems, and all other systems across the Company are operational."

Notably, certain networks and transactional services might not be accessible during the disruption, the documents said.

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## United States Sanctions Affiliates of Russia-Based LockBit Ransomware Group February 20, 2024

*The United States imposes sanctions on affiliates of group responsible for ransomware attacks on the U.S. financial sector*

WASHINGTON — Today, the United States is designating two individuals who are affiliates of the Russia-based ransomware group LockBit. This action is the first in an ongoing collaborative effort with the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and our international partners targeting LockBit.

"The United States will not tolerate attempts to extort and steal from our citizens and institutions," said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo. "We will continue our whole-of-government approach to defend against malicious cyber activities, and will use all available tools to hold the actors that enable these threats accountable." *(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

Russia continues to offer safe harbor for cybercriminals where groups such as LockBit are free to launch ransomware attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. These ransomware attacks have targeted critical infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and financial institutions. Notably, LockBit was responsible for the November 2023 ransomware attack against the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China's (ICBC) U.S. broker-dealer. The United States is a global leader in the fight against cybercrime and is committed to using all available authorities and tools to defend Americans from cyber threats. In addition to the actions announced today, the U.S. government provides critical resources to support potential victims in protecting against and responding to ransomware attacks. For example, last year, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency in conjunction with other U.S. Departments and Agencies and foreign partners published two cybersecurity advisories, "Understanding Ransomware Threat Actors: LockBit" and "LockBit 3.0 Ransomware Affiliates Exploit CVE 2023-4966 Citrix Bleed Vulnerability." These advisories detail the threats posed by this group and provide recommendations to reduce the likelihood and impact of future ransomware incidents.

This action follows other recent actions taken by the U.S. against Russian cybercriminals, including the recent trilateral designation of Alexander Ermakov, a Russian national involved in the 2022 ransomware attack against Medibank Private Limited, in coordination with Australia and the United Kingdom and last year's bilateral sanctions actions against the Trickbot Cybercrime Group with the United Kingdom. Russia has enabled ransomware attacks by cultivating and co-opting criminal hackers. Treasury has previously stressed that Russia must take concrete steps to prevent cyber criminals from freely operating in its jurisdiction. Today's actions reflect the United States' commitment to combatting cybercrime and pursuing the bad actors that target victims across the United States, its allies, and its partners.

### LOCKBIT: A MALICIOUS RUSSIAN RANSOMWARE GROUP

LockBit is a Russia-based ransomware group first observed in 2019 and best known for its ransomware variant of the same name. LockBit operates on a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, where the group licenses its ransomware software to affiliated cybercriminals in exchange for a percentage of the paid ransoms. LockBit is known for its double extortion tactics, where its cybercriminals exfiltrate vast amounts of data from its victims before encrypting the victim's computer systems and demanding ransom payments. LockBit was the most deployed ransomware variant globally in 2022 and remains prolific today.

OFAC's investigation identified LockBit as responsible for the ransomware attack on ICBC, which occurred on November 9, 2023. The ransomware attack disrupted ICBC's U.S. broker-dealer, affecting the settlement of over \$9 billion worth of assets backed by Treasury securities. The ransomware attack caused a blackout of ICBC's computer systems, resulting in a loss of e-mail and communications. ICBC's inability to access its systems caused securities to be delivered for settlement with no funds backing the trades.

*(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

## OFAC TARGETS AFFILIATES OF LOCKBIT RANSOMWARE GROUP

**Ivan Gennadievich Kondratiev**, a Russian national located in Novomokovsk, Russia, is a LockBit affiliate and leader of the LockBit affiliate sub-group, the National Hazard Society. Kondratiev is commonly known in the cybercriminal world as “Bassterlord” and “Fisheye,” and he also has ties to REvil, RansomEXX and Avaddon ransomware groups. Kondratiev has actively engaged in LockBit ransomware attacks.

**Artur Sungatov**, a Russian national, is a Lockbit ransomware group affiliate and has actively engaged in LockBit ransomware attacks. OFAC is designating each of these individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757, for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, an activity described in subsection (a)(ii)(D) of section 1 of E.O. 13694, as amended.

### SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals designated today may themselves be exposed to designation.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to [OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here](#). For detailed information on [the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list](#), please click [here](#).

See [OFAC’s Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risk for Facilitating Ransomware Payments](#) for information on the actions that OFAC would consider to be mitigating factors in any related enforcement action involving ransomware payments with a potential sanctions risk. For information on complying with sanctions applicable to virtual currency, see [OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry](#).

[For more information on the individuals designated today, click here.](#)

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## **U.S. hits Russia with more than 500 new sanctions after Alexei Navalny’s death**

(EIB will publish these as soon as we have them!)

The Biden administration’s move targets scores of Russian companies and individuals, aiming to constrict the billions of dollars in energy revenue that have financed President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.

## **Hungary approves Sweden’s long-delayed NATO bid, removing final obstacle to alliance’s historic expansion**

After the vote in Hungary’s parliament on Monday, Sweden is set to become NATO’s 32nd member, possibly within the week — completing a process that began with Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

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## **Responding to Two Years of Russia’s Full-Scale War On Ukraine and Navalny’s Death**

02/23/2024 10:23 AM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

Following Russia’s two years of unprovoked full-scale war, the death of opposition politician and anticorruption activist Aleksey Navalny, and a decade of aggression against Ukraine, the United States is sanctioning more than 500 individuals and entities in Russia and globally. There is a clear link between Russia’s authoritarianism, its domestic crackdown on dissent, and its aggression abroad. Today, we are imposing additional costs on Russia for both its internal repression and foreign aggression.

The Department of State is sanctioning three individuals in connection with the death of Navalny in Russian Penal Colony IK-3: the prison warden, regional prison head, and deputy director of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia. In addition, the Department is imposing sanctions on more than 250 entities and individuals, including those engaged in sanctions evasion and circumvention, and those bolstering Russia’s future energy and metals and mining production.

Along with these actions, the Department is sanctioning several individuals to promote accountability for acts supporting Russia’s war, including by those involved in the unlawful transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children. Today’s financial sanctions targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, as amended, which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The Department is also taking steps to impose visa restrictions on Russian Federation-installed purported authorities involved in human rights abuses in connection with the transfer, deportation and confinement of Ukrainian children.

Additionally, the U.S. government is issuing a [business advisory](#) to assist companies in making informed decisions regarding the risks of conducting business in Russia.

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## PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE DEATH OF ALEKSEY NAVALNY

The Department is designating the following three individuals connected to the death of Aleksey Navalny pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(A) for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **VALERIY GENNADEVICH BOYARINEV (BOYARINEV)** is the Deputy Director of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, which includes oversight of Penal Colony IK-3. BOYARINEV reportedly instructed prison staff to exert harsher treatment on Aleksey Navalny while he was in detention. Following Navalny's death, BOYARINEV was promoted to "Colonel General" by decree of Vladimir Putin.
- **IGOR BORISOVICH RAKITIN (RAKITIN)** and **VADIM KONSTANTINOVICH KALININ (KALININ)** are officials in the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia. RAKITIN is the overall head of the Federal Penitentiary Service of 1322 Russia for the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region, in which Penal Colony IK-3 is located. KALININ is the warden of Penal Colony IK-3.

## CONSTRAINING RUSSIA'S FUTURE ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS

### Further Sanctions on Entities Involved in the Arctic LNG 2 Project

The Department continues to designate entities involved in the development of Russia's future energy production and export capacity. Today, the Department is designating two major entities involved in the financing and construction of highly specialized liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers designed specifically for Limited Liability Company Arctic LNG 2 (LLC Arctic LNG 2), the operator of the Arctic LNG 2 project, as well as several other entities involved in Arctic LNG 2 and other future energy projects in Russia. Construction and development of the Arctic LNG 2 Project has relied on foreign service companies' expertise and technology to significantly expand Russia's future LNG export capacity.

