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U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney's Office
For Immediate Release
Defendant Sentenced in Conspiracy to Export Military Aircraft Parts to Iran
MIAMI, FL. - Jeffrey H. Sloman, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern
District of Florida, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National
Security, Michael Johnson, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Export Enforcement, Anthony V.Mangione, Special Agent in Charge, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and Amie R.
Tanchak, Resident Agent in Charge, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Criminal
Investigative Service, announced today that defendant Traian Bujduveanu was
sentenced in Miami federal court for his role in a conspiracy to illegally
export military and dual use aircraft parts to Iran. Bujduveanu's co-defendant,
Hassan Keshari, and his corporation, Kesh Air
International, were sentenced in May 2009.
U. S. District Court Judge Patricia Seitz sentenced Bujduveanu to thirty-five
(35) months' imprisonment, followed by three (3) years of supervised release. Bujduveanu
pled guilty on April 2, 2009, to Count 1 of the Indictment, which charged
conspiracy to export and cause the export of goods from the U.S. to the Islamic
Republic Iran, in violation of the Embargo imposed upon that country by the U.S.
and in violation of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Title 50, United States Code,
1705(a), and to export and cause to be exported defense articles, in violation
of the Arms Export Control Act, Title 22, United States Code, Section 2778(b),
all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.
As part of his plea, Bujduveanu, a Romanian national and naturalized U.S.
citizen, admitted that he used his Plantation, FL, corporation, Orion Aviation,
to sell aircraft parts to Keshari for purchasers in Iran and exported the
aircraft parts to Iran by way of freight forwarders in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates. Among the aircraft parts illegally exported to Iran through the
conspiracy were parts designed exclusively for the F-14 Fighter Jet, the Cobra
AH-1 Attack Helicopter, and the CH-53A Military Helicopter. All of these
aircraft are part of the Iranian military fleet, while the F-14 is known to be
used exclusively by the Iranian military. Moreover, all of the parts supplied
by Bujduveanu as part of the conspiracy are manufactured in the U.S., are
designed exclusively for military use, and have been designated by the U.S.
Department of State as "defense articles" on the U.S. Munitions List, thus
requiring registration and licensing with the Department of State, Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls. Neither Bujduveanu nor his co-defendants are
registered or had the required licenses to ship defense articles to Iran.
According to the Indictment and statements and documents filed with the court,
Bujduveanu received orders by email from Keshari requesting specific aircraft
parts for buyers in Iran. Bujduveanu then provided quotes, usually by e-mail,
to Keshari. After the receipt of payment for the parts from Keshari, Bujduveanu
then the parts to a company in Dubai through the use of false or misleading
shipping document. From Dubai, the parts were then shipped on to the purchasers
in Iran.
Bujduveanu has been in federal custody since his arrest in June 2008.
A copy of this press release may be found on the website of the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida at www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls.
Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida at
www.flsd.uscourts.gov or
http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov.
New York Bank Settles Allegations of Antiboycott Violations
WASHINGTON –
The U.S. Department of Commerce today announced that Gulf International Bank
(New York), the U S branch of Gulf International Bank, headquartered in Bahrain,
has agreed to pay a civil penalty of $49,850 to settle allegations that it
violated the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR).
“The Department of Commerce will continue to aggressively enforce its
regulations prohibiting U.S. companies from taking any action in support of
restrictive trade practices or unsanctioned boycotts,” Kevin Delli-Colli, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, said.
The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), through its
Office of Antiboycott Compliance, alleged that, on eight occasions during the
years 2002 through 2004, the Bank, in connection with transactions involving the
sale and transfer of goods from the United States to Syria, furnished prohibited
information about another person’s business relationship with a company known or
believed to be restricted from having any business relationship with Syria or in
another boycotting country.
BIS also alleged that the Bank, on seventeen occasions during the same time
frame, failed to report to the Department of Commerce its receipt of a request
to engage in a restrictive trade practice or boycott and, on one occasion,
failed to maintain records, as required by the EAR.