These actions follow the Department of State's designation of LLC Arctic LNG 2 in November 2023, as well as multiple other entities involved in the development of the Arctic LNG 2 project. These designations have already produced delays in the project exports and resulted in significant increases in the project's construction costs. Today's actions demonstrate the United States' continued commitment and resolve to constrain the Arctic LNG 2 project's production and export capacity.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SHIPBUILDING COMPLEX ZVEZDA** is a Russia-based shipbuilding company that is involved in the construction of up to 15 highly specialized LNG tankers intended for use in support of Arctic LNG 2 exports.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MODERN MARINE ARCTIC TRANSPORT SPG (SMART LNG)** is a Russia-based joint venture to lease new ice-class LNG carriers in support of Arctic LNG 2 exports.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOVATEK MURMANSK (NOVATEK MURMANSK)** is a Russia-based civil engineering construction company. NOVATEK MURMANSK, also known as the Belokamenka shipyard, is involved in the assembly of the gravity-based structures and LNG production lines for the Arctic LNG 2 project.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **AZORIA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (AZORIA SHIPPING COMPANY)** is a Cyprus-based shipping company intended to acquire a vessel supporting exports from the Arctic LNG 2 project. AZORIA SHIPPING COMPANY's global ultimate parent is Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot, a Russian state-owned enterprise.
- **ELIXON SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (ELIXON SHIPPING COMPANY)** is a Cyprus-based shipping company intended to acquire a vessel supporting exports from the Arctic LNG 2 project. ELIXON SHIPPING COMPANY's global ultimate parent is Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot, a Russian state-owned enterprise.
- **GLORINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (GLORINA SHIPPING COMPANY)** is a Cyprus-based shipping company intended to acquire a vessel supporting exports from the Arctic LNG 2 project. GLORINA SHIPPING COMPANY's global ultimate parent is Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot, a Russian state-owned enterprise.

### Targeting Other Russian Future Energy Projects

The Department is also taking action against entities involved in other Russian future energy projects.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GLOBALTEK** was established in 2019 to implement and develop the future Yakutia Gas Project.

The Department is designating an additional two entities involved in the development and operation of Russia's Ust-Luga LNG terminal. These actions follow previous sanctions against entities involved in the development of the Ust-Luga LNG terminal.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:

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- **OOO RUSKHIMALYANS (RUSKHIMALYANS)** is a Russia-based joint-venture company building an LNG complex at the Baltic Sea port of Ust-Luga. RUSKHIMALYANS is also the LNG project's operator.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW COMMUNAL TECHNOLOGIES (NKT)** is a subsidiary of RUSKHIMALYANS and is involved in transportation services and cargo handling on behalf of RUSKHIMALYANS.

#### Targeting a Major Russian State-Owned Enterprise Supporting Future Energy Projects

The Department is targeting a significant geological exploration company wholly owned by the Government of the Russian Federation. **JSC ROSGEOLOGIA (ROSGEO)** is a Russian state-owned multidisciplinary geological holding company, which provides geological exploration services. Within Russia, ROSGEO and its subsidiaries perform a range of geophysical services in the search and exploration of oil and gas fields. ROSGEO is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.

ROSGEO performs similar operations for hydrocarbon and solid mineral exploration in over a dozen countries, primarily through two subsidiaries, **YUZHMOREGEOLOGIYA AO and ZARUBEZHGELOGIYA AO (ZARUBEZHGELOGIYA)**. YUZHMOREGEOLOGIYA AO and ZARUBEZHGELOGIYA are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy.

- The following vessels are being identified as property in which YUZHMOREGEOLOGIYA AO has an interest: **YUZHMOREGEOLOGIYA** and **GELENDZHIK** are research vessels operated by YUZHMOREGEOLOGIYA AO for the purpose of geophysical exploration and are ultimately managed by ROSEGO.

The following entities affiliated with ROSGEO are engaged in activities such as surveying, industrial engineering, and providing engineering-related services in Russia. All eight entities are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **NPTS NEDRA AO**
- **IRKUTSKGEOFIZIKA AO**
- **SEVERO VOSTOCHNOE PGO AO**
- **SEVERO KAVKAZSKOE PGO AO**
- **SIBIRSKOE PGO AO**
- **CHELYABINSKGEOSEMKA AO**
- **DALNEVOSTOCHNOE PGO AO**
- **DALMORNEFTEGEOFIZIKA AO**

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the architecture sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **TSENTRALNOE PGO PAO (TSENTRALNOE PGO)** is owned by ROSGEO. TSENTRALNOE PGO provides architectural, engineering, and related services for geological exploration projects in Russia.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following two entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **TULSKOE NIGP AO and VNIGRI GEOLOGORAZVEDKA AO** are both ultimately owned or managed by ROSGEO. Both entities are engaged in the manufacture of geophysical and mining equipment

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following two entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **TSENTRKVARTS PAO** is managed by ROSGEO and is involved in geophysical exploration work for projects in Russia.
- **SEVERO ZAPADNOE PGO AO** is owned by ROSGEO. SEVERO ZAPADNOE PGO AO is engaged in mineral exploration and mining activities.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **SEVMORNEFTEGEOFIZIKA AO (SMNG)** is managed by ROSGEO. SMNG is involved in geophysical exploration and marine exploratory drilling in Russia, as well as for international projects on behalf of the Russian government.

The following vessels are being identified as property in which SMNG has an interest. The following five vessels are survey and research vessels used for the purpose of geophysical exploration and are ultimately managed by ROSGEO:

- **AKADEMIK PRIMAKOV**
- **PROFESSOR LOGACHEV**
- **AKADEMIK LAZEREV**
- **AKADEMIK NEMCHINOV**
- **PROFESSOR RYABINKIN**

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JSC POLAR MARINE GEOSURVEY EXPEDITION (PMGRE)** is engaged in mineral exploration and prospecting, and is managed by ROSGEO.

- The **AKADEMIK ALEKSANDR KARPINSKIY** is being identified as property in which PMGRE has an interest. **AKADEMIK ALEKSANDR KARPINSKIY** is a survey and research vessel operated by PMGRE for the purpose of geophysical exploration and is ultimately managed by ROSGEO.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following three entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy. These three entities are engaged in scientific engineering research, and are all managed by ROSGEO:

- **VNIGRIUGOL AO**
- **VNIIZARUBEZHGELOGIYA VZG AO**
- **AMIGE AO (AMIGE)**
  - The **BAVENIT** is being identified as property in which AMIGE has an interest. **BAVENIT** is a survey and research vessel operated by AMIGE for the purpose of geophysical exploration and is ultimately managed by ROSGEO.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **URANGEOLOGORAZVEDKA AO (URANGEO)** is managed by ROSGEO. URANGEO provides drilling services and related support for geological exploration projects in Russia.

#### **Continued Pressure on Rosatom Subsidiaries**

This is the sixth Russia sanctions action that includes designations of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom) subsidiaries. These targets include Rosatom entities supporting Russia's development of the Arctic region, future business development, and an enterprise of Russia's nuclear weapons complex.

The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY RUSATOM ARCTIC (RUSATOM ARCTIC)** is a subsidiary of Rosatom that was established in 2023 to aid in Russia's development of the Arctic region.
- **INNOVATION HUB LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (INNOHUB)** is a subsidiary of Rosatom that serves as Rosatom's business accelerator and includes an investment portfolio, a project office, and a research and development center.
- **FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ALEXANDROV RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (ALEXANDROV RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY)** is a subsidiary of Rosatom described as being a key enterprise of the nuclear weapons complex and involved in designing, testing, and supporting nuclear power and naval propulsion reactors, including for Russian submarines.

#### **DISRUPTING SANCTIONS EVASION AND BACKFILLING EFFORTS**

The Department continues to disrupt the networks and channels through which Russia attempts to procure technology and equipment from third countries to support its war effort. Specifically, these designations target producers, exporters, and importers of items critical to Russia's defense-industrial base, including common high-priority items identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, alongside the EU, UK, and Japan. Entities based in the PRC, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates, among other countries, continue to send these items and other important dual-use goods to Russia, including critical components that Russia relies on for its weapons systems. Many of these procured components also include U.S.-origin aviation parts from top U.S. manufacturers. Russia has continued to leverage sanctions evasion and circumvention networks to procure aviation and microelectronic components in an effort to sustain its military industrial base and aviation industry, to include expropriated U.S. and European aircraft.

#### **Targeting a Pathway for Microelectronics Imports to Russia**

The Department is designating the following entity pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP DA GROUP 22 (DA GROUP 22)** is a Kazakhstan-based company that is receiving common high-priority items from Germany-based company, ELIX ST LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, and is sending common high-priority items to Russia-based company LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY STEK. The end users of these common high-priority items include the Russian military and Russian space and defense manufacturers.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B), the following entity is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of DA GROUP 22, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **ELIX ST LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (ELIX ST)** is a Germany-based company that has supplied common high-priority items to Kazakhstan-based company, DA GROUP 22.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C), the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of ELIX ST:

- **YELENA LVOVNA CHERNET** is the Managing Director of ELIX ST.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY STEK (STEK)** is a Russia-based company involved in the production of electrical wiring works. STEK is receiving common high-priority items from DA GROUP 22.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SET 1 (SET 1)** is a Russia-based company involved in the production of radio and television-transmission apparatuses. SET 1 uses microelectronic imports from STEK to develop products for the Russian military.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity and individual are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ELIKS M (ELIKS M)** is a Russia-based company involved primarily in the wholesale distribution of industrial machinery and equipment. ELIKS M clients include various Russian defense companies.
- **YEVGENIY OLEGOVICH CHERNET** is the General Director and majority shareholder of ELIKS M.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ELEM GROUP (ELEM GROUP)** is a Kazakhstan-based company that has supplied common high-priority items to Russia-based, U.S.-designated STRELOI EKOMMERTS.

#### **Türkiye-based Entities Supplying Common High-Priority Items to Russia**

The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **MBK LOJISTIK MEDİKAL PAZARLAMA SANAYI IC VE DIS TICARET LIMITED SİRKETİ (MBK LOJISTİK)** is a Türkiye-based company that has supplied common high-priority items to Russia-based company, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY A AVERS.
- **OLIMPIK GAMA IC VE TICARET SANAYI LIMITED SİRKETİ (OLIMPIK GAMA)** is a Türkiye-based company that has supplied common high-priority items to Russia-based company, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRADE HOUSE KYUTEK.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRADE HOUSE KYUTEK (TRADE HOUSE)** is a Russia-based company that has received common high-priority electronic components supplied by Türkiye-based company, OLIMPIK GAMA.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY A AVERS (A AVERS)** is a Russia-based company that has received common high-priority electronic components supplied by Türkiye-based company, MBK LOJISTIK.

#### **Türkiye-based Entities Involved in Procuring G7-Origin Aircraft Components for Entities Based in Russia**

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **ALPHA VISIT SHOP FOREIGN TRADE LIMITED COMPANY (ALPHA VISIT)** is a Türkiye-based company, founded by a Russian national in May 2022, that supplied aircraft parts to Russia-based companies, including an entity that is Entity Listed by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security.

#### **A UAE-based Entity Supplying Common High-Priority Items to Russia**

The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **ASIA INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROVIDER LLC (ASIA INTERNATIONAL)** is a UAE-based company that has supplied common high-priority items to Russia-based, U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MDIKAM EK.

#### **UAE-based Entities Involved in Procuring G7-Origin Aircraft Components for Entities Based in Russia**

The Department is designating the following entity pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **POLARSTAR LOGISTICS LLC (POLARSTAR)** is a UAE-based company that offers cargo shipping services from the UAE to Russia. POLARSTAR is listed as an S7 Airlines representative office and acts as a cargo agent in the UAE on behalf of S7 Airlines, which is Entity Listed by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **S 7 ENGINEERING LLC (S7 ENGINEERING)** is a Russia-based company that offers maintenance services for U.S. and European-built aircraft and components in Russia and other countries. S7 ENGINEERING procures aircraft parts, including G7-origin components, from UAE-based companies.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, S7 ENGINEERING:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ANGAR (ANGAR)** is solely owned by S7 ENGINEERING. ANGAR is primarily engaged in renting, buying, selling, managing, and appraising real estate.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy:

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- **MIRAGE AIR CRAFT SERVICES SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP LLC** is a UAE-based company that supplied aircraft parts to the Russia-based company S7 ENGINEERING.
- **CRYNOFIST AVIATION FZCO** is a UAE-based company that supplied Russian aviation companies with G7-origin aircraft parts.
- **RBG SOLUTION FZE** is a UAE-based company that supplied G7-origin aircraft parts to the Russia-based company, S7 ENGINEERING.

#### **PRC-based Entities Involved in Procuring Electronic Components for Entities with Ties to the Russian Military**

The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **ZHEJIANG OULONG ELECTRIC CO LTD (ZHEJIANG OULONG ELECTRIC)** is a private manufacturer of printed circuit boards based in Wenzhou, PRC. From January to October 2023, Zhejiang Oulong Electric supplied Russian entities with more than \$2 million worth of products found on the BIS List of Common High Priority Items. ZHEJIANG OULONG ELECTRIC has supplied common high-priority items to Russia-based, U.S.-designated INELSO OOO. INELSO OOO was sanctioned by the United States in May 2023 and has also been identified in the Official Journal of the European Union as an entity that has contributed to Russia's military and technological enhancement or to the development of Russia's defense and security sector.
- **WUHAN MAIWE COMMUNICATION CO LTD (WUHAN MAIWE)** is a PRC-based company that supplies common high priority items to Russian companies. WUHAN MAIWE has supplied common high-priority items to Russia-based, U.S.-designated company REGION-PROF LLC. REGION-PROF LLC has procured multiple shipments of common high priority items on behalf of the Russian military and security services.
- **COREBAI MICROELECTRONICS BEIJING COMPANY LIMITED** is a PRC-based micro-electronics producer that has Russian distributors, works with SDN listed INELSO OOO, and has a distribution warehouse in Russia.

#### **CONSTRAINING RUSSIA'S METALS AND MINING REVENUE**

The Department of State continues to designate individuals and entities involved in Russia's metals and mining sector to further constrict Russia's revenue generation from this key source of funds for the Russian federal budget.

#### **Targeting Russia's Largest Pipe Producer**

The Department is designating **PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY (PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY)**, Russia's leading supplier of steel pipe, piping solutions, and related services. PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY also supplied piping for U.S.-designated Nord Stream 2 AG, the project implementation company for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i), for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy.

The following five entities, all of which are subsidiaries of PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY, are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TUBES 2000**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK OIL FIELD SERVICES**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK PREMIUM SERVICES**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK TECHNICAL SERVICE**
- **SPS ME FZCO**

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- The following additional subsidiaries of PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY are all being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY CHELYABINSK PIPE ROLLING PLANT** is the leading supplier of steel pipe, piping solutions, and related services for a variety of sectors of the Russian economy.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK YARTSEVSKIY METALLURGICAL PLANT** is a modern casting and rolling factory for the production of long products with a capacity of more than 300 thousand tons per year.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY VOLZHSKIY PIPE PLANT** is involved in the production of steel pipes, hollow profiles, and fittings.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY ORSKIY MACHINE BUILDING PLANT** is involved in the production of steel pipes, hollow profiles, and fittings.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY PEROVOURALSKIY NEW PIPE PLANT** produces steel pipes and cylinders.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SINARSKIY PIPE PLANT (SINARSKIY PIPE PLANT)** is a specialized enterprise for the production of steel pipes, providing industrial services.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY TAGANROG METALLURGICAL PLANT (TAGANROG METALLURGICAL PLANT)** produces many types of steel pipes.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SEVERSKIY PIPE PLANT (SEVERSKIY PIPE PLANT)** is one of the oldest metallurgical enterprises in Russia and produces various steel pipe products.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SMARTMET** manufactures steel tubes, pipes, and related fittings.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK PIPELINE SOLUTIONS** manufactures steel tubes, pipes, and related fittings.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK TAYMIR** treats and coats metals.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK STEEL HOLDING** is a subsidiary of PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY and is primarily engaged in holding or owning securities of companies and is involved in financial asset investing.