The antiboycott provisions of the EAR prohibit U.S. persons from complying with
certain requirements of unsanctioned foreign boycotts, including furnishing
information about business relationships with or in a boycotted country or with
blacklisted persons. In addition, the EAR requires that persons report their
receipt of certain boycott requests to the Department of Commerce.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY
Wednesday, May 27th, 2009
Office of Public Affairs
www.bis.doc.gov
202-482-2721
BIS Amends EAR to Address Security and
Competitiveness Issues with Thermal Imaging Cameras
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) today published an amendment to the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) that recalibrates controls on uncooled thermal imaging cameras
to address security and competitiveness issues. These cameras have commercial
and military applications, including firefighting, predictive/ preventive
maintenance, medical, perimeter monitoring, and targeting.
"This revision of the EAR will allow U.S. camera companies to more effectively
compete in their major markets with foreign manufacturers while ensuring
appropriate U.S. government review and oversight over commercial cameras used
for military purposes," said Matthew S. Borman, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Export Administration.
Specifically, the EAR amendment:
recognizes the availability of foreign commercial cameras and streamlines
controls on exports of certain levels of commercial uncooled thermal imaging
cameras to destinations in the European Union and certain other Wassenaar
members; establishes a mechanism for streamlining controls on higher-level,
civil consumer-ready commercial uncooled thermal imaging cameras; establishes a
process for streamlining controls on commercial uncooled thermal imaging cameras
to be incorporated into civil products by civil integrators; and
controls the reexport of foreign-made military products incorporating U.S.
commercial uncooled thermal imaging cameras.
BACKGROUND
BIS works to advance U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic
objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system
and by promoting continued U.S. strategic technology leadership.
From The State Department
May 26, 2009
Reminder Regarding
License Preparation Guidelines for Transactions Involving Statutorily Debarred
Electro-Glass Products and ITT Night Vision Division
All license applications related to the export of U.S.
Munitions List Category XII defense articles manufactured by statutorily
debarred Electro-Glass Products and/or ITT Night Vision Division of ITT
Corporation MUST list these entities as a source or manufacturer on the
application or the application will be returned without action for correction.
The export license applications involving these manufacturers must also be
supported by a transaction exception letter meeting the criteria found on the
DDTC Licensing website (http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/guidelines_instructions.html)
entitled “Electro-Glass Products: Information for Exporters and ITT Night Vision
Debarment: Information for Exporters.”
From the State Department- Defense Trade Controls:
Requirement for Full Execution of
Agreements/Amendments Prior to Export or Temporary Import
This notice is to inform applicants that the format for
Agreement and Amendment Approval Letters issued by DTCL has been
modified to specifically address the requirement that “No U.S.
signatories may export or temporarily import defense articles, technical
data or defense services against an agreement until all parties have
executed the agreement.”
This modification has been made to the preamble of the approval letter
for agreements and amendments issued to the applicant from this office
and reads as follows:
Dear Applicant:
The Department of State approves the request as identified subject to
the limitations, provisos and requirements stated below as well as the
requirements contained in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation.
This agreement may not enter into force until these requirements have
been satisfied. No U.S. signatories may export or temporarily import
defense articles, technical data or defense services against this
agreement until all parties have executed the agreement.
Purpose of Modification:
On December 12, 2008, Agreement and Amendment Approval Letters
issued by DTCL were revised to eliminate redundancy and enhance clarity
by minimizing informative and acknowledgement provisos. As part of that
revision, a proviso specifying that exports or temporarily imports
against the agreement were not authorized until all parties have
executed the agreement was removed, being deemed an informative proviso.
Since this revision, DTCL has received numerous queries as to whether a
fully executed agreement was still required prior to export or temporary
import, noting the requirement is not clearly described within the
International Traffic In Arms Regulation (ITAR).
This modification is necessary to ensure applicants are properly
informed of the requirement to fully execute agreements and amendments
prior to export or temporary import of defense articles, technical data
or defense services in furtherance of the agreement or amendment.
Implementation:
Effective March 18, 2009, this revision will be included in all
agreement and amendment approval letter issued by DTCL. Specific
revisions to individual approval letters issued between December 12,
2008 and March 18, 2009 will not be published. A copy of this notice
should be included with approval letters in cases where a specific
revision is desired.
The average processing time for ITAR licenses is
now 15 days. See metric
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/metrics/index.html
BIS reports increase in company voluntary self-disclosures
Despite the fact that exporters risk increased
penalties for wrongdoing, the U.S. Commerce Department?s Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) has found no shortage of companies making
voluntary self-disclosures of U.S. export control violations. Most of
the closed cases involving voluntary self-disclosures resulted only in a
warning letter and no penalties, but Kevin Delli-Colli, acting assistant
secretary for export enforcement, announced that taking this action
doesn?t mean companies avoid penalties altogether. ?Certain cases
deserve some consequences.? www.americanshipper.com
(3/11/09)
BIS improving Entity List
Recently senior officials with the U.S.