The following two additional subsidiaries of PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SINARATRANSAUTO** has worked in the automobiles logistics market since 2005 and provides comprehensive road transportation services for the SINARSKIY PIPE PLANT.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SINARAPROMTRANS (SINARAPROMTRANS)** is the only operator of internal railway logistics for the TAGANROG METALLURGICAL PLANT, VOLZHSKIY PIPE PLANT, and SEVERSKIY PIPE PLANT pipe factories, included in the PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY network. Additionally, SINARAPROMTRANS has two divisions in Siberia, which carry out rail delivery of coal from mining sites.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the accounting sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TMK BUSINESS SERVICES CENTER** is a subsidiary of PIPE METALLURGICAL COMPANY whose main business activities are accounting, bookkeeping, auditing activities, and tax consultancy.

#### **Further Targeting Russian Gold Mining**

The Department is designating **KONSTANTIN IVANOVICH STRUKOV (STRUKOV)** and **PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY UZHURALZOLOTO GROUP OF COMPANIES (JSC UGC)**, one of Russia's top ten gold miners. STRUKOV is the founder and majority owner of JSC UGC and was sanctioned by the United Kingdom on November 8, 2023. STRUKOV and JSC UGC are both being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, STRUKOV, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MANAGEMENT COMPANY UGC** is owned by STRUKOV.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SOVRUDNIK** extracts metal ores and is owned by JSC UGC.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY KOMMUNAROVSKIY GOLD MINE** is involved in the mining of ores and sands of precious metals such as gold, silver, and platinum.

#### **Targeting A Russian Aluminum Products Producer**

The Department is designating **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SAMARA METALLURGICAL PLANT (SAMARA METALLURGICAL PLANT)**, a Russia-based firm that produces a broad assortment of aluminum products and is the largest producer of semi-fabricated aluminum products in Russia. SAMARA METALLURGICAL PLANT is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy. **MIKHAIL GRIGORYEVICH SPICHAK (SPICHAK)** is the General Director of the SAMARA METALLURGICAL PLANT and **MAXIM YURYEVICH SMIRNOV (SMIRNOV)** is the President of the SAMARA METALLURGICAL PLANT. Both SPICHAK and SMIRNOV are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy.

#### **Targeting A Key Russian Metals & Mining Network**

The Department is targeting a network of Russian mining companies connected to the wealthy Russian Trotsenko family believed to be close to President of Russia Vladimir Putin. The following entities are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **ILLC GEOPROMINING INVESTMENT** is involved in activities including security and commodity exchanges among other financial service activities.
- **LLC HOLDING GPM (HOLDING GPM)** is involved in activities including investments in securities and financial asset investing.

HOLDING GPM is the founder and majority owner of the following four entities which are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, HOLDING GPM, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

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- **LLC GEOPROMAINING**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KRYAZH INVEST**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GEOPROMAINING VERKHNE MENKECHE**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NATSIONALNAYA SURMYANAYA KOMPANIYA (NSK)**

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NSK, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GROSS** was founded and is owned by NSK.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY VISMUT** is primarily engaged in the mining and enrichment of iron ores.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY ZVEZDA** is primarily engaged in mining, milling, or otherwise preparing ferroalloy ores.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SARYLAKH SURMA** is primarily engaged in mining, milling, or otherwise preparing ferroalloy ores.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AEON MINING** is primarily engaged in the mining of ores and sands of precious metals.

#### **CONSTRAINING RUSSIA'S WAR EFFORT**

##### **Entities and Individuals Manufacturing Weapons, Ammunitions, and Other Equipment**

The Department is continuing to take significant action to disrupt and degrade Russia's military industrial base and today is targeting nearly 60 entities and individuals involved in the manufacture of weapons, ammunition, and associated materiel. The defense industry entities and individuals included below manufacture weapons, ammunition, and related equipment for the Russian defense sector to support its illegal war against Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY TULA MACHINE BUILDING PLANT (TULAMASHZAVOD)** is one of the largest enterprises of the Russian military industrial base manufacturing numerous gun systems for Russian armored vehicles, aircraft, and anti-aircraft systems.
- **EVGENII ANATOLEVICH DRONOV** is the Director General of TULAMASHZAVOD.
- **PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY IMPERIAL TULA ARMS PLANT (IMPERIAL TULA ARMS PLANT)** manufactures high-precision antitank guided missiles and various small arms for the Russian military.
- **GUN-MAKING COMPANY LEVSHA-T LLC** manufactures small arms and is wholly owned by IMPERIAL TULA ARMS PLANT.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION PRIBOR NAMED AFTER S.S. GOLEMBIOVSKY (JSC NPO PRIBOR)** is one of Russia's largest manufacturers of small-caliber ammunition and weapons systems for use by the Russian military.

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- **ALEKSANDR VIACHESLAVOVICH SYCHUGOV** is the General Director of JSC VAF.
- **FEDERAL STATE ENTERPRISE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION KAZAN PLANT OF PRECISION ENGINEERING (NPO KZTM)** manufactures explosives for the Russian defense industry.
- **JSC SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN BUREAU NAMED AFTER M SIMONOV (OKB SIMONOV)** develops and produces unmanned aerial systems and aerial training targets.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRIMIX (3MX)** manufactures electronic warfare systems and anti-UAV systems used by the Russian military.
- **CENTRAL RESEARCH RADIO ENGINEERING INSTITUTE NAMED AFTER ACADEMICIAN A I BERG (TSNIRTI BERG)** builds satellite and radar equipment for contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE EKHRAN (EKHRAN)** works on the development, production, testing, and repair of aviation equipment used by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY ARZAMAS MACHINE BUILDING PLANT (ARZAMAS)** manufactures armored vehicles used by the Russian military in Ukraine.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPANY (MIC)** develops and manufactures armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored cars for the Russian military.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SPECIAL DESIGN BUREAU OF TRANSPORT MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (SPETSMASH)** develops and manufactures armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other specialized equipment for the Russian military.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY ASTEIS** manufactures armored vehicles for the Russian defense industry.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY SPECIAL DESIGN BUREAU OF INSTRUMENT MAKING AND AUTOMATION (SKB PA)** develops and manufactures electro-hydraulic, electromechanical, navigation, and control systems for mobile robotic complexes for the Russian defense industry.
- **FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT (NPO BAZALT)** is involved in the design and construction of air launched ordnance, rocket propelled grenades, and armored fighting vehicle ammunition. NPO BAZALT was designated pursuant to E.O. 13662 on July 16, 2014.
- **OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO NOVO-VYATKA (NOVO-VYATKA)** manufactures various technical equipment with defense applications. NOVO-VYATKA was designated pursuant to E.O. 13662 on December 22, 2015.
- **NIKOLAY VLADIMIROVICH PORKHACHEV (PORKHACHEV)** is the General Director of NPO BAZALT, and was the temporary General Director of OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO NOVO-VYATKA.
- **FARID KHABIBULLOVICH ABDRAKHMANOV** is the General Director of JOINT STOCK COMPANY EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN BUREAU NOVATOR, which develops and produces cruise missiles, including the Kalibr cruise missile, and was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 in September 2023.

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- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRADING HOUSE LOBAEV ARMS (LOBAEV ARMS)** is a company registered in Russia that manufactures weapons and ammunition.
- **VLADISLAV YEVGENYEVICH LOBAEV (VLADISLAV LOBAEV)** is the founder of LOBAEV ARMS.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LOBAEV ROBOTICS (LOBAEV ROBOTICS)** is a company registered in Russia that manufactures weapons and ammunition.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CONSTRUCTION BUREAU OF INTEGRATED SYSTEMS (LLC KBIS)** is a company registered in Russia that produces weapons and ammunition.
- **ELENA ANATOLYEVNA LOBAEVA (ELENA LOBAEVA)** is a founder and owner of LLC KBIS.
- **FUND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES AND PRODUCTION LOBAEV FOUNDATION (LOBAEV FOUNDATION)** is registered in Russia and its programs include the development of precision small arms technologies, development of the production of precision weapons, development and modernization of specialized UAVs, and development and supply of special equipment.
- **NIKOLAY YEVGENYEVICH LOBAEV (NIKOLAY LOBAEV)** is a shareholder, director, and legal representative of LOBAEV ARMS.

#### **Entities Supporting Russia's Military Industrial Base**

The Department continues to designate entities involved in the development of advanced technologies and high-tech machine tools being used to substitute production of goods Russia can no longer import, as well as entities involved in the manufacture of weapons and ammunition supporting Russia's defense industry. The Department is designating the following entities involved in the development of additive manufacturing (3D printing) and computer numerical control (CNC) technologies, among other individuals and entities within the Russian military industrial base.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY ELEKTRONNAYA MOSKVA** is contracted to cover technical support and maintenance of Moscow's facial recognition system.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 2050 ADDITIVE TECHNOLOGIES** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ADDITIVE TECHNOLOGY** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OFFICE TECHNOLOGY JETCOM** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NPC ANTEY** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MAKETIR** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ENGINEERING CENTER OF ADDITIVE TECHNOLOGIES** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOVAPRINT 3D** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ONSINT** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TPK FOLIPLAST** is a Russia-based additive manufacturing company.

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- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SPRUT TECHNOLOGY** is a Russia-based company that develops software for computer numerical control machines.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CENTER SPRUT T** is a Russia-based company that develops software for computer numerical control machines.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DIAPAZON** is a supplier of electronic components throughout Russia.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY KLINTSOVSKIY MOBILE CRANE PLANT** is one of the largest and most reputable manufacturers of lifting equipment in Russia. The plant produces modern automobile and crawler cranes.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA MET** repairs metalworking machines and is involved in the sale of machinery and equipment.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA SKD** is involved in the sale of woodworking machines.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA TSENTR TEKHNOLOGI I SERVIS** is an industrial machinery and equipment wholesaler headquartered in Russia.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA SERVIS** repairs machinery and equipment.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PROIZVODSTVENNYE RESHENIYA** is involved in the machining of metal products, manufacture of metalworking machines, and manufactures of other machine tools.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY PROIZVODSTVENNOE OBEDINENIE FORT (JSC PO FORT)** operates in the machinery wholesale industry.
- **DIANA EVGENEVNA KALIEDINA** is the Director General of JSC PO FORT.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MACHINE BUILDING FACTORY FORT** is involved in the machining of metal products, manufacture of metalworking machines, and manufactures of other machine tools.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SASOVSKI LITEINY ZAVOD** operates in the casting of iron industry.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MANAGEMENT COMPANY ABAMET** is a Russia-based industrial machinery and equipment wholesale company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HERMLE VOSTOK** is a Russia-based industrial machinery and equipment wholesale company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ATM GRUPP** is a Russia-based machinery wholesale company that supplies CNC machines.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INZHENERNO TEKHNOLOGICHESKI TSENTR ATM** is a Russia-based machinery wholesale company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ATM TEKHNOLODZHI** is a Russia-based machinery wholesale company that supplies high-quality metalworking equipment.

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- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KNAUER ENGINEERING** is a Russia-based company that operates in the Industrial Machinery Repair and Maintenance industry.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AMS TEKHNIKA** is a Russia-based company involved in the wholesale distribution of industrial machinery and equipment.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY JOINT TECHNOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE PERM PLANT OF METAL WORKING CENTERS (PZMC)** manufactures CNC metalworking machines, lathes, turn-milling, and milling machines including the PROTON T series machines.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY MEKHANIKA** produces advanced industrial equipment for high-performance turning and milling of steels and alloys.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY KOVROV ELECTROMECHANICAL PLANT (KEMZ)** designs and manufactures a variety of multifunctional turning, milling, and turn-mill machining CNC machines and associated equipment.
- **AKSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO TOZ-METIZ** manufactures high-precision fasteners and other hardware for the Russian defense industry and is wholly owned by IMPERIAL TULA ARMS PLANT.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NATIONAL CENTRE FOR INFORMATION SECURITY** is a Russia-based company that develops counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems and develops information security systems that are used by multiple Russian government agencies.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEIT** is a Russia-based company and is involved in the wholesale trade of electronic equipment and its spare parts.

#### **Countering Russia-Iran Military Cooperation and Arms Proliferation**

The Department remains focused on highlighting and disrupting the ongoing military cooperation between Iran and Russia to further Russia's war efforts against Ukraine. In December 2022 and October 2023, we designated numerous Russian and Iranian entities for their involvement in the proliferation of arms including transfers of UAVs from Iran for Russia's use against Ukraine, conventional arms and related materiel from Iran to Russia, and major weapons systems from Russia to Iran, including the Yak-130 combat aircraft.

Today, we continue these efforts by designating the Iranian MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS (MODAFL) for the first time under a Russia-related sanctions authority, as well as two shipping companies that have previously been involved in arms related transfers between Iran and Russia. At least as of 2022, ROSOBORONEKSPORT OAO had worked through MODAFL to facilitate Iranian munitions transfers to Russia. Additionally, MODAFL worked with other Iranian military entities to facilitate the transfer of armed UAVs to Russia beginning in 2022. This action aligns with the Department of the Treasury's designations today of a network of entities and individuals that has supported efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation and MODAFL to establish a facility in Russia to supply the Russian military with one-way attack UAVs, such as the Shahed-136 UAVs, and the Russian version, the Geran-2, for use in Russia's war against Ukraine.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B), the following entity is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of ROSOBORONEKSPORT OAO, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS (MODAFL)** is the Iranian Ministry of Defense and has been involved in transfers of major weapons systems between Russia and Iran. MODAFL was previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13224, and E.O. 13949.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **DALIR LTD** is a Russian shipping company based in Astrakhan, Russia on the Caspian Sea. Additionally, DALIR LTD previously transported military-related cargo for delivery to the Iranian military on behalf of ROSOBORONEKSPORT OAO, Russia's sole state-controlled intermediary agency for exporting and importing the entire range of military, defense, and dual-use products, technologies, and services. ROSOBORONEKSPORT OAO is designated pursuant to E.O. 14024, E.O. 13949, E.O. 13582 and E.O. 13662.

- Pursuant to the Order, the following vessels are being identified as property in which DALIR LTD has an interest: **ALIREZA 1** and **BALTIYSKIY-111**. ALIREZA 1 and BALTIYSKIY-111 are general cargo ships.

- **LADOGA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LADOGA LTD)** is a Russian shipping company based in Astrakhan, Russia on the Caspian Sea. Additionally, LADOGA LTD vessels previously made port calls in Russian-occupied Crimea and transported military-related cargo for delivery to the Iranian military on behalf of ROSOBORONEKSPORT OAO.

- Pursuant to the Order, **SKIF-V** is being identified as property in which LADOGA LTD has an interest. SKIF-V is a general cargo ship.

#### **Disrupting Russia-DPRK Munitions Transfers**

The Department will continue to disrupt and expose arms transfers between the DPRK and Russia. As part of that ongoing effort, the Department is designating two additional entities that have been involved in the transfer of munitions from the DPRK to Russia. Since September 2023, the DPRK has delivered more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia.

Russia has imported shipping containers carrying military-related cargo from the DPRK through Vostochny Port for use in the Ukraine conflict since early October 2023. Specifically, more than 7,400 containers of munitions and munitions-related materials have been delivered to Russia through the VOSTOCHNAYA STEVEDORING COMPANY LLC (VSC)-owned terminal at Vostochny Port. Containers of munitions and munitions-related materials have also been delivered to Russia through the nearby DUNAY PROBABLE NAVAL MISSILE FACILITY.

These designations follow the Department's designations of several other entities and individuals involved in munitions transfers from the DPRK to Russia in July, September, and December 2023 as well as designations of entities involved in the transfer of ballistic missiles from the DPRK to Russia in January 2024.

*(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **VOSTOCHNAYA STEVEDORING COMPANY LLC (VSC)** manages a terminal at Vostochny Port in Russia's far east through which more than 7,400 containers of munitions and munitions-related materials have been delivered from the DPRK.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **DUNAY PROBABLE NAVAL MISSILE FACILITY** is a Russian naval base and port facility that has been involved in the transfer of munitions from the DPRK to Russia.