Commerce Department?s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) noted
progress with how the agency is managing its new Entity List regulation.
Matt Borman, acting assistant secretary for export administration,
reported to industry members of the Regulations and Procedures Technical
Advisory Committee that the regulation is ?working as intended.? The
Entity List provides notice to the public that certain exports and
re-exports to parties identified on the Entity List require a license
from BIS and that availability of license exceptions in such
transactions is limited. The parties on the list are determined by the
U.S. government to be acting contrary to the national security or
foreign policy interests of the United States. The current Entity List
includes names of shell companies initially set up to illegally procure
U.S. exports. Once the agency targets them, the operations tend to
disappear.
www.americanshipper.com (3/11/09)
BIS posts major case list
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
issued its March 2009 listing of its most significant cases. Comprised
of two sections this case list provides new additions to the List,
followed by major cases from the last several years.
BIS List (March 2009)
http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/majorcaselist/mcl032009.pdf
March 24th, 2009
3 Irish men charged with exporting military equipment to Iran
Posted: 05:00 PM ET
By Terry Frieden
CNN Justice Producer
WASHINGTON (CNN) — Three Irish men and their arms trading company have
been charged with illegally exporting U.S.-made aircraft equipment
through other countries to avoid sanctions against selling aircraft
parts and equipment to Iran, the Justice Department announced Tuesday.
The 25-count indictment unsealed Tuesday in federal court in Washington
says three top corporate officials of Mac Aviation of Ireland had
trans-shipped millions of dollars worth of helicopter engines, aircraft
components and other military parts through Malaysia and the United Arab
Emirates to Iran.
CNN was unable to reach Mac Aviation, in Drumcliffe, Ireland, for
comment.
Although the three men are not currently in custody in Ireland, U.S.
officials said the charges will come as no surprise to the defendants.
U.S. authorities say they intend to seek extradition of the men to face
charges, and potentially lengthy prison sentences.
According to the indictment Thomas McGuinn, his son Sean McGuinn and
Sean Byrne conspired from 2005 to 2008 to buy parts from Rolls Royce
Corp. in Indiana, Pratt & Whitney in Connecticut and other U.S.
suppliers and secretly sell them to Iranian entities controlled by
Iran’s Ministry of Defense.
U.S. investigators say the equipment was routed through third countries,
including Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates, to Iranian companies.
Iranian companies — including the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial
Company, known by its Iranian acronym HESA — received 17 Rolls Royce
helicopter engines worth $4.27 million, according to the indictment.
The U.S. Treasury Department designated HESA as a proliferator of
weapons of mass destruction last year, saying it was controlled by
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The Treasury
Department said HESA also has provided support to the Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
The engine in question — called the “model 250″ by Rolls Royce — was
originally designed for a U.S. Army light observation helicopter, but
has since been installed in other helicopters, both civilian and
military.
The indictment also alleges that 50 components called “5th stage vanes”
— part of an aircraft’s aerodynamic function — were shipped from Pratt &
Whitney to Mac Aviation, and from there routed to Iran Aircraft
Industries in Tehran. Mac Aviation had claimed that the parts’ final
destination was Belgium, the indictment says. The parts were valued at
about $140,000.
Finally, the indictment alleges that Mac Aviation had 32 aircraft bolts
worth about $2,200 shipped from Texas to Dubai and then on to Kish
Island, Iran.
U.S. officials say the indictments are an outgrowth of the ongoing
investigation of a larger Iranian procurement network run by Hossein
Khoshnevisrad, an Iranian citizen arrested March 14 in San Francisco.
Khoshnevisrad allegedly used Mac Aviation and other firms around the
globe to help obtain sensitive U.S. technology destined for Iranian
militaries entities.
U.S. sanctions bar the sale of any aircraft parts to Iran, which many
analysts believe has led to increasingly unsafe aircraft in the Islamic
Republic.
The defendants are charged with two counts each of conspiracy, 19 counts
of violating the regulations restricting transactions with Iran and four
counts of false statement.
If convicted, they face 10 to 20 years in prison for each of the
regulatory violations, five to 20 years for each of the conspiracy
counts and five years for each false-statement count.
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