#### **Targeting Third-Party Support to Russia's Defense Sector**

The Department continues to be vigilant against entities and individuals in third countries that provide support to Russia's defense sector. Today's actions demonstrate that we will not hesitate to take action under all relevant authorities against those engaging in transactions with or providing other forms of support to Russia's defense sector.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JSC 558 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT** is a Belarusian defense company that maintains and repairs aircraft equipment and trains other personnel in the repair and operation of certain aviation materiel. JSC 558 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT retains close ties to the Russian defense sector and was previously designated pursuant to E.O. 14038 on February 24, 2022.
- **PAVEL IVANOVICH PINIGIN** is the former director of JSC 558 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT.
- **PRO HELI INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LIMITED (PRO HELI)** is a Uganda-based joint venture with the National Enterprises Corporation that provides maintenance, repair, and overhaul services for Uganda's fleet of Russian-origin helicopters. Additionally, PRO HELI maintains a partnership with the JSC 558 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT and has procured weapons from U.S.-designated Russian arms companies as recently as 2023.
- **VALERII COPEICHIN** is the CEO of PRO HELI and has previously been named in a United Nations report for involvement in weapons shipments to South Sudan.

#### **Continued Pressure on Private Military Companies**

The Department is continuing our efforts to expose and disrupt the activities of Russian private military companies and individuals supporting Russia's war aims against Ukraine. Despite the demise of the PMC Wagner's Yevgeniy Prigozhin, today's actions highlight our focus on countering the malign activities of such groups and individuals operating in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities and individual are being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:

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- **PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY CONVOY (PMC CONVOY)** is a private military company operating in Ukraine.
- **KONSTANTIN ALEXANDROVICH PIKALOV** is a leader of PMC CONVOY operating in Ukraine.
- **AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO KONSALT** is the new legal form of the PMC Wagner Center in Saint Petersburg, Russia.
- **ALEXEY VASILYEVICH TENSIN** is the former leader of PMC Wagner Center and a former manager at JSC Concern Kalashnikov.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(ii)(F), the following individuals are being designated for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, activities that undermine the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity of the United States, its allies, or its partners, for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **ANDREI NIKOLAEVICH TROSHEV** is a former senior leader of PMC Wagner and reportedly now holds a position in the Russian Ministry of Defense.
- **ANTON OLEGOVICH ELIZAREV** is a former commander in PMC Wagner.
- **STANISLAV ALEXANDROVICH ORLOV** is a commander of a private military company that has operated in Ukraine.
- **MIKHAIL VICTOROVICH TURKANOV** is a member of a private military company that has operated in Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, JOINT STOCK COMPANY BARNAUL CARTRIDGE PLANT, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **SHOOTING CENTER ALTAY SHOOTING LTD (SHOOTING CENTER ALTAY)** is a shooting range owned by JOINT STOCK COMPANY BARNAUL CARTRIDGE PLANT. Additionally, Shooting Center Altay reportedly has been used by PMC Wagner-affiliated individuals to conduct trainings.

#### **Continued Targeting of Russian State-Owned Enterprises**

The Department is further targeting Russian state-owned enterprises in the automotive sector, which continues to be a key aspect of the Russian military industrial base, as well as the state-owned enterprise involved in the development of the Russian Far East and Russian Arctic regions.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

**JOINT STOCK COMPANY FAR EAST AND ARCTIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (JSC KR DV)** is the management company responsible for coordinating investment projects in the Free Port of Vladivostok, the Special Administrative Region on Russky Island, and the advanced special economic zones in the Far Eastern and Arctic regions of Russia.

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The following ten entities are majority owned by JSC KR DV and coordinate future energy and mining projects, among others, in their respective titular region. Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), all ten entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, JSC KR DV:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV PRIMORYE**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV AMURSKAYA**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV BURYATIYA**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV CHUKOTKA**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV KAMCHATKA**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV MURMANSK**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV SAKHALIN AND KURILY**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV YAKUTIYA**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV YUZH NAYA YAKUTIYA**
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KR DV ZABAYKALYE**

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iv), the following entity is being designated for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE CENTRAL ORDER OF THE RED BANNER SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AUTOMOBILE AND AUTOMOTIVE ENGINES INSTITUTE NAMI (NAMI)** is the parent company of several entities conducting engineering research, manufacturing, and sales of automobiles in Russia. NAMI is included in a list of strategic enterprises essential for the national defense and security of Russia and is subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NAMI, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AUTO HOLDING (AUTO HOLDING)** is a Russia-based holding company owned by NAMI.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following NAMI-affiliated entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SHUSHARY AVTO** produces motor vehicles.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AURUS** produces motor vehicles.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FIBET NAMI ADVANCED ENGINEERING** is an automobile and auto parts company located in Russia and conducts sales of spare parts and accessories for cars and industrial vehicles.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NAMI INNOVATIVE COMPONENTS** produces components and accessories for motor vehicles.

#### **PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MALIGN ACTORS**

The Department is also taking further action today to target a range of individuals and entities involved in supporting the Russian government's war effort and other malign activities.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

#### **Targeting a Russian Proxy Authority in Occupied Territories of Ukraine**

**VITALIY VIKTOROVICH BULYUK (BULYUK)** is a so-called deputy head of the Russian-backed military-civilian administration of the Kherson Region. BULYUK is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(ii)(F) for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, activities that undermine the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity of the United States, its allies, or its partners, for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.

#### **Targeting Individuals Supporting Russia's Expropriation of Foreign Companies**

The Department continues to impose sanctions to highlight the Government of the Russian Federation's seizure of Russian subsidiaries of foreign companies.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following individuals are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **VASILI VLADISLAVOVICH NIKONOV** was appointed interim CEO of PJSC Unipro, the Russian subsidiary of Germany's Uniper that has been placed under "temporary control" by the Government of the Russian Federation.
- **VYACHESLAV EVGENEVICH KOZHEVNIKOV** was appointed the interim CEO of PAO Forward Energo, the Russian subsidiary of Finland's Fortum that has been placed under "temporary control" by the Government of the Russian Federation.

#### **Targeting Russia's Malign Influence in Moldova**

The Department is imposing sanctions on **MARINA TAUBER (TAUBER)**, chief representative in Moldova of **ILAN MIRONOVICH SHOR (SHOR)**, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order. During last year's local elections, TAUBER helped the fugitive, U.S.-sanctioned SHOR shift his party apparatus from the U.S.-sanctioned SHOR PARTY to other parties and subvert Moldova's electoral process through illegal vote buying on behalf of the Kremlin. SHOR has demonstrated his intent to use his malign criminal network, and TAUBER as his chief representative, to wage similar subversion campaigns in upcoming election cycles. Moldovans deserve free and fair democratic processes. The United States supports Moldova's progress on democratic and economic reforms and a future free from the grip of the Kremlin's malign influence. We will continue to promote accountability for those who try to subvert the will of the Moldovan electorate.

TAUBER is described as SHOR's second-in-command and has directed the operations of SHOR's malign networks in Moldova, as well as operations of the SHOR PARTY, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order. TAUBER is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SHOR, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order.

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#### The Network of Sergey Gordeev

**SERGEY EDUARDOVICH GORDEEV (GORDEEV)** is a Russian businessman whose ventures have benefitted from connections to SULIEMAN ABUSAIDOVICH KERIMOV and SERGEY SEMYONOVICH SOBYANIN, persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order. GORDEEV is the founder, general manager, and owner of LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HOLDING FINANCE. GORDEEV is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy. Additionally, two of GORDEEV's affiliated companies have allegedly been recruiting contract soldiers for Russia's war in Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HOLDING FINANCE (HOLDING FINANCE)** is involved in investments in securities and dealer activities.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PIK PLUS (PIK PLUS)** is involved in investments in securities and dealer activities.
- **INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LEDAMEN (LEDAMEN)** is located in Kaliningrad, Russia and is involved in investments in securities. Additionally, GORDEEV is the General Director of LEDAMEN.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INZHTEPLOPROGRESS (INZHTEP)** is a construction company located in Russia. INZHTEP is allegedly involved in the recruitment of contract soldiers for Russia's war in Ukraine.
- **PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY PIK SPECIALIZED HOMEBUILDER (PIK)** is a construction company located in Russia. Additionally, GORDEEV was the head of PIK until September 28, 2022.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PIK, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PIK KORPORATSIYA (PIK KORPORATSIYA)** is a wholly owned subsidiary of PIK and is involved in construction activities.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PIK KORPORATSIYA, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PIK GENPODRYAD (GENPODRYAD)** is majority owned by PIK KORPORATSIYA.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, GENPODRYAD, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

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- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PIK KORPORATSIYA (PIK KORPORATSIYA)** is a wholly owned subsidiary of PIK and is involved in construction activities.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PIK KORPORATSIYA, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PIK GENPODRYAD (GENPODRYAD)** is majority owned by PIK KORPORATSIYA.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, GENPODRYAD, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GENERAL CONTRACTOR MFS (GP-MFS)** is owned by GENPODRYAD. GP-MFS is allegedly involved in the recruitment of contract soldiers for Russia's war in Ukraine.

#### The Network of Andrey Komarov

**ANDREY ILYICH KOMAROV (KOMAROV)** is a Russian businessman active in various sectors of the Russian Federation economy. Ministry of Trade and Industry officials within the Government of the Russian Federation have planned to use ANDREY KOMAROV as a front man to acquire companies for Rostec. KOMAROV is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy. KOMAROV is also the founder and owner of **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SEPTEMBER (SEPTEMBER)**, which is active in the construction sector. SEPTEMBER is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KOMAROV, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OKTYABR (OKTYABR)** is solely owned by KOMAROV and is a facilities management company for KOMAROV's companies.

The Department is taking action to target a wide range of additional entities connected to KOMAROV's corporate network.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CYBERSTEEL (CYBERSTEEL)** is one of Russia's leading suppliers of stainless-steel tubular products.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CYBERSTEEL ALABUGA (CYBERSTEEL ALABUGA)** is involved in the manufacturing of steel pipes, hollow profiles and fittings.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CYBERSTEEL PROJECT 2 (CYBERSTEEL PROJECT 2)** is involved in the manufacturing of steel pipes, hollow profiles and fittings.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HS INVESTMENTS (HS INVESTMENTS)** is a Russia-based holding company.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HS INVESTMENTS, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRESSMAN SOFT PACKAGING NOVGOROD** is involved in the manufacturing of other paper and cardboard products in Velikiy Novgorod, Russia.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRESSMAN PREMIUM PACKAGING NOVGOROD (PRESSMAN PREMIUM PACKAGING NOVGOROD)** is a Russia-based company that operates in the paper product manufacturing industry.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRESSMAN PREMIUM PACKAGING SPB (PRESSMAN PREMIUM PACKAGING SPB)** manufactures paper and cardboard products in Saint Petersburg, Russia.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY START (START)** is a Russia-based holding company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HYPERSPACE (HYPERSPACE)** is a Russia-based holding company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY THREEAGRO (THREEAGRO)** is a Russia-based holding company.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GORA GOLDEN RATIO (GORA)** is a Russia-based holding company.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GORA GOLDEN RATIO, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KAMCHATSKAYA GORNAYA KOMPANIYA** is a Russia-based company that was founded by and is solely owned by GORA.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TIKHOOKEANSKAYA GORNAYA KOMPANIYA** is a Russia-based company that was founded by and is solely owned by GORA.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the accounting sector of the Russian Federation economy:

**LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DIGITAL CENTER HYPERSPACE** is a Russia-based company that operates in the accounting and tax preparation industry.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ZHELTUGINSKAYA MINING COMPANY (ZHELTUGINSKAYA)** is a Russia-based company that is involved in the mining of ore and precious metal dusts.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RIMERA ALNAS (RIMERA ALNAS)** is a Russia-based company that operates in the machinery and equipment manufacturing industry.
- **PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY IZHNEFTEMASH (IZHNEFTEMASH)** is a Russia-based company that operates in the machinery and equipment manufacturing industry.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RIMERA (LLC RIMERA)** is a Russia-based company that operates in the machinery and equipment manufacturing industry.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following are being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy.

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FEDOROVO MINERALZ** is a holding company in Russia majority owned by START.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FEDOROVO KHOLDING** is a holding company in Russia.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY BYSTRINSKAYA MINING COMPANY** is a Russia-based company that is involved in the mining of ores of other non-ferrous metals, as well as mining of ores and sands of precious metals.
- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY FEDOROVO RISORSES** is a Russia-based company involved in mining of ores of other non-ferrous metals.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the management consulting sector of the Russian Federation economy:

- **JOINT STOCK COMPANY RIMERA (JSC RIMERA)** is a Russia-based company that provides consulting services.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, JSC RIMERA, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RIMERA SERVIS (RIMERA SERVIS)** is a Russia-based company solely owned by JSC RIMERA that provides services to oil and natural gas companies.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY API FAKTORI (API FAKTORI)** is a Russia-based company solely owned by JSC RIMERA that conducts research and development in natural sciences and engineering.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HYPERSPACE TECHNOLOGIES (HYPERSPACE TECHNOLOGIES)** is a Russia-based company solely owned by JSC RIMERA that conducts computer programming activities.

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Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HYPERSPACE, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Order:

- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VARNA MINERALS** is a Russia-based company solely owned by HYPERSPACE involved in geological exploration and geochemical studies.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GEYSER GOLD** is a Russia-based company solely owned by HYPERSPACE involved in geological exploration and geochemical studies.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DATA 51** is a Russia-based company solely owned by HYPERSPACE involved in geological exploration and geochemical studies.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INNOVATIVE EDUCATION** is a Russia-based company solely owned by HYPERSPACE involved in real estate management.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TERRA GRUP** is a Russia-based company solely owned by HYPERSPACE involved in land purchasing and sales.
- **LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY URAL EDUCATIONAL RESIDENCE** is a Russia-based company solely owned by HYPERSPACE involved in real estate management.
- **Targeting Individuals Involved in the Forced Transfer, Deportation, and/or “Re-education” of Ukraine’s Children**

The Department continues to impose sanctions on persons involved in the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukraine’s children to camps promoting indoctrination of children in Russia, Belarus, and Russia-occupied Crimea. Today’s actions demonstrate the United States’ commitment to promoting accountability for the atrocities and other abuses inflicted by the Government of the Russian Federation on the people of Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(ii)(F), the following individuals are being designated for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, activities that undermine the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity of the United States, its allies, or its partners, for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **BORIS VYACHESLAVOVICH GRYZLOV (GRYZLOV)** is the current Russian Ambassador to Belarus and is involved in transferring Ukrainian children to Belarus. GRYZLOV has stated that children will continue to be deported from Ukraine as a part of the official policy of the Government of the Russian Federation.
- **DMITRIY FEDOROVICH MEZENTSEV (MEZENTSEV)** is the Secretary of State of the Union State between Belarus and Russia. MEZENTSEV is Russia’s former Ambassador to Belarus and has personally helped organize the transportation of children from Ukraine to Belarus. MEZENTSEV announced a resolution from the Union State to “host” 1,050 children from Ukraine in Belarus and has visited camps where deported children from Ukraine are staying.

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- **ALEXEY KONSTANTINOVICH TALAI (TALAI)** and his foundation have orchestrated the transport of multiple groups of children from Ukraine to Belarus. The deportations to Belarus have been funded by the Union State, an economic and political union between Moscow and Minsk. The Union State had already given tens of millions of rubbles to support TALAI’s efforts.
- **ALLA VIKTOROVNA BARKHATNOVA (BARKHATNOVA)** is the so-called Head of the Department of Labor and Social Policy of Russia’s occupation administration in Kherson and stated that occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast are working to increase the number of children who go on “trips” to “health recreation” camps in Russia. BARKHATNOVA is also identified as being personally involved in the transportation of Ukrainian children.
- **VITALIY KONSTANTINOVICH GANCHEV** is the Head of the Military-Civilian Administration of Russia’s occupation administration in the Kharkiv Region and is identified as being one of the individuals involved in deporting and “re-educating” Ukrainian children.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(A), the following individuals are being designated for being or having been leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation:

- **VLADIMIR VIKTOROVICH KHROMOV (KHROMOV)** is a Representative for the Commissioner of Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation and is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children from Russia-occupied regions of Ukraine.
- **AKHMED MAKHMUDOVICH DUDAEV (DUDAEV)** is the Minister of National Policy, Foreign Relations, Press and Information of Chechnya and organized trips to deport Ukrainian children.

Imposing Visa Restrictions on Russian Federation-installed Purported Authorities Involved in Human Rights Abuses in Connection with the Transfer, Deportation and Confinement of Ukraine’s Children

Additionally, the Department is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on five Russia-installed purported officials, including one immediate family member, for their involvement in human rights abuses of Ukrainian civilian minors, in connection with the transfer, deportation, and confinement of Ukraine’s children by Russian Federation and Russia-backed authorities.

*(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

This action is taken under the Immigration and Nationality Act 212(a)(3)(C) visa policy approved by Secretary Blinken in May 2022 to restrict visa issuance to Russian Federation military officials and Russia-backed or Russia-installed purported authorities who are believed to have been involved in human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, or public corruption in Ukraine, and immediate family members of such individuals, as appropriate.

#### **SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS**

As a result of today's sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with E.O. 14024, as amended, all property and interests in property of the sanctioned persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all individuals or entities that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.

All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.

Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: [OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov](mailto:OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov). Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State's [Delisting Guidance](#) page. For more information on E.O. 14024, [as amended](#), see [full text](#).

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### **U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo Announces Key Executive Leadership at U.S. AI Safety Institute The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) at Commerce will house the U.S. AI Safety Institute.**

February 07, 2024

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo announced today key members of the executive leadership team to lead the U.S. AI Safety Institute (AISI), which will be established at the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). Raimondo named Elizabeth Kelly to lead the institute as its inaugural director and Elham Tabassi to serve as chief technology officer. The U.S. AI Safety Institute was established under NIST at the direction of President Biden to support the responsibilities assigned to the Department of Commerce under the president's landmark Executive Order.

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

"I am confident that under the leadership of Elizabeth Kelly, and Elham Tabassi, the U.S. AI Safety Institute will be well positioned to develop the measurement science needed to promote safe and trustworthy development of AI," said Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and NIST Director Laurie E. Locascio.

"The Safety Institute's ambitious mandate to develop guidelines, evaluate models, and pursue fundamental research will be vital to addressing the risks and seizing the opportunities of AI. I am thrilled to work with the talented NIST team and the broader AI community to advance our scientific understanding and foster AI safety. While our first priority will be executing the tasks assigned to NIST in President Biden's executive order, I look forward to building the institute as a long-term asset for the country and the world," said Elizabeth Kelly, special assistant to the president for economic policy.

"The USAISI will advance American leadership globally in responsible AI innovations that will make our lives better. We must have a firm understanding of the technology, its current and emerging capabilities, and limitations. NIST is taking the lead to create the science, practice, and policy of AI safety and trustworthiness. I am thrilled to be part of this remarkable team, leading the effort to develop science-based, and empirically backed guidelines and standards for AI measurement and policy," said Elham Tabassi, chief AI advisor for NIST.

#### **ITA Forecasts More than 15% Increase of International Visitors to the United States in 2024**

The International Trade Administration released the U.S. government's official forecast of international visitation to the United States. ITA's National Travel and Tourism Office forecasts the total volume of international visitation to the United States to increase to 77.7 million in 2024, up 10.4 million, or 15.4% from 67.3 million visitors in 2023. NTTO also estimates international visitation to reach 85.2 million in 2025, surpassing pre-pandemic 2019 visitation of 79.4 million.

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#### **U.S. Department of State Concludes \$51 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by The Boeing Company**

*02/29/2024 03:59 PM EST*

Office of the Spokesperson

The U.S. Department of State has concluded an administrative settlement with The Boeing Company (Boeing) to resolve 199 violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR parts 120-130. The Department of State and Boeing reached this settlement following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

*(\*Continued On The Following Page)*

The administrative settlement between the Department of State and Boeing, concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses Boeing's unauthorized exports and retransfers of technical data to foreign-person employees and contractors; unauthorized exports of defense articles, including unauthorized exports of technical data to the People's Republic of China, a proscribed destination under ITAR § 126.1; and violations of license terms, conditions, and provisos of Directorate of Defense Trade Controls authorizations.

All of the alleged violations were voluntarily disclosed, and a considerable majority predate 2020. Boeing cooperated with the Department's review of this matter and has incorporated numerous improvements to its compliance program since the conduct at issue. Under the terms of the 36-month Consent Agreement, Boeing will pay a civil penalty of \$51 million. The Department has agreed to suspend \$24 million of this amount on the condition that the funds will be used for the Department-approved Consent Agreement remedial compliance measures to strengthen Boeing's compliance program. In addition, for an initial period of at least 24 months, Boeing will engage an external Special Compliance Officer to oversee the Consent Agreement, which will also require two external audits of its ITAR compliance program and implement additional compliance measures.

The settlement demonstrates the Department's role in furthering the national security and foreign policy of the United States by controlling the export of defense articles. The settlement also highlights the importance of exporting defense articles only pursuant to appropriate authorization from the Department. The Consent Agreement and related documents will be available for public inspection in the [Public Reading Room of the Department of State](#) and on the [Penalties and Oversight Agreements](#) section of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls' website.

For additional information, please contact the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Congressional and Public Affairs at [pm-cpa@state.gov](mailto:pm-cpa@state.gov)  
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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

February 29, 2024  
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**BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY**

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs  
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**Citing National Security Concerns, Biden-Harris Administration Announces Inquiry into Connected Vehicles**

***U.S. Department of Commerce Begins Regulatory Process to Consider National Security Risks Posed by ICTS Integral to Connected Vehicles***

***The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Seeks Information Regarding the Security of Connected Vehicles with PRC Technology in the U.S.***

*(\*Continued On The Following Column)*

**WASHINGTON, D.C.** – Today, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment to inform the potential development of regulations to secure and safeguard the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) supply chain for connected vehicles (CVs).

“It doesn't take a lot of imagination to think of how foreign government with access to connected vehicles could pose a serious risk to both our national security and the personal privacy of U.S. citizens,” said **U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo**. “To assess these national security concerns, we are issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to investigate the national security risks of connected vehicles, specifically PRC-manufactured technology in the vehicles. We need to understand the extent of the technology in these cars that can capture wide swaths of data or remotely disable or manipulate connected vehicles, so we are soliciting information to determine whether to take action under our ICTS authorities.”

“While we benefit greatly from the shift to a more digital and connected world, those connections create new avenues for espionage and sabotage. We must remain vigilant in identifying and securing those vulnerabilities, including potential vulnerabilities present in connected vehicles,” said **Under Secretary for Industry and Security Alan Estevez**. “Today's action demonstrates that we are taking thoughtful, deliberative, proactive steps to address concerns that connected vehicles may present for U.S. national security.”

The ANPRM explains how the incorporation of foreign adversary ICTS in CVs can create risks, for example, by offering a direct entry point to sensitive U.S. technology and data or by bypassing measures intended to protect U.S. persons' safety and security. In such cases, ICTS provided by persons or entities owned, controlled, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary may pose undue risks to critical infrastructure in the United States and unacceptable risks to national security. The People's Republic of China presents a particularly acute and persistent threat to the U.S. ICTS supply chain related to CVs.

This ANPRM demonstrates the Biden-Harris Administration's proactive efforts to address the potential national security risks associated with the ICTS integral to CVs and is a significant step in advancing the ICTS mission.

In this ANPRM, the Department seeks feedback on a number of issues, including: definitions; how potential classes of ICTS transactions integral to CVs may present undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security; implementation mechanisms to address these risks through potential prohibitions or, where feasible, mitigation measures; and whether to create a process for the public to request approval to engage in an otherwise prohibited transaction by demonstrating that the risk to U.S. national security is sufficiently mitigated in the context of a particular transaction.

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**About the Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS):**

Today's ANPRM is being issued pursuant to the authorities established under Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain" (May 15, 2019). E.O. 13873 delegates to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) authority to prohibit or impose mitigation measures on any ICTS transaction subject to United States jurisdiction that poses undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security or to U.S. persons.

The ICTS program became a mission of BIS in 2022. OICTS is charged with implementing a series of E.O.s under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) focused on protecting domestic information and communications systems from threats posed by foreign adversaries

**MISSION STATEMENT:**

***Given the geopolitical state of affairs with China, Russia, and Crimea, the Occupied territories of UKRAINE, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, embargoed countries and other specific threatening end users and entities, located in the United States and around the globe;***

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